Computer Science 161: Computer Security

Ralucă Ada Popa  Nicholas Weaver

http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/
Who Am I: Raluca Ada Popa

- Assistant professor in computer security
- Lead the system security research group, and co-run RISELab at UC Berkeley
- Research topics: **broadly** systems security and applied cryptography, and **more specifically**: secure analytics, databases, IoT and ML; decentralized security via blockchains/ledgers
- CTO & co-founder of a cybersecurity company, PreVeil
- Taught this class 3 times
Who Am I:
Nicholas Weaver

• A **lecturer** in the CS department
  + I am paid **exclusively** to care about my students
• A researcher at the International Computer Science Institute
  • & notorious Twitter shitposter @ncweaver

• Research focuses
  • Network Security
  • Online criminality
    • Including cryptocurrency
  • Online privacy
  • Public policy
  • Drones...
And a team of talented TAs
What is security?

Enforcing a desired property *in the presence of an attacker*

- data confidentiality
- user privacy
- data and computation integrity
- authentication
- availability
- …
Today’s outline

• Why is security important?
• Course logistics
• Intro to security principles
Why is security important?

- It is important for our
  - physical safety
  - confidentiality/privacy
  - functionality
  - protecting our assets
  - successful business
  - a country’s economy and safety
  - and so on...
Physical safety threats

Pacemaker hack can kill via laptop

By Jeremy Kirk, IDG News Service
Oct 21, 2012 11:44 AM

FBI probe of alleged plane hack sparks worries over flight safety
Privacy/confidentiality

91% of healthcare organizations have reported a data breach in the last five years.

Data Breach Tracker: All the major companies that have been hacked

Breaches in 2015 [ITRC]:
  Number of breaches = 5,497
  Number of Records = 818,004,561
Can affect a country’s economy...
Multiple times!

A Cyber-Weapon Warhead Test

By Nicholas Weaver  Wednesday, June 14, 2017, 11:38 AM

The Daily Beast has a story on “CrashOverride”, a computer program best described as transient anti-infrastructure warhead designed to disrupt the power grid. It was tested live against a Ukrainian substation in December 2016 creating a small blackout. Kim Zetter has another good report at Motherboard, and Dragos has the technical details.

Dragos attributes the attack as conducted by “ELECTRUM”, a group it assesses as being associated with Sandworm—an evaluation that is only slightly better than rolling attribution dice. It is probably more accurate to phrase the attribution as “probably Russia, and probably affiliated with the previous Ukrainian power grid attack in 2015.” (The December 2016 attack was the second assault on the Ukrainian
And It Is National Security!

America’s Electric Grid Has a Vulnerable Back Door—and Russia Walked Through It

A Wall Street Journal reconstruction of the worst known hack into the nation’s power system reveals attacks on hundreds of small contractors
And NotPetya...

- Someone (*cough* Russia *cough*) doesn't like Ukraine...
- They compromised the update channel for MeDoc
  - Think "TurboTax For Business in Ukraine": One of only two accounting packages which businesses can use to pay taxes
- They then monitored for weeks with their backdoor
  - This gave them a foothold in almost all who have Ukrainian business
- Then they released a malicious "worm"
  - A program which self-propagates: spreads from computer to computer in an institution
  - And then disabled all the infected computers with a fake "ransomware" payload
  - This cost Mersk shipping alone $100M-300M in lost revenue! White House estimates report $10B! in damage!?!?!
What is hackable?

• Everything!
• Especially things connected to the Internet

For The First Time, Hackers Use Refrigerator To Attack Business

IF IT CAN KILL YOU
DON'T CONNECT IT TO THE INTERNET!
Course structure

• Intro to security
  • memory safety, OS principles
• Cryptography
• Web Security
• Network Security
• Miscellaneous topics
What Will You Learn In This Class?

- How to think adversarially about computer systems
- How to assess threats for their significance
- How to build programs & systems with robust security properties
  - If I find out you start a new project in C or C++, or use unescaped SQL, or allow your website to support CSRF attacks...
    **NICK'S SPIRIT WILL REACH THROUGH YOUR MONITOR AND STRANGLE YOU!!!!**
- How to gauge the protections and limitations provided by today's technology
- How attacks work in practice
  - Code injection, logic errors, browser & web server vulnerabilities, network threats, social engineering (because there is no patch for humans)
What’s Required?

• Prerequisites:
  • CS 61B, 61C, 70
    • The TAs are hosting a CS61C review session tomorrow, 1/23, from 6-8pm at Soda 306
  • Familiarity with Unix, C, Java, Python and an ability to pick up new languages quickly
    • Project 2 will be in Go: see https://tour.golang.org/welcome/1 for an online tutorial
  • A willingness to get your hands dirty: See "Homework 0" on Piazza

• Engage!
  • In lectures, in section
  • Feedback is highly valuable

• Class accounts – see course home page

• Participate in Piazza (use same name as gradescope)
  • Send course-related questions/comments there, or ask in Prof/TA office hours
    • For private matters, contact instructors using private Piazza posts
  • Do not post publicly about specifics about problems/projects
Grading structure

- Absorb material presented in lectures and section
  - Please attend lecture and discussion!
- 3-4 course projects (24% total)
  - Done individually or in groups of 2
- 3-5 homework (16% total)
  - Done individually
- Two midterms (30%)
- A comprehensive final exam (30%)
Class Policies

- Late homework: no credit
- Late project: <24 hours: -10%, <48 hours: -20%, <72 hours: -40%, ≥72 hours: no credit
- Never share solutions, code, etc or let other students see them. Work on your own unless it is a group assignment
- Don’t use our slides to answer questions during class
- Sign up for a class account
- Participate in Piazza
  - Email *doesn’t scale*: course related questions/comments should be on Piazza or asked during office hours
Missing Midterms and Final Policy...

- If you can't make a midterm because of a University event or Academic conference
  - Arrange **now** in the "accommodations" Piazza folder so that we can have a remote proctor (University staff, staff of another university) to give you the exam at the same time remotely

- If you can't make a midterm or final because of another class having the exam at the same time
  - Arrange **now** to notify us in the accommodations Piazza folder as well. We will have a make-up exam **immediately after** the scheduled exam. If you can't make either, sorry, 🙃

- If you need DSP accommodations (extra time on exams, etc) or have exam conflicts process them **now as well**
Textbooks

- No required textbook. If you want additional reading
- **Optional:** *Introduction to Computer Security*, Goodrich & Tamassia
- **Optional:** *The Craft of System Security*, Smith & Marchesini
- We will also make available interesting readings online
Discussion

- Attend any discussion section you want that isn't full
  - If it is, go to another one, there are lots
- We **WILL NOT** have discussion this week
- We are going to try to let everyone in
- We may open up additional discussion sections
  - And discussion sections are not assigned
Online Resources & Accounts...

- We will use gradescope for homeworks, exams, and recording project grades
- We will use Piazza for class announcements etc...
- Webcasts should show up on bcourses
- We will use your class account (cs161-xxx) for various load balancing purposes and other tasks
- So set up all these up ASAP!
Intellectual Honesty Policy: Detection and Retribution

- We view those who would cheat as “attackers”
  - This includes sharing code on homework or projects, midterms, finals, etc…
  - But through this class we (mostly) assume rational attackers
    - Benefit of attack > \textbf{Expected} cost of the attack
      - Cost of launching attack + cost of getting caught * probability of getting caught
- We take a detection and response approach
  - We use many tools to detect violations
    - "Obscurity is not security", but obscurity \textit{can help.}
      Just let it be known that "We Have Ways"
  - We will go to DEFCON 1 (aka "launch the nukes") \textbf{immediately}
    - You will, \textit{at minimum}, receive negative points
    - “Nick doesn’t make threats. \textit{He keeps promises}”
Ethics Guide for Defense Against the Dark Arts

- Of necessity, this class has a fair amount of "dark arts" content
  - As defenders you must understand the offense: You can't learn defense against the dark arts without including the dark arts
  - But a lot of "don't try this at home" stuff
- Big key is **consent**
  - It's usually OK to break into **your own stuff** (modulo the DMCA)
    - It's a great way to evaluate systems
  - It's usually OK to break into someone else's stuff **with explicit permission to do so**
  - It is both grossly unethical and often **exceedingly criminal** to access systems without authorization
Also...

- There exists a classic game theory problem called the Prisoner's Dilemma
- For single-round Prisoner's Dilemma, the optimum strategy is "always-defect"
- For unbounded multi-round Prisoner's Dilemma, the optimum strategy in practice is "tit-for-tat"
  - AKA, be nice unless someone isn't nice to you
- Life is **multi-round**: so be excellent to each other!
  - Making things hostile for others makes the world worse for all
  - Stopping things from being hostile to others makes the world better for you
Stress Management & Mental Health...

• We'll try to not over-stress you too much
  • But there really is a lot to cover and this really is a demanding major
• We are going to somewhat front-load the projects
  • Since everybody else has stuff due at the very end, if there is a 4th it will be small
• If you feel overwhelmed, please use the resources available
  • Academically: Ask on Piazza, Slack, Tutoring, Office hours
  • Non-Academic: Take advantage of University Health Services if you need to
    • Nick did! Zoloft (an antidepressant) and therapy saved my life, twice
• Failure is always an option
  • If something bad happens near the end of the semester, there are withdrawals and incompletes.
  • It is OK to fail or just barely pass...
    Nick grades as a Berkeley Undergrad included a B- in Physics 111BSC & Thermodynamics, a C+ in Chem 112A (O-chem), and a C in Physics 137A (Quantum)...
Webcasts?

Yes

- Benefits of webcasts:
  - Allows students to catch up on lecture at some other time
  - Allows us to oversubscribe the class: We intend to let everybody in!
  - Allows sharing the lecture with a larger community
    - This would be a benefit, but the University won’t pay for human-done captions, while YouTube’s automatic captions will get the University sued for violating the ADA!
    - If anyone has a significant hearing disability, please contact me. We may be able to get the DSP program to provide real captions so we can publish them
  
- Costs of webcasts:
  - Students may not attend class because “hey, webcast”
    - It hurts Nick’s fragile ego to lecture to an empty classroom. 😞
  - But webcast has less context, you can’t ask questions, etc etc etc
  
- But we’re doing it.
Some Philosophy

• The rest of this lecture is largely focused on philosophical issues
• People and Money
• Threat Model
• Prevention, Detection & Response, Mitigation and Recovery
• False Positives, False Negatives, and Compositions
• And then some real word security tips
It All Comes Down To People...
The Attacker(s)

• People attack systems for some reason
  • No attackers? No problem!
• They may do it for money
• They may do it for politics
• They may do it for the lulz
• They may just want to watch the world burn
• Often the most effective security is to attack the **reasons** for an attacker
  • "We are sick of playing whak-a-mole on bad guys... Instead we play whak-a-mole on bad-guy business models"
Personal Security: Threat Model and Chill...

• Who and why might someone attack you?
• Criminals for money
• Teenagers for laughs or to win in an online game
• Governments
  • Probably not: We aren't important enough
  • And even if important enough we're only worth the B game: aka the same things used against us by criminals
• Intimate partners
  • A surprisingly powerful and dangerous adversary, often neglected in the security world
Beware the Intimate Partner Threat

- The IPT is probably the most dangerous attacker you or others can reasonably expect to face
  - Lives are on the line in these situations
- IPTs have physical access
  - Turn your phone into a bug and location tracker: it's easy if your phone is in their hands...
- IPTs have intimate knowledge and strong social engineering
  - I had a colleague who's ex broke into his Facebook account: by abusing the 3-friends password reset option
- IPTs are often motivated to target a particular person: No "bear race"
- A good summary from Karen Levy
It All Comes Down to People... The Users

• If a security system is unusable it will be unused
  • Or at least so greatly resented that users will actively attempt to subvert it:
    "Let's set the nuclear launch code to 00000000" (oh, and write down the password anyway!)

• Users will subvert systems anyway

• Programmers will make mistakes
  • And mistakes are tied to the tools they use
  • "If you don't loath C and C++ by the time this class is over we have failed"

• And Social Engineering...
  • "Because there is no patch for Human Stupidity"
But Don't Blame The Users...

- Often we blame the user when an attacker takes advantage of them...
- Yet we've consistently constructed systems that encourage users to do the wrong thing!
- Phishing is a classic example:
- Which is a phishing email and which is an actual email from Chase?
Oh, and it comes down to money too... 

- "You don't put a $10 lock on a $1 rock...
- Unless the attacker can leverage that $1 rock to attack something more important
- "You don't risk exposing a $1M zero-day on a nobody"
- So I'm quite content to use my iPhone in a hostile network: free market cost of a zero-day (unknown/unpatchable) exploit for iOS is somewhere between $500k to $1.5M
- Cost/benefit analyses appear all throughout security
Prevention

• The goal of prevention is to stop the "bad thing" from happening at all
• On one hand, if prevention works its great
  • E.g. if you don't write in an unsafe language (like C) you will never worry about buffer overflow exploits
• On the other hand, if you can only depend on prevention...
  • You get Bitcoin and Bitcoin thefts
  • E.g. $68M stolen from a Bitcoin exchange
  • Or Ethereum's July 2018: four separate multi-million-dollar theft incidents
  • Or Coinbase accounts: Averaging a known theft a day!
Detection & Response

• Detection: See that something is going wrong
• Response: Actually do something about it
• Without some response, what is the point of detecting something being wrong?
False Positive and False Negatives

- False positive:
  - You alert when there is nothing there

- False negative:
  - You fail to alert when something is there

- This is the real cost of detection:
  - Responding to false positives is not free
    - And too many false positives and alarms get removed
  - False negatives mean a failure
Defense in Depth

- The notion of layering multiple types of protection together
  - EG, the Theodesian Walls of Constantinople:
    Moat -> wall -> depression -> even bigger wall
  - And some towers to rain down an eclectic mix of flaming and pointy death on those caught up in the defenses

- Hypothesis is that attacker needs to breech all the defenses
  - At least until something comes along to make the defense irrelevant like, oh, say siege cannons

- But defense in depth isn't free:
  - You are throwing more resources at the problem
  - You can have a increased false positive rate:
    If D1 has rate FP1 and D2 has rate FP2, a composition where either can alert has:
    $\text{FP} = \text{FP1} + (1-\text{FP1}) \times \text{FP2}$
Mitigation & Recovery...

• OK, something bad happened...
  • Now what?
• Assumption: bad things will happen in the system
  • So can we design things so we can get back working?
• So how do I plan for earthquakes?
  • "1 week of stay put and 50+ miles of get outta town"
• So how do I plan for ransomware?
  • "If my computer and house catches on fire, I have backups"... AKA, "If you love it, back it up!"
Real World Security...
How is your account breached?

• Humans can't remember good passwords...
• Well, we can remember a couple good passwords, but that's about it
~28 BITS OF ENTROPY

\[ 2^{28} = 3 \text{ days at } 1000 \text{ guesses/sec} \]

Difficulty to guess: easy

Was it trombone? No, troubador. And one of the Os was a zero? And there was some symbol...

Difficulty to remember: hard

~44 BITS OF ENTROPY

\[ 2^{44} = 550 \text{ years at } 1000 \text{ guesses/sec} \]

Correct horse battery staple

Four random common words

Difficulty to guess: hard

Through 20 years of effort, we've successfully trained everyone to use passwords that are hard for humans to remember, but easy for computers to guess.
Real World Security...
How is your account breached?

• So we compensate with password **reuse**
  • You use the same lame password on a large number of sites that *hopefully* don't matter

• One of those sites gets breeched...
  • And now the bad guy has your password
  • And can now log into all those other sites where you used the same password...

• This was one of the leading methods the Russians used to invade the US Power Grid!!!
  • Send out a phishing email that looks like a DropBox sharing...
  • Compromise an industry site which requires logins...
  • When user types in password, well, that is also probably their login password on their computer!
Password entropy is rarely relevant. The real modern danger is password reuse.

How so?

Password you wrote?

Set up a web service to do something simple, like image hosting or tweet syndication, so a few million people set up free accounts.

BAM, you’ve got a few million emails, default usernames, and passwords.

Tons of people use one password, strong or not, for most accounts.

Use the list and some proxies to try automated logins to the 20 or 30 most popular sites, plus banks and PayPal and such.

You’ve now got a few hundred thousand real identities on a few dozen services, and nobody suspects a thing.

Well, that’s where I got stuck. I could probably net a lot of money, one way or another, if I did things carefully. But research shows more.

And then what?
Well, that's where I got stuck. Why did you think I hosted so many unprofitable web services?

I could probably net a lot of money, one way or another, if I did things carefully. But research shows more money doesn't make people happier, once they make enough to avoid day-to-day financial stress.

I could mess with people endlessly, but I do that already. I could get a political or religious idea out to most of the world, but since March of 1997 I don't really believe in anything.

So, here I sit, a puppetmaster who wants nothing from his puppets. It's the same problem Google has.

Oh?
OF THE WORLD. OH!
SINCE MARCH OF 1997 I DON'T REALLY BELIEVE IN ANYTHING.

PROBLEM! GOOGLE HAS.

OH?

GOOGLE...
OKAY, EVERYONE, WE CONTROL THE WORLD'S INFORMATION. NOW IT'S TIME TO TURN EVIL. WHAT'S THE PLAN? MAKE BOATLOADS OF MONEY?

WE ALREADY DO!
SET UP A COMPANYWIDE COD4: MODERN WARFARE TOURNAMENT EACH WEEK?
THAT'S NOT EVIL!
OOF, DIGS ON THE LOBBY TV!

OKAY, WE SUCK AT THIS.
So what to do?
Password Managers

- A program which runs on your computer or phone
  - You enter a master password to unlock an encrypted store
  - It can then enter passwords for you in websites
  - It can also generate strong, unique, random passwords
- Often include cloud syncing as well
  - So you *better* make sure your master password is good
  - But now means you have your master password everywhere
- Several options, I personally like 1password but there are others as well
  - EG, others like Keepass
And Fido U2F Security Keys

- A very powerful second-factor for 2-factor authentication
  - Touch to cryptographically prove that you hold the key...
- We will use this as a case study when we get to cryptography...
- But takeaway for now: This *can not be phished*:
  - The security key itself knows which site it is talking to through the browser:
    it knows the difference between www.google.com and www.g00gle.com
  - The touching allows the security key to know that a person is making the request