

CS 161 – Signatures & Secret Sharing

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Attacks on cryptography

- Direct attack
 - example: exhaustive search
- Known plaintext
- Chosen plaintext
- Usual assumptions: chosen plaintext attack; attacker knows E, D but not key

Notation

- Ciphertext = Encryption (Plaintext, encryption-Key)
 - sometimes we use “cleartext” instead of “plaintext”
- $\text{Key} \in \text{Keyspace}$
- $\text{Keysize} = \log_2(|\text{Keyspace}|)$
- $c = E(m, k)$ (or $c = E_k(m)$ or $c = \{m\}_k$)
- Also Plaintext = Decryption(Ciphertext, decryption-Key)
- encryption-Key = decryption-Key (symmetric)
- encryption-Key \neq decryption-Key (asymmetric)
- $m = D(c, k) = E^{-1}(c, k)$ (or $c = D_k(m)$)

RSA

- Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (1978 – published 1979)
- Idea:
 - Given e , find d , such that $ed = K(p-1)(q-1)+1$ for some K
 - Encryption: $c = E(m) = m^e \bmod pq$
 - Decryption: $D(c) = c^d \bmod pq$
 - So $D(E(m)) = m^{ed} \bmod pq = m^{K(p-1)(q-1)+1} \bmod pq = m$
- Issues:
 - Given e , how can we find d ?
 - Answer: use EGCD (extended greatest common divisor)
 - Euclidean algorithm
 - Given x, y , EGCD finds $Ax + By = \text{GCD}(x, y)$
 - Let $x=e, y=(p-1)(q-1)$, then $Ae = (-B)(p-1)(q-1) + 1$
 - How can compute exponentiation modulo pq fast?
 - Repeated squaring mod pq – use binary form of number

RSA allows for “public keys”


- Encryption key public, decryption key private
 - Easy way to send secret messages
 - If we can guess plaintext, we can break (so we add random bits)
 - Decryption only by intended recipient
 - Perfect for distributing symmetric keys
- Encryption key private, decryption key public
 - Only I can send messages, anyone can verify (and read)
 - A type of “digital signature”
 - We will develop this idea in detail

Asymmetric crypto

- Advantages
 - Doesn't require advance set up
 - Strongest forms are as hard as factoring
 - Perfect for solving key distribution problem
 - Good for building protocols
- Disadvantages
 - Slow, slow, slow (& takes space too)
 - Secrecy & source authentication takes two encryptions
 - Need to find a way to prove “public keys” are honest
 - Future lecture: public key hierarchy

How do we know a public key?

- One approach – the **big directory** (white pages)
 - Need to make secure big directory
 - Need to keep it updated
- Better approach: allow one party to attest to another
 - Public key infrastructure (PKI)
 - Public key certificate (PKC)
 - Certificate authority (CA)




A hypothetical public-key hierarchy

Doug Tygar's public key is ...
Love, Arnold Schwarzenegger


Digitally signed by AS



A hypothetical public-key hierarchy



A hypothetical public-key hierarchy



Replay attacks

- Cryptosystems are vulnerable to replay attacks.
- Record message; playback later identically
- “Yes”/“No”
- Solution: use nonces (random bits; timestamp) etc.
- Message is <text, timestamp>

Keeping a secret

- Suppose we want to keep a secret among t people
- One way to do this is to set $\text{secret} = \sum \text{secret shares} \pmod{n}$
- Another way is exploit linear equations

$$f(x) = x^q + a_{q-1}x^{q-1} + \cdots + a_1x + a_0 \pmod{p}$$

- Secret = a_0
- Distribute $f(1), f(2), \dots, f(t)$
- Now a quorum q of those people can recover the secret

Factoring & RSA

- Factoring is easy \rightarrow RSA is easy
- We have **not** proved that RSA is as hard as factoring.
- We need better cryptosystems
 - Secret sharing – allows party to store message secretly
 - Rabin signatures – equivalent to factoring

Chinese Remainder Theorem

- We can represent numbers mod **pq**
- Alternatively as a pair mod **p** and mod **q**
- $1 = \langle 1 \bmod 3, 1 \bmod 5 \rangle$
- $7 = \langle 1 \bmod 3, 2 \bmod 5 \rangle$
- $12 = \langle 0 \bmod 3, 2 \bmod 5 \rangle$

Square roots

- This means that a square root mod pq has four roots.
- Suppose that $r^2 = m \bmod pq$
- And $r = \langle s \bmod p, t \bmod q \rangle$
- Then for square roots are:
- $\langle s \bmod p, t \bmod q \rangle$
- $\langle -s \bmod p, t \bmod q \rangle$
- $\langle s \bmod p, -t \bmod q \rangle$
- $\langle -s \bmod p, -t \bmod q \rangle$
- If we can find the square roots, then we can factor pq
- $\langle s \bmod p, t \bmod q \rangle + \langle -s \bmod p, t \bmod q \rangle = \langle 0 \bmod p, 2t \bmod q \rangle = \text{multiple of } p$

Rabin Signature algorithm

- If we can factor pq , it is easy to take square roots
 - This means square roots are a great signature
 - Easy to verify (just take a square)
 - If someone has a square root taking algorithm then he can factor easily.
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- Square roots \leftrightarrow factoring