Network Security War Stories

CS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph September 7, 2005

Phone System Hackers: Phreaks

- · Earliest phone hackers?
- 1870's teenagers


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
- 1920's (first automated switchboards)
- Mid-1950's saw deployment of automated direct-dial long distance switches


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






Blue Boxes: Free Long Distance Calls

- · Once trunk thinks call is over, use a "blue box" to dial desired number - Emits MF signaling tones
- · Builders included members of California's Homebrew Computer Club:
 - Steve Jobs (AKA Berkeley Blue)
 - Steve Wozniak (AKA Oak Toebark)
- Red boxes, white boxes, pink boxes, … - Variants for pay phones, incoming calls, ... September 7, 200 S161 Fall 200 Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/Wagner




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The Game is On · Cat and mouse game between telcos and phreaks - Telcos can't add filters to every phone switch - Telcos monitor maintenance logs for "idle" trunks

- Phreaks switch to emulating coin drop in pay phones
- Telcos add auto-mute function
- Phreaks place operator assisted calls (disables mute)
- Telcos add tone filters to handset mics
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- The Phone System's Fatal Flaw?
 - In-band signaling!
 - Information channel used for both voice and signaling
- Knowing "secret" protocol = you control the system September 7, 2005

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 Not (mostly) solved until the deployment of digital 2nd generation systems in the 1990's CS161 Fall 2005

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Signaling System #7

- "Ma Bell" deployed Signaling System #6 in late 1970's and SS#7 in 1980's
 - Uses Common Channel Signaling (CCS) to transmit out-of-band signaling information
 - Completely separate packet data network used to setup, route, and supervise calls
 - Not completely deployed until 1990's for some rural areas

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- · False sense of security...
 - Single company that owned entire network


- SS7 has no internal authentication or security September 7, 2005 CS161 Fall 2005 Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/Wagne

Today's Phone System Threats Deregulation in 1980's

- Anyone can become a Competitive Local ExChange (CLEC) provider and get SS7 access
- PC modem redirections (1999-)
 - Surf "free" gaming/porn site and download "playing/viewing sw
 - Software mutes speaker, hangs up modem, dials Albania
 - Charged \$7/min until you turn off PC (repeats when turned on)
 - Telco "forced" to charge you because of international tariffs
- PBX hacking for free long-distance
 - Default voicemail configurations often allow outbound dialing for convenience
- 1-800 social engineering ("Please connect me to x9011...") September 7, 2005 CS161 Fall 2005 12 Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/Wagner



- · In-band signaling enabled phreaks to compromise telephone system integrity
- Moving signaling out-of-band provides added security
- New economic models mean new threats - Not one big happy family, but bitter rivals
- · End nodes are vulnerable - Beware of default configurations!
- Social engineering of network/end nodes September 7, 2005 CS161 Fall 2005 Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/Wagner




· Infected DEC VAX (BSD) and Sun machines


- 99 lines of C and >3200 lines of C library code


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








Internet Worms: Zero-Day Exploits


- Morris worm infected a small number of hosts in a few days (several thousand?)
 But, Internet only had ~60,000 computers!
- What about today? ~320M computers
- Theoretical "zero-day" exploit worm
 - Rapidly propagating worm that exploits a common Windows vulnerability on the day it is exposed
- Propagates faster than human intervention, infecting all vulnerable machines in minutes CS161 Fall 2005 Josept/TigarVariani/Wagner




Sapphire (AKA Slammer) Worm January 25, 2003 Fastest computer worm in history Used MS SQL Server buffer overflow vulnerability Doubled in size every 8.5 seconds, 55M scans/sec Infected >90% of vulnerable hosts within 10 mins Infected at least 75,000 hosts Caused network outages, canceled airline flights, elections problems, interrupted E911 service, and caused ATM failures









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





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