

# Sharing Multimedia on the Internet and the Impact for Online Privacy



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On average, how often are you posting images and videos on the Internet (e.g. Facebook, Flickr, Craigslist)?

a) Never



- a) Never
- b) About once a month or less



- a) Never
- b) About once a month or less
- c) About once a week



- a) Never
- b) About once a month or less
- c) About once a week
- d) About once a day



- a) Never
- b) About once a month or less
- c) About once a week
- d) About once a day
- e) More than once a day



## A Popular Introduction to the Problem









How would you judge the issue raised by Colbert? a) It's a comedy. I don't worry about any of this.



- a) It's a comedy. I don't worry about any of this.
- b) There is some truth to it but its mostly exaggarated.



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- c) It's a comedy depection of the reality but most of the stuff is becoming an issue.



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- c) It's a comedy depection of the reality but most of the stuff is becoming an issue.
- d) He only touched a small part of the problem. The actual issues are even more serious.



### **SU** Our Observations



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- Many Internet sites and mobile apps encourage sharing of data too easily and users follow.
- •Users **and** even engineers often unaware of (hidden) search and retrieval possibilities of shared data.
- Local privacy protection ineffective against inference across web-sites.





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- Governments improve search and retrieval to do forensics and intelligence gathering



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•The previous described issues are a problem with any type of public or semipublic posts and are not specific to a certain type of information, e.g. text, image, or video.



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- •The previous described issues are a problem with any type of public or semipublic posts and are not specific to a certain type of information, e.g. text, image, or video.
- However, let's focus on multimedia data: images, audio, video.





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• Twitter: up to 120M messages per day





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- But multimedia retrieval is hard
  - →Researchers work on making retrieval better.
  - →Industry develops workarounds to make retrieval easier right away.



### Hypothesis



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- Let's take a look at some retrieval approaches:
  - Geotagging
  - Multimodal Location Estimation
  - Audio-based user matching



# Workaround: Manual Tagging



# Workaround: Geotagging


INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SCIENCE INSTITUTE












Source: Wikipedia



### **Geo-Tagging**



Allows easier clustering of photo and video series as well as additional services.



### Support for Geo-Tags

Social media portals provide APIs to connect geo-tags with metadata, accounts, and web content.

Portal	%	Total
YouTube (estimate)	3.0	3M
Flickr	4.5	180M

Allows easy search, retrieval, and ad placement.




#### **Related Work**



"Be careful when using social location sharing services, such as FourSquare."



#### **Related Work**



Mayhemic Labs, June 2010: "Are you aware that Tweets are geo-tagged?"







Did you know about geo-tagging and its potential?

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- a) I had never heard about geo-tagging before.
- b) I knew about geo-tagging but never thought about what it could be used for.
- c) I knew about geo-tagging and knew the potential for photo organization and retrieval
- d) I know about geo-tagging, it's use and the privacy risks.
- e) I only heard about privacy risks of geo-tagging but never really thought about what it is good for.





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What if multimedia retrieval actually worked?



G. Friedland and R. Sommer: "Cybercasing the Joint: On the Privacy Implications of Geotagging", Proceedings of the Fifth USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec 10), Washington, D.C, August 2010. 19



• Cybercasing: Using online (location-based) data and services to enable real-world attacks.

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  - "Secret" office



SPORTS

BALLS

**SPORTS** 


BALLS

Pictures in Tweats can be see located


From a te found:

- Home lo

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# Celebs unaware of Geo-**Tagging** twitpic

Click here to login or



Working with the very talented Adam Hamilton on creating a new album. My best. Bill



#### EXIF IFD1

- Compression {0x0103} = JPEG compression (6)
- X-Resolution {0x011A} = 4718592/65536 ===> 72
- Y-Resolution {0x011B} = 4718592/65536 ===> 72
- X/Y-Resolution Unit {0x0128} = inch (2)
- Y/Cb/Cr Positioning (Subsampling) {0x0213} = centered / center of pixel array (1)
- Embedded thumbnail image:




#### EXIF GPS IFD

- GPS Version ID {0x00} = 0x02,0x02,0x00,0x00
- GPS Latitude Reference {0x01} = N
- GPS Latitude {0x02} = 34/1,12/1,3/1 [degrees, minutes, seconds] ===> 34° 12′ 3″ == 34.200833°
- GPS Longitude Reference {0x03} = W
- GPS Longitude {0x04} =

[degrees, minutes, seconds] ===>



## Google Maps shows Address...





### Case Study 2: Craigslist

"For Sale" section of Bay Area <u>Craigslist.com</u>: 4 days: 68729 pictures total, 1.3% geo-tagged

#	Model	#	Model
414	iPhone 3G	6	Canon PowerShot SD780
287	iPhone 3GS	3	MB200
98	iPhone	2	LG LOTUS
32	Droid	2	HERO200
26	SGH-T929	2	BlackBerry 9530
20	Nexus One	1	RAPH800
9	SPH-M900	1	N96
9	RDC-i700	1	DMC-ZS7
6	T-Mobile G1	1	BlackBerry 9630





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- Sometimes selling high-valued goods, e.g. cars, diamonds




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- Sometimes "call Sunday after 6pm"



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- Sometimes selling high-valued goods, e.g. cars, diamonds
- Sometimes "call Sunday after 6pm"
- Multiple photos allow interpolation of coordinates for higher accuracy



### Craigslist: Real Example





## Craigslist: Real Example









#### Recall:



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 Once data is published, the Internet keeps it (in potentially many copies).



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
#### Recall:

- Once data is published, the Internet keeps it (in potentially many copies).
- APIs are easy to use and allow quick retrieval of large amounts of data

Can we find people on vacation in YouTube?



Experiment: Cybercasing using the YouTube API (240 lines in Python)





#### Input parameters



#### Input parameters

**Location**: 37.869885, -122.270539

Radius: 100km

Keywords: kids

Distance: 1000km

Time-frame: this week



Output



Output

Initial videos: 1000 (max\_res)



### Output

Initial videos: 1000 (max res)

→User hull: ~50k videos



### Output

Initial videos: 1000 (max res)

→User hull: ~50k videos

→Vacation hits: 106



### Output


Initial videos: 1000 (max res)

→User hull: ~50k videos

→Vacation hits: 106

**→**Cybercasing targets: >12







### The Threat is Real!

#### **Bits**



Business - Innovation - Technology - Society

September 12, 2010, 10:24 AM

#### Burglars Picked Houses Based on Facebook Updates

By NICK BILTON



Illustration by Nick Bilton/The New York Times





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a) No, people just have to be more careful. The possibilities still outweigh the risks.



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- b) Maybe it should be regulated somehow to make sure no harm can be done.



#### Do you think geo-tagging should be illegal?

- a) No, people just have to be more careful. The possibilities still outweigh the risks.
- b) Maybe it should be regulated somehow to make sure no harm can be done.
- c) Yes, absolutely this information is too dangerous.






Is this really about geo-tags? (remember: hypothesis)



# Ongoing Work:

### The Berkeley Multimodal Location Estimation Project



http://mmle.icsi.berkeley.edu



### Multimodal Location Estimation

We infer location of a Video based on visual, audio, and tags:

- Use geo-tagged data as training data
- Allows faster search, inference, and intelligence gathering even without GPS.

G. Friedland, O. Vinyals, and T. Darrell: "Multimodal Location Estimation," pp. 1245-1251, ACM Multimedia, Florence, Italy, October 2010.






## ediaEval Benchmark

#### MediaEval Benchmarking Initiative for Multimedia Evaluation

The "multi" in multimedia: speech, audio, visual content, tags, users, context

#### ICSI/UCB Estimation System at Placing Task 2012 (Cumulative)



Distance between estimation and ground truth

J. Choi, G. Friedland, V. Ekambaram, K. Ramchandran: "Multimodal Location Estimation of Consumer Media: Dealing with Sparse Training Data," in Proceedings of IEEE ICME 2012, Melbourne, Australia, July 2012.



## YouTube Cybercasing Revisited

	Old Experiment	No Geotags
Initial Videos	1000 (max)	107
User Hull	~50k	~2000
Potential Hits	106	112
Actual Targets	>12	>12

YouTube Cybercasing with Geo-Tags vs Multimodal Location Estimation





Do you think research about geo-location should be abandonend?



Do you think research about geo-location should be abandonend?

a) No, of course not.



Do you think research about geo-location should be abandonend?

- a) No, of course not.
- b) No, but regulated.



Do you think research about geo-location should be abandonend?

- a) No, of course not.
- b) No, but regulated.
- c) Yes, absolutely.





Is this really only about geo-location?



Is this really only about geo-location?

No, it's about the privacy implications of multimedia retrieval in general.



## Example




#### Idea: Can one link videos across acounts?



# Idea: Can one link videos across acounts? (e.g. YouTube linked to Facebook vs anonymized dating site)



## User ID on Flickr videos





## Persona Linking using Internet Videos

H. Lei, J. Choi, A. Janin, and G. Friedland: "Persona Linking: Matching Uploaders of Videos Accross Accounts", at IEEE International Conference on Acoustic, Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP), Prague, May 2011



## Persona Linking using Internet Videos

#### Result:

H. Lei, J. Choi, A. Janin, and G. Friedland: "Persona Linking: Matching Uploaders of Videos Accross Accounts", at IEEE International Conference on Acoustic, Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP), Prague, May 2011



## Persona Linking using Internet Videos

#### Result:

On average having 20 videos in the test set leads to a 99% chance for a true positive match!

H. Lei, J. Choi, A. Janin, and G. Friedland: "Persona Linking: Matching Uploaders of Videos Accross Accounts", at IEEE International Conference on Acoustic, Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP), Prague, May 2011







And now? What do you think has to be done? a) Nothing can be done. Privacy is dead.



- a) Nothing can be done. Privacy is dead.
- b) We need to educate people about this and try to save privacy. (fight)



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- c) I will really think before I post, and I agree with b).



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- c) I will really think before I post, and I agree with b).
- d) I will really think before I post, and I agree with a).
- e) I won't post anything anymore! (flee)



## More examples and more discussion



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http://cybercasing.blogspot.com



## What to do about it?

(under construction)



## i What to do about it?

http://teachingprivacy.icsi.berkeley.edu
(under construction)



## lThank You!

## Questions?

Work together with:
Robin Sommer, Jaeyoung Choi, Luke
Gottlieb, Howard Lei, Adam Janin,
Oriol Vinyals, Trevor Darrel, Dan
Garcia, K. Ramchandran, E.
Venketsan, and others.