





	Goals for Today		What is in a PTE?				
 Finish dis Protection 	scussion of both Address Trans n	slation and	 What is in a Page Table Entry (or PTE)? Pointer to next-level page table or to actual page Permission bits: valid, read-only, read-write, write-only 				
• Caching a Note: Some s adapted from	and TLBs slides and/or pictures in the following slides ©2005 Silberschatz, Galvin,	g are and Gagne	 Example: Intel x86 architecture PTE: Address same format previous slide (10, 10, 12-bit offset) Intermediate page tables called "Directories" Page Frame Number Free OLDADEUVP 31-12 11-9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 P: Present (same as "valid" bit in other architectures) W: Writeable U: User accessible PWT: Page write transparent: external cache write-through PCD: Page cache disabled (page cannot be cached) A: Accessed: page has been accessed recently D: Dirty (PTE only): page has been modified recently L = 1 = 4MB page (directory only). Battom 22 bits of virtual address serve as affset 				
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 Does protection require hardware support for translation and dual-mode behavior? No: Normally use hardware, but anything you can do in hardware can also do in software (possibly expensive) Protection via Strong Typing Restrict programming language so that you can't express program that would trash another program Loader needs to make sure that program produced by valid compiler or all bets are off Example languages: LISP, Ada, Modula-3 and Java Protection via software fault isolation: Language independent approach: have compiler generate object code that provably can't step out of bounds Compiler puts in checks for every "dangerous" operation (loads, stores, etc). Again, need special loader. 	it Hardware
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do certain things (Proof Carrying Code)	" that code cannot)
- Or: use virtual machine to guarantee safe behavior (loads and stores recompiled on fly to check bounds) 3/2/10 CS162 ©UCB Spring 2010 Lec 13.15	safe behavior check bounds) Lec 13.15

Administrivia

- Midterm in 1 week:
 - Monday, 3/9, 3:30-6:30pm, (277 Cory Hall this room!)
 - Should be 2 hour exam with extra time
 - Closed book, one page of hand-written notes (both sides)
- No class on day of Midterm
 - Extra Office Hours: Next tuesday 1:00-3:00
- Midterm Topics
 - Topics: Everything up to Thursday 3/4
 - History, Concurrency, Multithreading, Synchronization, Protection/Address Spaces, TLBs
- Make sure to fill out Group Evaluations!
- Project 2
 - Initial Design Document due Thursday 3/4
 - Look at the lecture schedule to keep up with due dates!
- 3/2/10

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 Set Associative or Fully Associative: - Random - LRU (Least Recently Used) 								
<u>Size</u>	2-way 4-way 8-way ze LRU Random LRU Random LRU Rando							
16 KB	5.2%	5.7%	4.7%	5.3%	4.4%5.0%			
64 KB	1.9%	2.0%	1.5%	1.7%	1.4%1.5%			
256 KB	1.15%	1.17%	1.13%	1.13%	1.12%1.12%			





What Actual	y Happens on a TLB Mi	iss?	Who	at happens on a Context Switch?	
 Hardware traversed On TLB miss, hardwatable to fill TLB (maximum stable to fill TLB (maximum stable to fill TLB (maximum stable to fill TLB (maximum stable) If PTE valid, hards with stable to fill TLB (maximum stable) Software traversed for the stable to fill the stable	page tables: vare in MMU looks at cur ay walk multiple levels) Jware fills TLB and processo invalid, causes Page Fault, at to do afterwards Page tables (like MIPS) ssor receives TLB fault ge table to find PTE TLB and returns from fault invalid, internally calls Pag de hardware traversal ystems tend to have more slation for many things s of an operating system	rrent page or never knows after which) t e Fault handler e TLB faults	 Need to do addresses to - Address S longer vali Options? Invalidate	something, since TLBs map virtue o physical addresses space just changed, so TLB entries r id! TLB: simple but might be expensive f switching frequently between processe rocessID in TLB an architectural solution: needs hardwa inslation tables change? ole, to move page from memory to d in lidate TLB entry! rise, might think that page is still in met	al no s? re isk or mory!
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