Network Security 6

Firewalls, DNSSEC

Infosec

A profession that turns normal people into whiskey drinking, swearing, paranoid, disheartened curmudgeons with no hope for the future of computers or humanity.

*Hi, I work in Infosec. Please pass the whiskey. No, I won’t fix your computer.*

@joXn@weirderearth @joXn · 14 Sep 2018

Keeping our workplace safe!

It has been ⏳32768 days since the last integer overflow incident.

SwiftOnSecurity Retweeted

*Not like the rapper* @natzynaz_ · Mar 12

DID YALL KNOW IF YOU RECORD AUDIO AND TAKE NOTES USING ONENOTE, YOU CAN GO BACK TO A LINE IN YOUR NOTES AND HEAR WHAT THE PROFESSOR WAS SAYING AT THE TIME YOU TYPED THOSE NOTES. IT’S ALL SYNCED

I wish I knew this as a freshman
• Motivation: How do you harden a set of systems against external attack?
• Key Observation:
  • The more network services your machines run, the greater the risk
  • Due to larger attack surface
• One approach: on each system, turn off unnecessary network services
  • But you have to know all the services that are running
  • And sometimes some trusted remote users still require access
• Plus key question of scaling
  • What happens when you have to secure 100s/1000s of systems?
  • Which may have different OSs, hardware & users ...
  • Which may in fact not all even be identified ...
Taming Management Complexity

- Possibly more scalable defense: Reduce risk by blocking in the network outsiders from having unwanted access to your network services
  - Interpose a firewall so the traffic to/from the outside must traverse
  - Chokepoint can cover thousands of hosts
Selecting a Security Policy

- Firewall enforces an (access control) policy:
  - Who is allowed to talk to whom, accessing what service?

- Distinguish between inbound & outbound connections
  - Inbound: attempts by external users to connect to services on internal machines
  - Outbound: internal users to external services
  - Why? Because fits with a common threat model. There are thousands of internal users (and we’ve vetted them). There are billions of outsiders.

- Conceptually simple access control policy:
  - Permit inside users to connect to any service
  - External users restricted:
    - Permit connections to services meant to be externally visible
    - Deny connections to services not meant for external access
How To Treat Traffic Not Mentioned in Policy?

• Default Allow: start off permitting external access to services
  • Shut them off as problems recognized

• Default Deny: start off permitting just a few known, well-secured services
  • Add more when users complain (and mgt. approves)

• Pros & Cons?
  • Flexibility vs. conservative design
  • Flaws in Default Deny get noticed more quickly / less painfully

In general, use Default Deny
A Dumb Policy: Deny All Inbound connections...

- The simplest packet filters are *stateless*
  - They examine only individual packets to make a decision
- But even the simplest policy can be hard to implement
  - Deny All Inbound is the default policy on your home connection
- Allow:
  - Any outbound packet
  - Any inbound packet that is a reply... OOPS
- We can fake it for TCP with some ugly hacks
  - Allow all outbound TCP
  - Allow all inbound TCP that does not have both the SYN flag set and the ACK flag not set
    - May still allow an attacker to play some interesting games
- We can't even fake this for UDP!
Stateful Packet Filter

- Stateful packet filter is a router that checks each packet against security rules and decides to forward or drop it
  - Firewall keeps track of all connections (inbound/outbound)
  - Each rule specifies which connections are allowed/denied (access control policy)
Example Rule

- **allow tcp connection 4.5.5.4:* -> 3.1.1.2:80**

  - Firewall should permit TCP connection that’s:
    - Initiated by host with Internet address 4.5.5.4 and
    - Connecting to port 80 of host with IP address 3.1.1.2
  
  - Firewall should permit any packet associated with this connection

- Thus, firewall keeps a table of (allowed) active connections. When firewall sees a packet, it checks whether it is part of one of those active connections. If yes, forward it; if no, check to see if rule should create a new allowed connection
Example Rule

- **allow tcp connection *:/int -> 3.1.1.2:80/ext**
  - Firewall should permit TCP connection that’s:
    - Initiated by host with any internal host and
    - Connecting to port 80 of host with IP address 3.1.1.2 on external Internet
  - Firewall should permit any packet associated with this connection
  - The /int indicates the network interface.
  - This is "Allow all outgoing web requests"
Example Ruleset

- allow tcp connection *:*/*/int -> *:*/*/ext
- allow tcp connection *:*/*/ext -> 1.2.2.3:80/int

- Firewall should permit outbound TCP connections (i.e., those that are initiated by internal hosts)
- Firewall should permit inbound TCP connection to our public webserver at IP address 1.2.2.3
Stateful Filtering

Suppose you want to allow inbound connection to a FTP server, but block any attempts to login as “root”. How would you build a stateful packet filter to do that? In particular, what state would it keep, for each connection?
State Kept

- No state – just drop any packet with root in them
- Is it a FTP connection?
- Where in FTP state (e.g. command, what command)
- Src ip addr, dst ip addr, src port, dst port
- Inbound/outbound connection
- Keep piece of login command until it’s completed – only first 5 bytes of username
Beware!

- Sender might be malicious and trying to sneak through firewall
- “root” might span packet boundaries

1. ..........ro
2. ot.....................

Packet #1  Packet #2
Beware!

- Packets might be re-ordered
Beware!

TTL field in IP header specifies maximum forwarding hop count.

Packet discarded in transit due to TTL hop count expiring.

Assume the Receiver is 20 hops away.

Assume firewall is 15 hops away.

Assume the Receiver is 20 hops away.
Other Kinds of Firewalls

- **Application-level firewall**
  - Firewall acts as a proxy. TCP connection from client to firewall, which then makes a second TCP connection from firewall to server.
  - Only modest benefits over stateful packet filter.
Secure External Access to Inside Machines

- Often need to provide secure remote access to a network protected by a firewall
- Remote access, telecommuting, branch offices, ...
- Create secure channel (Virtual Private Network, or VPN) to tunnel traffic from outside host/network to inside network
- Provides Authentication, Confidentiality, Integrity
- However, also raises perimeter issues

(Try it yourself at https://security.berkeley.edu/services/bsecure/bsecure-remote-access-vpn)
Why Have Firewalls Been Successful?

• Central control – easy administration and update
  • Single point of control: update one config to change security policies
  • Potentially allows rapid response

• Easy to deploy – transparent to end users
  • Easy incremental/total deployment to protect 1000’s

• Addresses an important problem
  • Security vulnerabilities in network services are rampant
  • Easier to use firewall than to directly secure code ...
Firewall Disadvantages

- Functionality loss – less connectivity, less risk
  - May reduce network’s usefulness
  - Some applications don’t work with firewalls
    - Two peer-to-peer users behind different firewalls
- The malicious insider problem
  - Assume insiders are trusted
    - Malicious insider (or anyone gaining control of internal machine) can wreak havoc
- Firewalls establish a security perimeter
  - Like Eskimo Pies: “hard crunchy exterior, soft creamy center”
  - Threat from travelers with laptops, cell phones, ...
Pivoting...

• Thus the goal of the attacker is to "pivot" through the system
• Start running on a single victim system
  • EG, using a channel that goes from the victim to the attacker's server over port 443: an encrypted web connection
• From there, you can now exploit internal systems directly
• Bypassing the primary firewall
• That is the problem: A single breach of the perimeter by an attacker and you can no longer make any assertions about subsequent internal state
Takeaways on Firewalls

- Firewalls: Reference monitors and access control all over again, but at the network level
- Attack surface reduction
- Centralized control
Break
Random fact...

Grew up in Huntington Beach, CA
“surf city”

Took him 8 years to finish grad school because he didn’t want to work for a living
A Warning:
Slides have a lot of detail about DNSSEC

- You’re not required to know all the details, but should understand the high-level overview
  - Which entities hold keys and what information is signed using those keys
  - How we provide authenticated denial of existence
- Why study DNSSEC?
  - It is a real world PKI with some very unique trust properties:
    - A constrained *path of trust* along *established business relationships*.
  - It is important to appreciate the real world of what it takes to build a secure system
Host at \texttt{xyz.poly.edu} wants IP address for \texttt{www.mit.edu}

Idea: connections \{1,8\}, \{2,3\}, \{4,5\} and \{6,7\} all run over SSL / TLS
But This Doesn't Work

- TLS provides **channel** integrity, but we need **data** integrity
- TLS in this scheme is not **end to end**
  - In particular, the recursive resolver is a **known adversary**:
    - "NXDOMAIN wildcarding": a "helpful" page when you give a typo
    - Malicious MitM of targeted schemes for profit
- TLS in this scheme is **painfully slow**:
  - DNS lookups are 1 RTT, this is 3 RTTs!
- The design of DNSSEC actually has no **confidentiality**
  - We use DNS to contact hosts:
    Keeping the DNS secret doesn't generally disguise who you talk to!
DNS security: If the Attacker sees the traffic...

- All bets are off:
  - DNS offers NO protection against an on-path or in-path adversary
    - Attacker sees the request, sends the reply, and the reply is accepted!

- The recursive resolver is the most common in-path adversary!
  - It is implicitly trusted
  - Yet *often abuses* the trust

- And this scheme keeps the resolver as the in-path adversary
So Instead Let's Make DNS a PKI and records certificates

- **www.berkeley.edu** is already trusting the DNS authorities for **berkeley.edu**, **.edu**, and **.**(the root)
- Since **www.berkeley.edu** is in bailiwick for all these servers and you end up having to contact all of them to get an answer.

- **So let's start signing things:**
  - . will sign .edu's key
  - .edu will sign Berkeley's key
  - Berkeley's key will sign the record

- **DNSSEC: DNS Security Extensions**
  - A heirarchical, distributed trust system to validate the mappings of names to values
Enter DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions)

- An extension to the DNS protocol to enable cryptographic authentication of DNS records
- Designed to prove the value of an answer, **or that there is no answer**!
- A restricted path of trust
  - Unlike the HTTPS CA (Certificate Authority) system where your browser trusts every CA to speak for every site

With backwards compatibility:
- Authority servers don’t need to support DNSSEC
  - But clients should know that the domain is not secured
- Recursive and stub resolvers that don’t support DNSSEC must not receive DNSSEC information
Reminder: DNS Message Structure

- DNS messages:
  - A fixed header: Transaction ID, flags, etc...
  - 1 question: Asking for a name and type
  - 0-N answers: The set of answers
  - 0-N authority: ("glue records"): Information about the authority servers and/or ownership of the domain
  - 0-N additional: ("glue records"): Information about the authority server’s IP addresses
  - Glue records are needed for the resolution process but aren’t the answer to the question
Reminder: DNS Resource Records and RRSETs

- DNS records (Resource Records) can be one of various types
  - Name TYPE TTL Value

- Groups of records of the same name and type form RRSETs:
  - E.g. all the nameservers for a given domain.
  - All the records in the RRSET have the same name, type, and TTL
The First New Type: OPT

- DNS contains some old limits:
  - Only 8 total flag bits, and messages are limited to 512B
- DNSSEC messages are much bigger
- DNSSEC needs two additional flags
  - DO: Want DNSSEC information
  - CD: Don’t check DNSSEC information
- EDNS0 (Extension Mechanisms for DNS) adds the OPT resource record
  - Sent in the request and reply in the additional section
    - Uses CLASS field to specify how large a UDP reply can be handled
    - Uses TTL field to add 16 flag bits
      - Only flag bit currently used is DO
  - Used to signal to the authority that the client desires DNSSEC information
The second new type, a certificate: **RRSIG**

- A signature over an RRSET (not just a single answer): Multiple fields
  - Type: The DNS type which this is the RRSIG for
  - Algorithm: IANA assigned identifier telling the encryption algorithm
  - Labels: Number of segments in the DNS name
  - Original TTL: The TTL for the record delivered by the authority
  - Signature Expiration
  - Signature Inception
    - Both in seconds since January 1, 1970
  - Key tag: What key was used (roughly. Its a checksum on the key bits)
  - Signer’s name
  - Signature
So an **RRSIG** in action
(The **NS** entries for **isc.org**.)

- Type of the record: It's an RRSIG for
- Algorithm #5: RSA/SHA-1
- 2 labels in the name
- 7200s initial TTL
- Key tag 50012
- Key belongs to isc.org.
- And lots of cryptogarbage...

```bash
nweaver% dig +dnssec NS isc.org @8.8.8.8
```

```plaintext
;; ANSWER SECTION:
isc.org.                4282    IN      NS      ns.isc.afilias-nst.info.
isc.org.                4282    IN      NS      sfba.sns-pb.isc.org.
isc.org.                4282    IN      NS      ams.sns-pb.isc.org.
isc.org.                4282    IN      RRSIG   NS 5 2 7200 2013051233253

20130415233253 50012 isc.org. HUXmb89gB4pVehWRcuSkJg020gw2d8QMhTrcu1ZD7nKo
miXHQFupxL5vT
iq5VUREGBQtnT7FEdPEJlCiJeogbAmqt3F1V5kBfdxZLe/EzYzgSGW
sy/VHI5d+t6/EiuCjM01UXCH1+L0YAqiHox5gsWMzRW2kvjZXhRHE2+U i1Q=
```
How Do We Know What Key To Use Part 1: **DNSKEY**

- The **DNSKEY** record stores key information
  - 16 bits of flags
  - Protocol identifier (always 3)
  - Algorithm identifier
  - And then the key itself

- The keys are split into multiple roles
  - The Key Signing Key (KSK) is used only to sign the **DNSKEY** RRSET
  - The Zone Signing Key (ZSK) is used to sign everything else

- The client has hardwired in one key for .
  - This is the root’s KSK (Key Signing Key)
The DNSKEY for .

- The first is the root’s ZSK
- The second is the root’s KSK

- The RRSIG is signed using the KSK
- Now the client can verify that the ZSK is correct

nweaver% dig +norecurse +dnssec DNSKEY . @a.root-servers.net
...

;; ANSWER SECTION:
.
172800 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8
AwEAAc5byZvwHMUCqt7WSeAr30Z2ao4x0Yj/3UcbtFzQoT67N7CyMmN
qFmfvXxksSi/E+mtT0axFVDjiJtLklUsyqIm9ZlWGZKU3GZqI9Sfp1Bj
QkhI+yLa4m4y4z2N28rxWxSWCYY740PREnMUtgXRdthwABYAb2Wpum3y1
RgxNCP1/
.
172800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8
AwEAAagAIKlvZrCP6Io7gEzahOR+9w29euxjhVvLOyQbSEW008gcCjF
FVQUTf6v58fLjwBd0Y10EzrAcQqBGChZ/RS1Io08g0NfnfL2MTJRkoxX
bfDancVpQuYehg37NZW4AQ9VnMVDxP/VHL496M/QzXkNj5/Efucp2gaD
X6RS6CXpoY68LsvPVjR0ZSwzz1apAzvN9dlzEheX7ICBBtuA6G3LQpz
W5h0A2hzCTMjJ3Pj8LbqF6dsV6D0Bzgul0sGicG0Yl70yQdXfZ57relS
Qageu+iPAdTT25AsRTOuob80N6clmqrAmRLKB1p1fwYB4N7knNNuIq
QxA+Uk1ihz0=
.
172800 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 0 172800 20130425235959 20130411000000 19036 .

{Cryptographic Goop}
But how do we know what key to use part 2? **DS**

- The **DS** (Delegated Signer) record is relatively simple
  - The key tag
  - The algorithm identifier
  - The hash function used
  - The hash of the signer’s name and the KSK
- The **parent** signs **DS** (Delegated Signer) records for the child’s keys
  - So for the DS for .org is provided by the root
  - This is returned with the NS RRSET by the parent
  - And the RRSIG is signed by the parent, not the child
The **DS** for **org**.

- The two DS records are for the same key
- Just with different hash functions, SHA-256 and SHA-1
- The **RRSIG** is signed using the . ZSK not the KSK
- And covers both DS records

```bash
nweaver% nweaver% dig +norecurse +dnssec www.isc.org @a.root-servers.net

... ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
org. 172800 IN NS d0.org.afilias-nst.org.
...
org. 172800 IN NS a0.org.afilias-nst.info.
org. 86400 IN DS 21366 7 2
96EEB2FFD9B00CD4694E78278B5EFDBAB0A80446567B69F634DA078F0 D90F01BA
org. 86400 IN DS 21366 7 1 E6C1716CFB6BDC84E84CE1AB5510DAC69173B5B2
org. 86400 IN RRSIG DS 8 1 86400 20130423000000 20130415230000 20580 . {Cryptographic Goop}
```
### DNS Lookup for www.isc.org

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>DNSKEY</td>
<td>{cryptogoop}</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>

#### User's ISP's

- Recursive Resolver

#### Authority Server (the “root”)

- Answers:
  - org. NS a0.afilias-nst.info
  - org. IN DS 21366 7 2 {cryptogoop}
  - org. IN DS 21366 7 1 {cryptogoop}
  - org. IN RRSIG DS 8 1 86400 20130423000000 20130415230000 20580 . {cryptogoop}

- Additional:
  - a0.afilias-nst.info A 199.19.56.1
Putting It All Together To Lookup www.isc.org

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<td>. IN DNSKEY</td>
<td>257 3 8</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>. IN DNSKEY</td>
<td>256 3 8</td>
<td>{cryptogoop}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>. IN RRSIG DNSKEY</td>
<td>8 0 172800 20130425235959 20130411000000 19036</td>
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User's ISP's

Recursive Resolver
Putting It All Together To Lookup [www.isc.org](http://www.isc.org)

User’s ISP’s Recursive Resolver

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### org. Authority Server

- A www.isc.org
- Answers:
  - Authority:
    - isc.org. DS {cryptogoop}
    - isc.org. RRSIG DS {cryptogoop}
  - Additional:
    - sfba.sns-pb.isc.org. A 199.6.1.30

Putting It All Together To Lookup www.isc.org
## Putting It All Together To Lookup [www.isc.org](http://www.isc.org)

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<tr>
<td>isc.org.</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>sfbay.sns-pb.isc.org</td>
<td>86400</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sfbay.sns-pb.isc.org</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>149.20.64.3</td>
<td>86400</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>DNSKEY</td>
<td>{cryptogoop}</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
And so on...

• The process ends up requiring:
  • Ask the root for www.isc.org and the DNSKEY for .
  • Ask org for www.isc.org and the DNSKEY for org.
  • Ask isc.org for www.isc.org and the DNSKEY for isc.org

• Dig commands
  • dig +dnssec +norecurse www.isc.org @a.root-servers.net
  • dig +dnssec +norecurse DNSKEY . @a.root-servers.net
  • dig +dnssec +norecurse www.isc.org @199.19.56.1
  • dig +dnssec +norecurse DNSKEY org. @199.19.56.1
  • dig +dnssec +norecurse www.isc.org @149.20.64.3
  • dig +dnssec +norecurse DNSKEY isc.org. @149.20.64.3
So why such a baroque structure?

- Goal is end-to-end data **integrity**
  - Even authorized intermediaries such as the recursive resolver don’t need to be trusted
  - Don’t benefit (much) from confidentiality since DNS is used to contact hosts
- Signature generation can be done all offline
  - Attacker must compromise the signature generation system, not just the authority nameserver
    - Allows other authority servers to be simply mirrors
- Validation can happen at either the recursive resolver or the client
  - The DNSKEYs cache very well
    - So most subsequent lookups will not need to do these lookups
- Constrained path of trust
  - For a given name, can enumerate the trusted entities
Another reason: Latency

- The DNS community is obsessed with latency
  - Thus the refusal to simply switch to TCP for all DNS traffic
- A recursive resolver may
  - Automatically fetch the **DNSKEY** record with a parallel request
  - While waiting for a child’s response, validate the parent’s **DS** record
    - Generally the validation should be the same time or faster so we can do this in parallel
  - Result: Only two signature validations of latency added even on uncached requests and no additional network latency
    - One for the **DNSKEY** to get the ZSK
    - One for the final RRSET

- A stub resolver looking up foo.example.com:
  - In parallel fetch **DS** and **DNSKEY** for foo.example.com, example.com, .com, and the DNSKEY for .
Two additional complications

• **NOERROR**:  
  • The name exists but there is no record of that given type for that name  
  • For DNSSEC, prove that there is no ds record  
    • Says the subdomain doesn’t sign with DNSSEC  

• **NXDOMAIN**:  
  • The name does not exist  

• **NSEC (Provable denial of existence), a record with just two fields**:  
  • Next domain name  
    • The next valid name in the domain  
  • Valid types for this name  
    • In a bitmap for efficiency
NSEC in action

- Name is valid so NOERROR but no answers
- Single NSEC record for www.isc.org:
  - No names exist between www.isc.org and www-dev.isc.org
  - www.isc.org only has an A, AAAA, RRSIG, and NSEC record

nweaver% dig +dnssec TXT www.isc.org @8.8.8.8
...
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 20430
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 4, ADDITIONAL: 1
...
;; QUESTION SECTION:
www.isc.org. IN TXT

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
www.isc.org. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC {RRSIG DATA}
The Use of **NSEC**

- Proof that a name exists but no type exists for that name
  - Critical for “This subdomain doesn’t support DNSSEC”: Return an **NSEC** record with the authority stating “There is no **DS** record”

- Proof that a name does not exist
  - It falls between the two **NSEC** names
  - Plus an **NSEC** saying “there is no wildcard”

- Allows trivial domain enumeration
  - Attacker just starts at the beginning and walks through the NSEC records
    - Some consider this bad...
So NSEC3

- Rather than having the name, use a **hash** of the name
  - Hash Algorithm
  - Flags
  - Iterations of the hash algorithm

- Salt (optional)
- The next name
- The RRTYPEs for this name
- Otherwise acts like NSEC, just in a different space

nweaver% dig +dnssec TXT org @199.19.57.1
...
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
...
h9p7u7tr2u91d0v0ljs9l1gidnp90u3h.org. 86400 IN NSEC3 1 1 1 D399EAAB
  H9Q3IMI6H6CIJ4708DK5A3HMJLEI0PF NS SOA RRSIG DNSKEY NSEC3PARAM
h9p7u7tr2u91d0v0ljs9l1gidnp90u3h.org. 86400 IN RRSIG NSEC3 {RRSIG}
Comments on NSEC3

• It doesn't really prevent enumeration
  • You get a hash-space enumeration instead, but since people chose reasonable names...
  • An attacker can just do a brute-force attack to find out what names exist and don't exist after enumerating the hash space

• The salt is mostly pointless!
  • Since the whole name is hashed, foo.example.com and foo.example.org will have different hashes anyway

• The only way to really prevent enumeration is to dynamically sign values
  • But that defeats the purpose of DNSSEC's offline signature generation
DNSSEC transport

- A validating client must be able to fetch the DNSSEC related records
  - It may be through the recursive resolver
  - It may be by contacting arbitrary DNS servers on the Internet
- One of these two must work or the client *can not validate* DNSSEC
  - This acts to limit DNSSEC's real use:
    Signing other types such as cryptographic fingerprints (e.g. DANE)
Oh, And What If Your Registrar Is Compromised...

- The **registrar** is the company where you registered your domain name
- So if you register `foo.com`, you contract with a registrar for `.com`
- You provide your registrar with your DS record
- So if the bad guy takes over your registrar or your account with your registrar...
- Your DNSSEC is screwed, the bad guy just replaces both the DS and NS entries with their own...
- And now can intercept *all non-encrypted traffic* you receive, since they can answer for your DNS
But What About TLS?

- The bad guy can intercept all traffic going to your domain...
- And TLS certificates like LetsEncrypt work by validating that you can put stuff on your domain...
- So the bad guy can also mint TLS certificates
- So he can decrypt all the "secure" web traffic, be a Man-in-the-Middle, and then forward traffic onward!
- Some actor has been doing this for espionage in the middle east!
- Only defense beyond securing your registrar and registration is to also use certificate pinning
DNSSEC summary

- OPT records to say "I want DNSSEC"
- RRSIG records are certificates
- DNSKEY records hold public keys
- DS records hold key fingerprints
  - Used by the parent to tell the child's keys
- NSEC/NSEC3 records to prove that a name doesn't exist or there is no record of that type