

Worms and Viruses

CS 161/194-1
Anthony D. Joseph
October 26, 2005

Outline

- What is a Worm/Virus?
- Why are they created?
- Infection Vectors and Payloads
 - How they propagate and what they do
- Worm propagation rates
- Virus/Worm detection/prevention
 - File scanners, host scanners, network scanners
 - Host monitors
- Targeted Worms and Viruses

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Internet Worms and Viruses

- Self-replicating code and data
 - Worms are self-propagating (search network)
 - Typically exploit vulnerabilities in an application running on a machine or the machine's OS
 - Viruses typically require a human interaction before propagating
 - Running e-mail attachment, or click link in e-mail
 - Inserting/connecting "infected" media to a PC
- Behavioral invariant: they seek to propagate

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Why Create Worms/Viruses?

- Formerly was a prestige motivation
 - Finding bugs, mass infections, ...
 - 50% of viruses contain crackers'/groups' names
- Cracking for profit, including organized crime
 - Create massive botnets 10-100,000+ machines infected
 - Overloading/attacking websites, pay-per-click scams, spamming/phishing e-mail, or phishing websites...
 - More on botnets on Wednesday...
 - Corporate/personal espionage (SSN, passwords, docs, ...)
- Closing security loopholes
 - Is this ethical?

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Revisiting Zotab Virus (August 2005)

- Financially-driven motive
 - Infected machines and set IE security to low (enables pop-up website ads)
 - Revenue from ads that now appear
 - User may remove virus, but IE settings will likely remain set to low
 - Continued revenue from ads...
- Update (August 25th)

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– Farid Essebar was arrested in Morocco and Atilla Ektici was detained by police in

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Infection Vectors and Payloads

- Two components to worms and viruses
- Infection vectors
 - How they get onto your machine and then propagate
- Payloads
 - What they do on your machine

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Infection Vectors

- Network scanning for potential victims (worms)
- Local/server/P2P files (viruses/worms)
- E-mail message components (viruses)
- Web sites (worms/viruses)

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Network Scanning for Potential Victims (Worms)

- How to scan the network?
 - Pick address, try to exploit protocol vulnerabilities
- How to generate addresses?
 - Use a PRG, but how to initialize the PRG?
- Same seed on each host (common flaw!)
 - Need to generate local seed...
- Generate 32-bit IP address or 4 8-bit parts?
 - Is even or uneven probing better?
 - Local hosts are likely to be same OS/patch level and have higher bandwidth
 - Also local addr space is denser

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Worm Exploits

- Buffer overflow on servers/clients
 - Identify de-serializing errors, send exploit code
 - MSBlaster DCOM/RPC exploit
- Forcing protocol parsing errors
 - Identify errors in protocol handling/state machine
 - Morris worm fingerd remote code exec
- Weak passwords
 - Brute force: try name backwards, appended, ...
- Out-of-the box configuration errors
 - Default ID/password
 - Debugging mode enabled (Morris worm sendmail exploit)

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Infecting via Files

- Factory installed
- Removable media (viruses)
 - Floppies, CD/DVD-ROMs, USB drives/keys
- Files on shared servers and P2P networks (worms/viruses)
 - Have to convince user to click to open...
 - Or, an infected existing document
- E-mail file attachments (viruses)
 - Have to convince user to click to open...

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Infecting via E-mail

- E-mail attachments (viruses)
 - Files (see last slide)
 - Scripts: Windows Scripting Host
 - HTML files: browser exploits (next slide)
- HTML-formatted e-mail messages
 - Browser exploits (next slide)
 - User clicks on links (leads to browser exploits)
 - Windows Scripting Host
 - Executes simply by viewing e-mail msg (LoveLetter)
 - Embedded images (JPEG/PNG render exploits)

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Why E-mail-based Infections?


- E-mail has become globally ubiquitous
 - By 2006, e-mail traffic is expected to surge to 60 billion messages daily
- Message Labs scanned 14.7 billion emails scanned, found >6% were viral
- Nearly all of the most virulent worms of 2004 spread by email (Symantec/Sophos)

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Increasing Sophistication



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Web Sites (Worms/Viruses)

- Set up malicious server, or infect existing server
 - Porn, Warez/Crackz/Gamez, anti-spyware(!) sites
- Exploit bugs in browser rendering engine
 - “Drive-by-download” infection
- ActiveX exploits
 - Leverage bugs in ActiveX components
 - Enable remote script/code execution
- HTML parsing vulnerabilities
 - Redirect to malicious sites
 - Cause buffer overflow, or file download and execute

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Types of Payloads

- Bootstrap loader
- Message
- Propagation engine
 - System settings/DNS changer, file installer
- Destructive actions
- Zombie software installer
- Trojans/Browser Help Objects installer
- But, sometimes payloads don't work
 - Inadvertent system crashes instead

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Payloads (1/2)

- Bootstrap loader
 - Used when exploit can only send a small amount of code/script
 - Establishes TFTP connection back to infecting machine to retrieve real payload
- Message (could be null)
- Propagation engine
 - Permanently installs virus/worm by changing system settings, or replacing/infecting system files (rootkit)
 - Infect local/server/P2P documents, music, etc.
- Malicious: disk corruption, or BIOS re-flash

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Payloads (2/2)

- Zombie software install
 - Password cracker
 - Spambot or Distributed Denial of Service bot
- Trojans/Browser Help Objects installer
 - Adware/spyware install
 - Typically, implemented as BHOs
 - Collect personal info, logins/passwords for financial sites, files/data and send to attacker
 - Create popups and search redirects

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Fast Propagating Worm/Virus Side Effects

- Traffic floods network links
 - Slammer prevented admins from accessing servers to shut them down/patch them
 - Affected the access links
 - Border Gateway Protocol heartbeats monitor links
 - Timeouts caused links to drop, stopped worm traffic
 - Heartbeats get through, links come back up, worm traffic flows again (repeat!)
- Overwhelms servers (e-mail/other)
 - Denial of service (sometimes intentional)

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Virus/Worm Toolkits

- Dozens of websites and downloadable toolkits for building worms/viruses
- Make it easy for script kiddies to create new threats
- But, most are built from common building blocks with the same polymorphic engines
 - Can create signatures for blocks and engines
- Encryption is a looming threat...

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Propagation Rates

- Classic theory
 - Function of # vulnerable hosts (N), initial compromise rate (K), start time (T)
- Logisitics equation:

$$a = \frac{e^{K(t-T)}}{1 + e^{K(t-T)}}$$
- a is number of infected hosts


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Code Red I Propagation

- Can't easily count infected hosts
 - Count scans instead
- Theory matches observed




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Propagation Rates (New Theory)

- Slammer
- Doesn't apply to fast propagating worms
 - Links have bandwidth / latency constraints
 - No universal connectivity



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Other Factors


- TCP (3-way) versus UDP
 - Latency between attacker and victim has major impact for TCP
 - Timeout delay when scanning
- Also, function of scan algorithm
 - PRN quality
 - Broken algorithms mean missed hosts
 - Seed computation
 - Scan distribution (even or local bias?)

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Propagation Behavior



- More efficient scanning finds victims faster (< 1hr)
- Even faster propagation is possible if you cheat
 - Wasted effort scanning non-existent or non-vulnerable hosts
 - Warhol: seed worm with a "hit list" of vulnerable hosts (15 mins)

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Virus Propagation Rates

- How to determine virus propagation rates?
 - Don't have universal connectivity
 - Small worlds effect: 6-degrees of separation
 - Have to account for queuing delays
 - Limited (delayed) by human interaction rate
 - Very hard to model analytically
- E-mail viruses tend to appear first in Asia, then Europe, finally North/South America
 - Follows business day/timezones

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Detection/Prevention Techniques

- File and host scanners and monitors
 - Signature-based scanners
 - Have "zero" false negatives/positives
 - Significant human delay (hours to days)
 - Heuristic-based scanners
 - Non-zero false negative/positive rates
- Network scanners
- Firewalls
- Throttling

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Signature Generation Requires Human Intervention

- Human element slows reaction times
 - Malcode collection can take hours
 - Signature generation can take hours to days
 - Signature distribution can take hours to days
 - Novel malcode propagates faster than signatures
- Signature methods are mired in an arms race
 - MyDoom.m and Netsky.b slipped through EECS mail scanners
 - Malcode: polymorphic today, encrypted in future
 - Signature-based approach alone is insufficient

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File/Host Scanners and Monitors

- File
 - One-time/periodic "scan" or continuous real-time monitor
 - Scan all files on read/write
 - Heuristic: look for code similarities (e.g., propagation engines), not identical matches
- Host scanner
 - One-time/periodic "scan" or continuous real-time monitor
 - Scan active processes, bios, registry, ... for infections
 - Heuristic: examine process memory, look for anomalous registry entries, ...

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Network Scanners

- Place at network ingress point
- Scan all incoming traffic, especially e-mail
 - Uses signatures like file scanners
 - Also heuristic e-mail scanning (phishing, spam)
- Can also apply exfiltration scanning
 - Phishing attempts, viruses/worms that attempt to transmit personal/sensitive/corporate data
- Scaling and reliability issues

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Firewalls

- Usually deployed at network ingress points
 - Default deny all
 - Stops worm scans
 - Except for public services, like web servers!
 - And, trusted servers/clients
 - Can lead to complacency
 - Remember, network is only one propagation method
 - Laptops are a problem
- Partial solution: host-based firewalls
 - Now mandatory at Berkeley
 - Still need signatures for detection

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Network Throttling

- Heuristic approach: limit #connections/min
 - Idea: slow down worm scans or outgoing virus e-mails
 - Algorithm placed in routers
- Limit outbound connections to slow down worms
- Can't set a fixed limit, why?
 - Users have different sending rates, servers, ...
- Inverse throttling
 - Tar pits
 - Delay connections to non-existent/protected hosts
 - Consumes precious OS resources on worm machine

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Example Scenario

- You arrive at work and start reading e-mail
- In your inbox is a business proposal from your biggest competitor
- You're curious so you open and read the proposal
- You decide to ignore it and continue on with your work
- Two weeks later you lose your biggest clients to the competitor, they lowball you on a bid, announce a better version of your planned killer product, ...
- Fact or fiction?

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Fact!

- You're the victim of a targeted attack
- Opening the proposal secretly installed a Trojan horse program
 - The Trojan searched your hard drives and network shares for confidential documents and e-mail messages
 - Then, it sent them out to a server run by your competitor
- Custom attacks are hard to detect
 - One-of nature means no signatures

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Targeted Attacks

- Israel (May 19, 2005)
 - 7 businessmen and 11 private detectives arrested for using Trojan horse for cyber industrial espionage
 - Satellite TV, cell phone, auto import business
- Trojan designed by husband-wife pair in Britain
 - Named Rona (variant of Hotword Trojan)
- Caught because husband installed it on father-in-law's computer and it posted copies of a private manuscript online

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Designing a Targeted Attack

- How to profile target to identify OS, SW?
 - Send an e-mail message and examine reply!
 - User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.5) Gecko/20031007
 - More work to determine OS/SW patch levels
- Then craft an attack:
 - HTML script vulnerabilities
 - Embedded/remote images
 - Web site exploits
 - Office documents (macros, scripts, ...)
 - Other document types (PDF, PS, ...)

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Worm/Virus Summary

- Arms race between creators and protectors
- Existing signature approaches are limited
- Financial motive poses growing threat
- High risk from Warhol worms
- Viruses are still a critical threat
 - FBI survey of 269 companies in 2004 found that viruses caused ~\$55 million in damages

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