Web Security: 1) Ul-based attacks 2) Tracking on the web

CS 161: Computer Security
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November 15, 2016

Announcements

- Last core lecture, misc topics next
- High level ideas of misc topics on final
- Proj 3 due, Thur 17th Nov

Clickjacking attacks

 Exploitation where a user's mouse click is used in a way that was not intended by the user

Talk to your partner

 How can a user's click be used in a way different than intended?

Simple example

```
<a
  onMouseDown=window.open(http://www.evil.com)
  href=http://www.google.com/>
Go to Google</a>
```

What does it do?

- Opens a window to the attacker site
 Why include href to Google?
- Browser status bar shows URL when hovering over as a means of protection

Recall: Frames

 A frame is used to embed another document within the current HTML document

Any site can frame another site


The <iframe> tag specifies an inline frame

Example

HTML page

```
<iframe src="http://www.google.com/"> </iframe>
```

UI rendering




Frames

- Outer page can set frame width, height
- But then, only framed site can draw in its own rectangle

- Modularity
 - Brings together code from different sources

What happens in this case?



Frames: same-origin policy

- Frame inherits origin of its URL
- Same-origin policy: if frame and outer page have different origins, they cannot access each other
 - In particular, malicious JS on outer page cannot access resources of inner page

How to bypass same-origin policy for frames?

Clickjacking

Clickjacking using frames


Evil site frames good site

Evil site covers good site by putting dialogue boxes or other elements on top of parts of framed site to create a different effect

Inner site now looks different to user


Compromise visual integrity – target

- Hiding the target
- Partial overlays




UI Subversion: Clickjacking

 An attack application (script) compromises the context integrity of another application's User Interface when the user acts on the UI



Compromise visual integrity – target

- Hiding the target
- Partial overlays



Compromise visual integrity – pointer: cursorjacking

Can customize cursor!

```
CSS example:
#mycursor {
cursor: none;
width: 97px;
height: 137px;
background: url("images/custom-cursor.jpg")
}
```

Javascript can keep updating cursor, can display shifted cursor





```
Fake cursor, but more visible
```

Compromise visual integrity – pointer: cursorjacking

Cursorjacking deceives a user by using a custom cursor image, where the pointer was displayed with an offset



Download .exe



Clickjacking to Access the User's Webcam



Defeating sitekeys

- Some sites use/used a secret image to identify site to user (e.g., Bank of America)
 - only good site should know the secret image
 - user should check that they receive the correct image



Invented
by
Berkeley
grad
student!

- What is it aimed to protect against?
 - phishing attacks

Not really used much now, not considered effective mostly because users ignore these images and don't remember what the image was for each site

How can clickjacking subvert sitekeys?

- Phishing sites frame login page to get correct image to appear
- Overlay input box from outer frame at the same location as the password box for the inner frame
- User types password accessible to attacker now

How can we defend against clickjacking?


Discuss with a partner

Defenses

- User confirmation
- Good site pops dialogue box with information on the action it is about to make and asks for user confirmation
- Degrades user experience
- UI randomization
- good site embeds dialogues at random locations so it is hard to overlay
- Difficult & unreliable (e.g. multi-click attacks)

Defense 3: Framebusting

Web site includes code on a page that prevents other pages from framing it



What is framebusting?

Framebusting code is often made up of

- a conditional statement and
- a counter action

```
Common method:
```

```
if (top != self) {
    top.location = self.location;
}
```

A Survey

Framebusting is very common at the Alexa Top 500 sites

[global traffic rank of a website]

| Sites | Framebusting |
|---------|--------------|
| Top 10 | 60% |
| Top 100 | 37% |
| Top 500 | 14% |

credit: Gustav Rydstedt

Many framebusting methods

```
Conditional Statements
               if (top != self)
      if (top.location != self.location)
        if (top.location != location)
       if (parent.frames.length > 0)
             if (window != top)
      if (window.top !== window.self)
      if (window.self != window.top)
     if (parent && parent != window)
     if (parent && parent.frames &&
         parent.frames.length>0)
if((self.parent && !(self.parent===self)) &&
      (self.parent.frames.length!=0))
```

Many framebusting methods

Counter-Action Statements

top.location = self.location

top.location.href = document.location.href

top.location.href = self.location.href

top.location.replace(self.location)

top.location.href = window.location.href

top.location.replace(document.location)

top.location.href = window.location.href

top.location.href = "URL"

document.write(")

top.location = location

top.location.replace(document.location)

top.location.replace('URL')

top.location.href = document.location

Most current framebusting can be defeated

Easy bugs

Goal: bank.com wants only bank.com's sites to frame it

Bank runs this code to protect itself:

Problem: http://badguy.com?q=bank.com

Abusing the XSS filter

IE8 reflective XSS filters:

On a browser request containing script:

http://www.victim.com?var=<script> alert('xss') ... </script>

Server responds

Brower checks

If <script> alert('xss'); appears in rendered page, the IE8 filter will replace it with <sc#pt> alert('xss') ... </sc#pt>

How can attacker abuse this?

Abusing the XSS filter

Attacker figures out the framebusting code of victim site (easy to do, just go to victim site in attacker's browser and view the source code)

```
<script> if(top.location != self.location) //framebust </script>
```

Framing page does:

```
<iframe src="http://www.victim.com?var=<script> if (top ... " >
```


XSS filter modifies framebusting script to:

```
<sc#pt> if(top.location != self.location)
```

XSS filter disables legitimate framebusting code!!


Defense: Ensuring visual integrity of pointer

- Remove cursor customization
 - Attack success: 43% -> 16%




Ensuring visual integrity of pointer

- Freeze screen outside of the target display area when the real pointer enters the target
 - Attack success: 43% -> 15%
 - Attack success (margin=10px): 12%
 - Attack success (margin=20px): 4% (baseline:5%)



Ensuring visual integrity of pointer


- Lightbox effect around target on pointer entry
 - Attack success (Freezing + lightbox): 2%



How about a temporal integrity attack example?


Enforcing temporal integrity

- UI delay: after visual changes on target or pointer, invalidate clicks for X ms
 - Attack success (delay=250ms): 47% -> 2% (2/91)
 - Attack success (delay=500ms): 1% (1/89)



Enforcing temporal integrity


- Pointer re-entry: after visual changes on target, invalidate clicks until pointer re-enters target
 - Attack success: 0% (0/88)



Other Forms of UI Sneakiness

Users might find themselves living in The Matrix ...


"Browser in Browser"



Discussion

- So, how do these lessons apply to desktop applications?
- Compare the security model for desktop apps:
 - Are desktop apps safer against these attacks?
 - Are desktop apps riskier against these attacks?

Is there any hope?



Other defense: X-Frames-Options (IE8, Safari, FF3.7)

- Web server attaches HTTP header to response
 - Two possible values: DENY and SAMEORIGIN
 - DENY: browser will not render page in framed context
 - SAMEORIGIN: browser will only render if top frame is same origin as page giving directive

- Good defense ... but poor adoption by sites (4 of top 10,000)
- Coarse policies: no whitelisting of partner sites, which should be allowed to frame our site

Summary

 Clickjacking is an attack on our perception of a page based on the UI

- Framebusting is tricky to get right
 - All currently deployed code can be defeated

Use X-Frame-Options

Tracking on the Web

What does a site learn about you when you visit them?

Discuss with your neighbor

The sites you visit learn:

- The URLs you're interested in
 - Google/Bing also learns what you're searching for
- Your IP address
 - Thus, your service provider & geo-location
 - Can often link you to other activity including at other sites
- Your browser's capabilities, which OS you run, which language you prefer
- Which URL you looked at that took you there
 - Via the HTTP "Referer" header

They also learn cookies!

They also learn cookies

Why is that harmful?

| ● O Cook | ies |
|---|----------------|
| Search: Q | |
| The following cookies are stored on yo | our computer: |
| Site | Cookie Name |
| accounts.google.com | |
| auth.berkeley.edu | |
| ► cnn.com | |
| ► facebook.com | |
| ▶ google.com | |
| markets.on.nytimes.com | |
| ▶ nytimes.com | |
| ▶ us.cnn.com | |
| wt.o.nytimes.com | |
| Name: <no cookie="" selected=""></no> | |
| Content: <no cookie="" selected=""></no> | |
| Host: <no cookie="" selected=""></no> | Let's remove a |
| Path: <no cookie="" selected=""></no> | of our cookies |
| Send For: <no cookie="" selected=""></no> | |
| Expires: <no cookie="" selected=""></no> | |
| Remove Cookies Remove All Coo | okies |

Cookies

Search:

Q

The following cookies are stored on your computer:

Site

Cookie Name

Cool, no web site is tracking us ...

Name: <no cookie selected>

Content: <no cookie selected>

Host: <no cookie selected>


Path: <no cookie selected>


Send For: <no cookie selected>


Expires: <no cookie selected>

Remove Cookies)

(Remove All Cookies







| • |) O O | ookies | |
|---|--|------------------|---------------------|
| | Search: Q The following cookies are stored o | on your computer | : |
| | Site | Cookie Na | ame |
| | ▼ google.com | | |
| | google.com | PREF | |
| | google.com | NID | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | Name: NID | | |
| _ | Content: 67=wM7cm7WZI9DNm0 | DB4IMS8Vu1K3Ng | Lr0SIUZt2RkVeQw_zbA |
| | Domain: .google.com | * | |
| | Path: / | | Goodness knows |
| | Send For: Any type of connection | | what info they |
| | Expires: October 28, 2014 at 2:1 | 1:10 PM | decided to put |
| | Remove Cookie Remove All | Cookies | in the cookie |

| | Cookies | |
|--|-------------|--|
| Search: Q The following cookies are stored on your computer: | | |
| Site | Cookie Name | |
| ▼ google.com | | |
| google.com | PREF | |
| google.com | NID | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Name: NID | | |

Content: 67=wM7cm7WZI9DNm0B4IMS8Vu1K3NgLr0SlUZt2RkVeQw_zbA

Domain: .google.com

Path: /

Send For: Any type of connection


Expires: October 28, But it lasts for months ...


Remove Cookie Remove All Cookies

Private browsing

You can turn on a mode called private browsing on your browser


What is this?
Does it protect you against tracking?





Private browsing

- 3
- "Private Browsing allows you to browse the Internet without saving any information about which sites and pages you've visited."
 - deletes history of URL visits, passwords, cookies too
 - Private Browsing maintains cookies for as long as the private browsing window is open. Once you quit the browser, it gets deleted
 - So still tracked for a good while!



Search: (Q

The following cookies are stored on your computer:

| Cookie Name |
|--------------------|
| |
| PREF |
| NID |
| |
| utma |
| utmb |
| utmc |
| utmz |
| |
| VISITOR_INFO1_LIVE |
| YSC |
| |

Name: __utma

youtube.com

Content: 62528430.549021593.1398719659.1398719659.1398719659.

PREF

Domain: .support.mozilla.org

Path: /

Send For: Any type of connection

Expires: April 17, 2018

Remove Cookie

Remove All Cookies

This one sticks around for two years.

Search: Q

The following cookies are stored on your computer:

| Site | | Cookie Name | |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------------|--|
| ▼ go | ogle.com | | |
| | google.com | PREF | |
| | google.com | NID | |
| ▼ su | pport.mozilla.org | | |
| | support.mozilla.org | utma | |
| | support.mozilla.org | utmb | |
| | support.mozilla.org | utmc | |
| | support.mozilla.org | utmz | |
| ▼ yo | utube.com | | |
| , | youtube.com | VISITOR_INFO1_LIVE | |
| , | youtube.com | YSC | |

Name: __utma

youtube.com youtube.com

Content: 62528430.549021593.1398719659.1398719659.1398719659.

PREF

Domain: .support.mozilla.org

Path: /

Send For: Any type of connection

Expires: April 17, 2018

Remove Cookie Remove All Cookies

How did YouTube enter the

picture??

Search: (Q

The following cookies are stored on your computer:

| Cookie Name |
|--------------------|
| |
| PREF |
| NID |
| |
| utma |
| utmb |
| utmc |
| utmz |
| |
| VISITOR_INFO1_LIVE |
| YSC |
| PREF |
| |

Name: PREF

Content: fv=13.0.0

Domain: .youtube.com

Path: /

Send For: Any type of connection


Expires: April 17, 2018

Remove Cookie

Remove All Cookies

YouTube is remembering the version of Flash I'm

running ...

















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By PETER BAKER and MARK LANDLER

The United States ordered travel bans and asset freezes for seven Russian officials, including two said to be in President Vladimir V. Putin's inner circle, and froze assets for 17 firms.

■ 284 Comments

- · Mayor of Eastern Ukraine City Is Shot
- · Putin Rival Takes Message to East Ukraine

Times Minute





Mohamed Abd El Ghany/Reuters

Egypt Sentences More Than 680 to Death

The Muslim Brotherhood's spiritual leader and hundreds of others were sentenced on charges of inciting or committing violence. Supporters, above, reacted to the verdict Monday.

= 130 Comments

Chernobyl: Capping a



Political Executions in Egypt

It is clear from the sentencing of 680 people to death in a mass trial that the country's judges have become a government tool.

- Editorial: Smartphones and the 4th Amendment
- Krugman: High Plains Moochers

The Opinion Pages THE STONE

What Does Buddhism Require?

The reality of rebirth may not be necessary. But believing in it probably is.



- Gessen: Salon of the Exiled
- · Op-Ed: The Wire Next Time
- · Op-Docs | 'Verbatim: What Is a Photocopier?'

Today's Times Insider


Behind the scenes of The New York Times

- · Thinking of Wine as Food With Eric Asimov
- Introducing Times Insider





The New Hork Times HOME DELIVERY



Search: (Q

The following cookies are stored on your computer:

| Site | Cookie Name |
|------------------------------------|------------------|
| nytimes.com | _dyus_8765260 |
| nytimes.com | rsi_segs |
| nytimes.com | kxtag27935.day |
| nytimes.com | kxtag27728.day |
| nytimes.com This one tracks the | kxtag15486.day |
| nytimes.com This one tracks the | kxtag21418.day |
| nytimes.com details of my system & | kxtag22998.day |
| nytimes.con detalls of my system & | kxtag21233.day |
| nytimes.com browser | kxtag28173.day |
| nytimes.con | _chartbeat2 |
| nytimes.com | _chartbeat_uuniq |
| nytimes.com | kxtech |
| nytimes.com | kxsegs |
| nvtimes.com | krux seas |
| Name: kytech | |

Name: kxtech

Content: device%3DComputer%26manufacturer%3DApple%2520Inc.%26os%3DMac%2520OS%2520X%26browser%3DFirefox%25202

Host: www.nytimes.com


Path: /

Send For: Any type of connection

Expires: May 28, 2014 at 2:26:53 PM

Remove Cookie

Remove All Cookies



Third-Party Cookies

- How can a web site enable a third party to plant cookies in your browser & later retrieve them?
 - Include on the site's page (for example):
 - <img src="http://doubleclick.net/ad.gif" width=1
 height=1>
- Why would a site do that?
 - Site has a business relationship w/ DoubleClick
- Why can this track you?
 - Now DoubleClick sees all of your activity that involves their web sites
 - Because your browser dutifully sends them their cookies for any web page that has that img
 - Identifier in cookie ties together activity as = YOU

The following cookies are stored on your computer:

| Site | Cookie Name |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| ▼ google.com | |
| google.com | PREF |
| google.com | NID |
| ▼ support.mozilla.org | |
| support.mozilla.org | _utma |
| support.mozilla.org | utmb |
| support.mozilla.org | utmc |
| support.mozilla.org | utmz |
| ▼ youtube.com | |
| youtube.com | VISITOR_INFO1_LIVE |
| youtube.com | YSC |
| youtube.com | PREF |

Content: 62528430.549021593.1398719659.1398719659.1398719659.

Domain: .support.mozilla.org

Path: /

Send For: Any type of connection

Expires: April 27, 2016 at 2:14:27 PM

Remove Cookie

Remove All Cookies

Remember this 2-year

Mozilla cookie?

Google Analytics

- Any web site can (anonymously) register with Google to instrument their site for analytics
 - Gather information about who visits, what they do when they visit
- To do so, site adds a small Javascript snippet that loads http://www.google-analytics.com/ga.js
 - You can see sites that do this because they introduce a "__utma" cookie
- Code ships off to Google information associated with your visit to the web site
 - Shipped by fetching a GIF w/ values encoded in URL
 - Web site can use it to analyze their ad "campaigns"
 - Not a small amount of info ...

```
http://www.google-analytics.com/__utm.gif?utmwv=4.9.1&utmn=408493431&utmhn=www.sidereel.com&utme=8(userType)9(LoggedOut)11(2)&utmcs=UTF-8&utmsr=1680x1050&utmsc=24-bit&utmul=en-us&utmje=1&utmfl=10.2 r153&utmdt=Watch Online | American Idol Episodes - American Idol ep 23 - via videobb.com - SideReel&utmhid=72439433&utmr=0&utmp=/American_Idol/season-10/episode-23/links/6541441&utmac=UA-1471387-3&utmcc=_utma=108050432.2066052302.1287459230.1291684208.1291691628.9;+__utmz=108050432.1287459230.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none);&utmu=QqAAE
```

```
http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/ads?correlator=1291905478049&output=json_html&callback=GA_googleSetAdContentsBySlotForSync&impl=s&client=ca-pub-7758644218383495&slotname=wlv_728x90_atf&page_slots=wlv_728x90_atf&cust_params=title=American%20Idol&state=loggedout&noautoplay=&cookie=ID=75911ff51976ad00:T=1287459230:S=ALNI_ZMQH1Jqg70f_neADngl50Ga4VbuCg&url=http://www.sidereel.com/American_Idol/seaseason=10/episode=23/links/6541441&ref=http://www.sidereel.com/American_Idol/season=10/episode=23/search&lmt=1291905477&dt=1291905478069&cc=100&biw=830&bih=772&ifi=1&adk=1569465027&u_tz=-420&u_his=5&u_java=true&u_h=1050&u_w=1680&u_ah=1000&u_aw=1680&u_cd=24&u_nplug=10&u_nmime=88&flash=10.2.153&gads=v2&ga_vid=2067052302.1287459230&ga_sid=1291691698&ga_hid=72439433&ga_fc=true
```

http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/adview?ai=B2b9cRoCZTfuHCtDaqQGpkZXqC_m q7IgCmdXb2CWBvtvXQwAQARgBIMe9rBc4AGDJltGGyKOgGbIBEHd3dy5zaWRlcmVlbC5jb226AQk3Mjh 4OTBfYXPIAQnaAUhodHRwOi8vd3d3LnNpZGVyZWVsLmNvbS9BbWVyaWNhbl9JZG9sL3NlYXNvbi0xMC9 lcGlzb2RlLTIzL2xpbmtzLzY1NDE0NDGYAoAKuAIYwAIByALhm54b4AIA6gIKNDI4NTU5MjM00JADrAK YA6wCqAMB6AOjCeqDmQjoA-YC9QMAAABE4AQB&siqh=1xAuEwn3fOw

Values Reportable via Google Analytics

Affiliation Billing City Billing Country Billing Region Browser Lang. Complete URL Cookie Values Current Page Event Tracking Flash Version **Grand Total**

Host Name Java-enabled Language Encoding Order ID Page Title Product Code Product Name Profile Number Repeat Campaign Visit Quantity Screen Color Depth

Screen Resolution Shipping Cost Special Event Start Campaign Sess. Tax Tracking Code Version Unique GIF ID **Unit Price** User Defined Var Variations on an Item

Still More Tracking Techniques ...

- Any scenario where browsers execute programs that manage persistent state can support tracking by cookies
 - -Such as Flash?

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Flash Player Help

Website Privacy Settings panel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Flash Player Help

Settings Manager

- Global Privacy Settings Panel
- Global Storage Settings Panel
- Global Security Settings Panel
- Global Notifications Settings Panel
- Website Privacy Settings Panel
- Website Storage Settings Panel

Display Settings

Local Storage Settings

Microphone Settings

Camera Settings

Privacy Settings


Local Storage Pop-Up Question

Privacy Pop-Up Question

Security Pop-Up Question

About Updating Adobe Flash Player

Some Flash cookies "respawn" regular browser cookies that you previously deleted!



Note: The Settings Manager that you see above is not an image; it is the actual Settings Manager. Click the tabs to see different panels, and click the options in the panels to change your Adobe Flash Player settings.

The list of websites above is stored on your computer of MV browser had or change your privacy settings or local storage settings to this list, or to any of the information that the websites your computer.

Flash cookies from 67 sites!


Use this panel to specify privacy settings for any of the requested permission to use your camera or microphone or to store information

on your computer.



What does Facebook learn?

- Many pages include a Facebook "Like" button.
- What are the implications, for user tracking?
- Facebook can track you on every site that you visit that embeds such a button



From Facebook:

What information does Facebook get when I visit a site with the Like button?

If you're logged into Facebook and visit a website with the **Like** button, your browser sends us information about your visit. Since the **Like** button is a little piece of Facebook embedded on another website, the browser is sending info about the request to load Facebook content on that page.

We record some of this info to help show you a personalized experience on that site and to improve our products. For example, when you go to a website with a **Like** button, we need to know who you are in order to show you what your Facebook friends have liked on that site. The data we receive includes your user ID, the website you're visiting, the date and time and other browser-related info.

Tracking – So What?

- Cookies form the core of how Internet advertising works today
 - Without them, arguably you'd have to pay for content up front a lot more
 - (and payment would mean you'd lose anonymity anyway)
 - A "better ad experience" is not necessarily bad
 - Ads that reflect your interests; not seeing repeated ads
- But: ease of gathering so much data so easily ⇒ concern of losing control how it's used
 - Privacy concerns
 - Large amounts of private data in one place

careerbuilder.com⁻

More Employers Screening Candidates via Social Networking Sites

Five tips for creating a positive online image Rosemary Haefner, Vice President of Human Resources at CareerBuilder



When you interview, they Know What You've Posted

Gone are the days when all job seekers had to worry about were their résumés and cover letters. Today, those documents remain a staple of the <u>job-search</u> process, but they are joined by a growing phenomenon: social networking.

Forty-five percent of employers reported in a June 2009 CareerBuilder survey that they use social networking sites to screen potential employees, compared to only 22 percent of employers last year. Eleven percent of employers plan to start using social networking sites for the screening process. More than 2,600 hiring managers participated in the survey.

Why employers disregard candidates after screening online

Thirty-five percent of employers reported they have found content on social networking sites that caused them not to hire the candidate, including:

- Candidate posted provocative or inappropriate photographs or information 53 percent
- Candidate posted content about them drinking or using drugs -- 44 percent
- Candidate bad-mouthed their previous employer, co-workers or clients -- 35
 percent
- Candidate showed poor communication skills -- 29 percent
- Candidate made discriminatory comments -- 26 percent
- Candidate lied about qualifications -- 24 percent
- Candidate shared confidential information from previous employer -- 20 percent

Tracking – So What?

- Cookies etc. form the core of how Internet advertising works today
 - Without them, arguably you'd have to pay for content up front a lot more
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 - A "better ad experience" is not necessarily bad
 - Ads that reflect your interests; not seeing repeated ads
- But: ease of gathering so much data so easily ⇒ concern of losing control how it's used
 - Content shared with friends doesn't just stay with friends ...
 - You really don't have a good sense of just what you're giving away ...



My baby girl.... http://t.co/5qLfLV6

2 minutes ago via Twitter for Android




BritBangert
Brittany Bangert

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@BritBangert Brittany Bangert April 5, 2011





Login to leave a comment











Put this photo on your website

Views 11

Events


Tags



Search Maps



Directions Search nearby more▼







I Can Stalk U

Raising awareness about inadvertent information sharing

Home

How

Why

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Contact Us

Who have we stalked recently?



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>RangeLifeEnt</u> at 51 Great Jones St New York NY

1 minute ago · Map Location · View Tweet · View Picture · Reply to RangeLifeEnt



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>lnicklasson</u> at http://maps.google.com/?q=57.1344444444,12.7141666667 2 minutes ago · Map Location · View Tweet · View Picture · Reply to lnicklasson



ICanStalkU was able to stalk Welerson13 at http://maps.google.com/?q=-15.7380555556,-47.8986111111 2 minutes ago · Map Location · View Tweet · View Picture · Reply to Welerson13



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>BritBangert</u> at 920 Hawley St Taylorville IL

1 minute ago · Map Location · View Tweet · View Picture · Reply to BritBangert



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>jiggy Owla</u> at http://maps.google.com/?q=13.7830055879,100.518500685 4 minutes ago · <u>Map Location</u> · <u>View Tweet</u> · <u>View Picture</u> · <u>Reply to jiggy Owla</u>



ICanStalkU was able to stalk gcolony at http://maps.google.com/?q=37.7851666667,-122.404166667 4 minutes ago · Map Location · View Tweet · View Picture · Reply to gcolony

Links

- Mayhemic Labs
- PaulDotCom
- SANS ISC
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Center for Democracy & Technology

How did you find me?

Did you know that a lot of smart phones encode the location of where pictures are taken? Anyone who has a copy can access this information.

read more

Help me fix this!

Disabling Geo-Tagging on your phone is easy.

How To Gain Better Privacy?

discuss with your neighbor

How To Gain Better Privacy?

- Force of law
 - Example #1: web site privacy policies
 - US sites that violate them commit false advertising
 - But: policy might be "Yep, we sell everything about you, Ha Ha!"

THE NEW YORKER's Privacy Policy (when you buy their archives)

7. Collection of Viewing Information. You acknowledge that you are aware of and consent to the collection of your viewing information during your use of the Software and/or Content. Viewing information may include, without limitation, the time spent viewing specific pages, the order in which pages are viewed, the time of day pages are accessed, IP address and user ID. This viewing information may be linked to personally identifiable information, such as name or address and shared with third parties.

How To Gain Better Privacy?

Force of law

- Example #1: web site privacy policies
 - US sites that violate them commit false advertising
 - But: policy might be "Yep, we sell everything about you, Ha Ha!"
- Example #2: SB 1386
 - Requires an agency, person or business that conducts business in California and owns or licenses computerized 'personal information' to disclose any breach of security (to any resident whose unencrypted data is believed to have been disclosed)
 - Quite effective at getting sites to pay attention to securing personal information



May 8, 2009 1:53 PM PDT

UC Berkeley computers hacked, 160,000 at risk



This post was updated at 2:16 p.m. PDT with comment from an outside database security software vendor.

Hackers broke into the University of California at Berkeley's health services center computer and potentially stole the personal information of more than 160,000 students, alumni, and others, the university announced Friday.

At particular risk of identity theft are some 97,000 individuals whose Social Security numbers were accessed in the breach, but it's still unclear whether hackers were able to match up those SSNs with individual names, Shelton Waggener, UCB's chief technology officer, said in a press conference Friday afternoon.

How To Gain Better Privacy?

- Technology
 - Various browser additions
 - Special browser extensions
 - Tor and anonymizers later in course

Browser: "Tracking protection"

Private browsing includes tracking protection

Blocks third-party trackers based on Disconnect.me

- basic: blocks commonly known analytics trackers, social sharing trackers, and advertising trackers, but allows some known content trackers to reduce website breakage.
- strict: blocks all known trackers, including analytics, trackers, social sharing trackers, and advertising trackers as well as content trackers. The strict list will break some videos, photo slideshows, and some social networks.



Browsers: Do not track flag

You can turn on this flag in your browser


What does it do?

- Tells web servers you want to opt-out of tracking
- It does this by transmitting a Do Not Track HTTP header every time your data is requested from a web server


It does not enforce that there is no tracking, it is up to the web servers whether they decide to track or not

WHY DO NOT TRACK MAY NOT PROTECT ANYBODY'S PRIVACY

By Geoff Duncan — June 9, 2012







Some ad companies do provide more generic ads as a result of this flag

Browser extension: Ghostery

User installs browser extension:

- Recognizes third-party tracking scripts on a web page based on an actively curated database of such scripts
- 2. Blocks HTTP requests to these sites
- as a result, Facebook buttons don't even show
- 3. Users can create "Whitelists" of allowed sites
- e.g., allow FB button but note that you allow tracking by FB too

But you have to be careful...



- Users can opt-in to sending anonymously data back to Evidon, the parent company, to improve its tracking database
- Evidon sells this data to ad companies...
- But strategy is transparent, users opt into this

Conclusions

- Third-party apps can track us even if when we don't visit their website
- Tracking is very common on the web and can collect a lot of data about you
- Some solutions exist, but have caveats