### **Web Security**

#### **CS 161: Computer Security**

#### Prof. Raluca Ada Popa




Nov 1, 2015

Some content adapted from materials by David Wagner or Dan Boneh

### What is the Web?

A platform for deploying applications and sharing information, *portably* and *securely* 



### HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol)

#### A common data communication protocol on the web

CL	IENT BROWSER	
	arebank.com/account.html	<b>http f</b> Get /a
	Smith	Host:
Accounts Bill Pay Mail Transfers		
		<mark>אדז</mark> אדז אדז

WEB SERVER

#### HTTP REQUEST:

GET /account.html HTTP/1.1 Host: www.safebank.com


#### HTTP RESPONSE: HTTP/1.0 200 OK

<html> . . </html>



### URLs


#### Global identifiers of network-retrievable resources




### HTTP



### **HTTP Request**







### HTTP



### **HTTP Response**



Can be a webpage



### HTML

A language to create structured documents One can embed images, objects, or create interactive forms



### CSS (Cascading Style Sheets)

Style sheet language used for describing the presentation of a document

# index.css p.serif { font-family: "Times New Roman", Times, serif; } p.sansserif { font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; }



### Javascript


Programming language used to manipulate web pages. It is a high-level, untyped and interpreted language with support for objects.

#### Supported by all web browsers

```
<script>
function myFunction() {
document.getElementById("demo").innerHTML = "Text changed.";
}
</script>
```

#### Very powerful!

### HTTP



#### WEB SERVER


#### HTTP REQUEST:

GET /account.html HTTP/1.1 Host: www.safebank.com

#### HTTP RESPONSE: HTTP/1.0 200 OK <html> . . </html> webpage



### Page rendering



Thanks to you


Stay in the know

Online Bill Pay

Family budgets

### DOM (Document Object Model)

a cross-platform model for representing and interacting with objects in HTML



### Web & HTTP 101

CL	IENT BROWSER 🧕
000	safebank.com ×
← ⇒ C (	🗋 safebank.com/account.html 😎 🔧
SAFE	BANK Alice
	Smith
Accounts Bill Pay Mail Transfers	

#### WEB SERVER

#### HTTP REQUEST:

GET /account.html HTTP/1.1 Host: www.safebank.com

#### HTTP RESPONSE:

HTTP/1.0 200 OK <html> . . . </html>



### The power of Javascript

Get familiarized with it so that you can think of all the attacks one can do with it

### What can you do with Javascript?

Almost anything you want to the DOM!

A JS script embedded on a page can modify in almost arbitrary ways the DOM of the page. The same happens if an attacker manages to get you load a script into your page.

w3schools.com has nice interactive tutorials

## Example of what Javascript can do...

Can change HTML content:

JavaScript can change HTML content.

```
<button type="button"
onclick="document.getElementById('demo').innerHTML =
'Hello JavaScript!'">
    Click Me!</button>
```

DEMO from w3schools.com

### Other examples

Can change images Can chance style of elements Can hide elements Can unhide elements Can change cursor

### Other example: can access cookies

#### Read cookie with JS:

var x = document.cookie;

#### Change cookie with JS:

document.cookie = "username=John Smith; expires=Thu, 18 Dec 2013 12:00:00 UTC; path=/";



### Frames

- Enable embedding a page within a page
- <iframe src="URL"></iframe>

Earn money from relevant ads on your website	src = google.com/ name = awglogin	
Google AdSense matches ads to your site's content, and you earn money whenever your visitors click on them.	Sign up now »	<pre>&gt; outer page</pre>
<section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><text><text><text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header>	Sign in to Google AdSense with your Google Account Email: Password: Sign in	inner page

### Frames



- Modularity
  - Brings together content from multiple sources
  - Client-side aggregation
- Delegation
  - Frame can draw only on its own rectangle

### Frames


- Outer page can specify only sizing and placement of the frame in the outer page
  - demo
- Frame isolation: Our page cannot change contents of inner page, inner page cannot change contents of outer page


### Web security



### A historical perspective

- The web is an example of "bolt-on security"
- Originally, the web was invented to allow physicists to share their research papers
  - Only textual web pages + links to other pages; no security model to speak of





### The web became complex and adversarial quickly

- Then we added embedded images
  - Crucial decision: a page can embed images loaded from another web server
- Then, Javascript, dynamic HTML, AJAX, CSS, frames, audio, video, ...
- Today, a web site is a distributed application
- Attackers have various motivations

#### Web security is a challenge!

### **Desirable security goals**

- Integrity: malicious web sites should not be able to tamper with integrity of my computer or my information on other web sites
- **Confidentiality:** malicious web sites should not be able to learn confidential information from my computer or other web sites
- **Privacy:** malicious web sites should not be able to spy on me or my activities online

- Risk #1: we don't want a malicious site to be able to trash my files/programs on my computer
  - Browsing to awesomevids.com (or evil.com) should not infect my computer with malware, read or write files on my computer, etc.

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- Defense: Javascript is sandboxed; try to avoid security bugs in browser code; privilege separation; automatic updates; etc.


- Risk #2: we don't want a malicious site to be able to spy on or tamper with my information or interactions with other websites
  - Browsing to evil.com should not let evil.com spy on my emails in Gmail or buy stuff with my Amazon account

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- Defense: the same-origin policy
  - A security policy grafted on after-the-fact, and enforced by web browsers

• Risk #3: we want data stored on a web server to be protected from unauthorized access


- Risk #3: we want data stored on a web server to be protected from unauthorized access
- Defense: server-side security

• Each site in the browser is isolated from all others



#### browser:


• Multiple pages from the same site are not isolated



browser:

### Origin

- Granularity of protection for same origin policy
- Origin = protocol + hostname + port




 It is string matching! If these match, it is same origin, else it is not. Even though in some cases, it is logically the same origin, if there is no match, it is not

One origin should not be able to access the resources of another origin

Javascript on one page cannot read or modify pages from different origins

 The origin of a page is derived from the URL it was loaded from

#### http://en.wikipedia.org



- The origin of a page is derived from the URL it was loaded from
- Special case: Javascript runs with the origin of the page that loaded it



### Origins of other components

- <img src=""> the image is "copied" from the remote server into the new page so it has the origin of the embedding page (like JS) and not of the remote origin
- iframe: origin of the URL from which the iframe is served, and not the loading website.

### Exercises

Originating document	Accessed document	
http://wikipedia.org/a/	http://wikipedia.org/b/	
http://wikipedia.org/	http://www.wikipedia.org/	
http://wikipedia.org/	https://wikipedia.org/	
http://wikipedia.org:81/	http://wikipedia.org:82/	
http://wikipedia.org:81/	http://wikipedia.org/	



### **Cross-origin communication**

- Allowed through a narrow API: postMessage
- Receiving origin decides if to accept the message based on origin (whose correctness is enforced by browser)



postMessage
("run this
script",
script)




#### Check origin, and request!

### Chromodo Private Internet Browser

Fast and versatile Internet Browser based on Chromium, with highest levels

of speed, security and privacy!



### Coming up: attacks on web servers!

