

Statistical Database Security (Part 2)

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Census bureau problem

- Wants to publish average statistics
- But how do they change when a new person joins?

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Approaches that don't work

- Adding noise
 - Why not?
- Thresholding
 - Why not?
- Revealing Medians
 - Why not?

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Example

Name	Sex	Race	Aid	Fines	Drugs	Dorm
Adams	M	C	5000	45	1	Holmes
Bailey	M	B	0	0	0	Grey
Chin	F	A	3000	20	0	West
Dewitt	M	B	1000	35	3	Grey
Earhart	F	C	2000	95	1	Holmes
Fein	F	C	1000	15	0	West
Groff	M	C	4000	0	3	West
Hill	F	B	5000	10	2	Holmes
Koch	F	C	0	0	1	West
Liu	F	A	0	10	2	Grey
Majors	M	C	2000	0	2	Grey

- List NAME where
 $SEX=M \wedge DRUGS=1$

- List NAME where
 $(SEX=M \wedge DRUGS=1) \vee (SEX \neq M \wedge SEX \neq F) \vee (DORM=AYRES)$

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Census rules

- "n items over k percent"
- Withhold data if n items represent over k percent of data reported.

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Sum attack

- Sums of Financial Aid by Dorm and Sex

	Holmes	Grey	West	Total
M	5000	3000	4000	12000
F	7000	0	4000	11000
Total	12000	3000	8000	23000

- Conclusion - no woman in Grey receives financial aid

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Count attack

	Holmes	Grey	West	Total
M	5000	3000	4000	12000
F	7000	0	4000	11000
Total	12000	3000	8000	23000

	Holmes	Grey	West	Total
M	1	3	1	5
F	2	1	3	6
Total	3	4	4	11

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Median attack

- By manipulating the data or finding the median of two intersecting sets, can reveal individual data
- Median aid when sex = m, drugs = 2

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Tracker attacks

- Instead of asking
 - count ((SEX=F) \wedge (RACE=C) \wedge (DORM=Holmes))
- We ask
 - count (SEX=F)
 - count ((SEX=F) \wedge (RACE \neq C) \vee (DORM \neq Holmes))

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More generally any linear combination

- If we ask n queries of n variables, we can often manipulate the results

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Approaches to control

- Limited response suppression
 - But vulnerable to trackers
- Combined results and rounding
 - Vulnerable to iterated queries
- Random sample
 - Inaccurate results, vulnerable to iterated queries
- Random data perturbation
 - Vulnerable to iterated queries
- Query analysis
 - Really hard

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Imperfect solutions for inference

- Suppress obviously sensitive information
- Track what the user knows
- Disguise the data

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