Security Principles

Happy Birthday, Linux!

Here's your cake, go ahead and compile it yourself.

Announcement: Logistics

- Extension students, see Piazza for how to sign up on GradeScope
  - Course sign-in code is
- Project 1 will be issued next Monday
  - Will either be solo or with a single partner, its up to you
    - You don't need to keep the same partner on subsequent projects

The Properties We Want in a Safe

- We want the inside to be inaccessible to an attacker
  - But what ***sort*** of attacker?
  - But ***how much time*** does the attacker have?
- We want to ***measure*** how much time & capabilities needed for an attacker
  - For a safe, ratings communicate how much based on experts performing the attack
    - Such security ratings are much harder in the computer security side

Security Rating: A Real Safe

- TL-15:
  - An expert with common tools will take >= 15 minutes to break in
- May even have "relockers"
  - EG, a pane of glass which, if shattered when trying to drill for the combo lock, causes the safe to freeze closed!

Security Rating: A Stronger Safe

- TL-30:
  - The same expert and tools now takes 30 minutes

Security Rating: Now We Are Talking

- TRTL-30
  - 30 minute to break with tools and/or a cutting torch

Security Rating: Maximum Overkill...

- TXTL-60:
  - 60 minutes with tools, torches, and up to 4 oz of ***explosives!***
  - Far easier to use "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" on someone who knows the combination



Security Rating:

😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂...

- This is legally a "gun safe"
  - Meets the California requirements for "safe" storage of a handgun
- But it is practically ***snake oil***:
  - Cylindrical locks can often be opened with a Bic pen
  - Some safes like this open if you just ***drop them a foot!***
- So why do people buy this?
  - It creates an ***illusion*** of security
  - It meets the ***legal requirement*** for security

Lesson:
Security is economics

- More security (***generally***) costs more
  - If it costs the same or less and doesn't impose other costs, you'd always go with "more security"
- Standards often define security
  - The safe standards from Underwriters Laboratories
    - If you are selling a real safe to a customer who knows what they are buying, you have to meet theses standards
  - The "gun safe" standards from the California Department of Justice


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
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
uTorrent
2 items
uTorrent
Applications
LIGHT. LIMITLESS. ENGINEERED FOR
POWERFUL DOWNLOADING.


µTorrent
Add
Add URL
Add Feed
Start
Stop
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Upgrade Now
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Search
TORRENTS
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ETA
Uploaded
General
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Files
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Speed
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TRANSFER
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Remaining:
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Seeds:
Download Speed:
Upload Speed:
Peers:
Down Limit:
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Reach Millions of People with a Self Serve Ad


What is this program *able* to do?
Can it leak your files elsewhere?
Attack_of_the_Giant_Leeches.avi - Add New Torrent
Save As
Torrent Contents
Date: 10/23/05, 2:50:07 AM
Select All
Select None
Name
Path
Size
Attack_of_the_Giant_L...
699.8 MB
Advanced...
Cancel
OK
Add
Add URL
Add Feed
Start
Stop
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FEEDS
All Feeds
General
TRANSFER
GENERAL
Advertisement
Reach Millions of People with a Self Serve Ad


What is this program *able* to do?
Can it leak your files elsewhere?
Can it delete all of your files?
Can it send spam?
Can it add a new executable
to your search path?
YES. Why?
Attack_of_the_Giant_Leeches.avi - Add New Torrent
Save As
Torrent Contents
Select All
Select None
Advanced...
Cancel
OK
Add
Add URL
Add Feed
Start
Stop
Active
Uploaded
of People with
a Self Serve Ad



What does this program ***need*** to be able to do?

Maybe:

- access screen
- manage a directory of downloaded files
- access config & documentation files
- open connections for a given set of protocols
- receive connections as a server

Check for Understanding

- We've seen that laptop/desktop platforms grant applications a lot of privileges

- Quiz: Name a platform that does a better job of least privilege

So What Do You Think Here?

Thinking About Least Privilege

- When assessing the security of a system's design, identify the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
  - What components does security ***rely upon***?
- Security requires that the TCB:
  - Is correct
  - Is complete (can't be bypassed)
  - Is itself secure (can't be tampered with)
- Best way to be assured of correctness and its security?
  - KISS = Keep It Simple, Stupid!
  - Generally, Simple = Small
- One powerful design approach: privilege separation
  - Isolate privileged operations to as small a component as possible

The Base for Isolation: The Operating System...

- The operating system ***process*** provide the following "guarentees" (you hope)
  - Isolation: A process can not access (read or write) the memory of any other process
  - Permissions: A process can only change files etc if it has permission to
    - This ***usually*** means "Anything that the user can do" in something like Windows or MacOS
      - It can be considerably less in Android or iOS
    - But even in Windows, MacOS, & Linux one can say "I don't want any permissions"

Web browser



"Drive-by malware": malicious web page exploits browser bug to infect local files

The Chrome browser



Goal: prevent “drive-by malware”, where a malicious web page exploits a browser bug to infect local files

The Chrome browser



70% of vulnerabilities are in the rendering engine.

1M+ lines of code

Now it sandboxes ***each web context*** so you can't even read out other web page content (E.g. spectre)

Ensuring Complete Mediation

- To secure access to some capability/resource, construct a ***reference monitor***
- Single point through which all access must occur
  - E.g.: a network firewall
- Desired properties:
  - Un-bypassable ("complete mediation")
  - Tamper-proof (is itself secure)
  - Verifiable (correct)
  - (Note, just restatements of what we want for TCBs)
- One subtle form of reference monitor flaw concerns race conditions …

A Failure of Complete Mediation

Time of Check to Time of Use Vulnerability: Race Condition


```
procedure withdrawal(w)
   // contact central server to get balance
   1. let b := balance

   2. if b < w, abort

   // contact server to set balance
   3. set balance := b - w

   4. dispense $w to user
```

Suppose that *here* an attacker arranges to suspend first call, and calls `withdrawal` again **concurrently**

TOCTTOU = Time of Check To Time of Use

A Hundred Million Dollar TOCTTOU Bug...



- Ethereum is a cryptocurrency which offers "smart" contracts
  - Program you money in a language that makes JavaScript and PHP look beautiful and sound
- The DAO (Distributed Autonomous Organization) was an attempt to make a distributed mutual fund in Ethereum
  - Participants could vote on "investments" that should be made
    - Of course nobody actually had any idea what to do with the "investments" but hey, its the DAO! Gotta get in on the DAO!
- The DAO supported withdrawals as well
  - What is the point of a mutual fund that you couldn't take your money out of?

A "Feature" In The Smart Contract

- To withdraw, the code was:
  - Check the balance, then send the money, then decrement the balance
- But sending money in Ethereum can send to ***another program written by the recipient***
- So someone "invested", then did a withdraw to his program
  - Which would initiate another withdraw...

```
public void buyItem(Account buyer, Item item) {
  if (item.cost > buyer.balance)
     return; /* they can't afford it */

   buyer.possessions.put(item); /* provide item */

   buyer.possessionsUpdated(); /* freshen screen */

   buyer.balance -= item.cost; /* deduct cost */

   buyer.balanceUpdated(); /* freshen screen */

 }
```

What if an **uncaught exception** happens *here*?

Welcome to a Nuclear Bunker



Two Man Control:
Each Needs To Turn the Key



Desired Security Property:
Only Want To Destroy The World On Purpose

“Separation of responsibility.”

Summary:
Notions Regarding Managing Privilege

- Least privilege
  - The notion of avoiding having unnecessary privileges
- Privilege separation
  - A way to achieve least privilege by isolating access to privileges to a small Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
- Separation of responsibility
  - If you need to have a privilege, consider requiring multiple parties to work together (collude) to exercise it

Impact of a Password Policy




Internet Explorer
When you send information to the Internet, it might be possible for others to see that information. Do you want to continue?
In the future, do not show this message.
Yes
No


Internet Explorer
When you see a dialog box like this, click 'Yes' to make it go away. If available, click the checkbox first to avoid being bothered by it again.
In the future, do not show this message.
Yes
No


Website Certified by an Unknown Authority
Unable to verify the identity of svn.xiph.org as a trusted site.
Possible reasons for this error:
- Your browser does not recognise the Certificate Authority that issued the site's certificate.
- The site's certificate is incomplete due to a server misconfiguration.
- You are connected to a site pretending to be svn.xiph.org, possibly to obtain your confidential information.
Please notify the site's webmaster about this problem.
Before accepting this certificate, you should examine this site's certificate carefully. Are you willing to to accept this certificate for the purpose of identifying the Web site svn.xiph.org?
Examine Certificate...
Accept this certificate permanently
Accept this certificate temporarily for this session
Do not accept this certificate and do not connect to this Web site
OK
Cancel


Website Certified by an Unknown Authority
Unable to verify the identity of svn.xiph.org as a trusted site.
Blah blah geekspeak geekspeak geekspeak.
Before accepting this certificate, your browser can display a second dialog full of incomprehensible information. Do you want to view this dialog?
View Incomprehensible Information
Make this message go away permanently
Make this message go away temporarily for this session
Stop doing what you were trying to do
OK
Cancel

Security Keys and Human Factors

- This is a security key for storing key material for an encrypted military phone



Summary:
Dealing with Users

- Psychological acceptability
  - Will users abide a security mechanism, or decide to subvert it?

- Consider human factors
  - Does a security mechanism assume something about human behavior when interacting with the system that might not hold, even in the absence of conscious decisions by the users to subvert


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
SURFACE of EARTH.
OFFICERS' QUARTERS.
SOLDIERS' QUARTERS.
DIESEL MOTORS for AIR and LIGHT.
← TO SLEEPING QUARTERS.
SOLDIERS' QUARTERS.
FOOD.
AMMUNITION.
CLERKS.
TELEPHONE BUREAU.
MEDICINE SUPPLIES.
HOSPITAL.
SUBTERRANEAN R.R. CONNECTION.
AMMUNITION STORES.
325 Feet


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Strong fortifications


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LIECH.
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
Vichy
ITALY
Bay of Biscay
0 100 Miles
0 100 Kilometers
MONACO
Ligurian Sea
Golfe du Lion
Corsica
ANDORRA
Mediterranean Sea
Legend
Blue- Taken over by June 12
Black- Path of German Solders
Dark Green- Taken over by June 4
Red Dots- Maginot Line
Orange- Vichy France

“Only as secure as the weakest link.”

- "A door lock is only as strong as the window"


ACCIDENT
ON
MOTORWAY


ACCIDENT
ON
MOTORWAY


ADMIN


CAUTION!
ZOMBIES!
AHEAD!!!
RUN FOR
COLD
CLIMATES
THE END
IS NEAR!
!!!!!!!!!
NAZI
ZOMBIES!
RUN!!!


RAPTORS
AHEAD
CAUTION


TRAPPED
IN SIGN
FACTORY


SEND
HELP!

“Don’t rely on security through obscurity.”

- Because otherwise the raptors will get you...
- Obscurity does help but you need to design your system so that it fails...
- Kerckhoffs's Principle:
  - A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.
- Shannon's Maxim:
  - The enemy knows the system


Leitura do código de barras
Instruções de uso


Bradesco
Tarifas de
Serviços Bancários
Multi Expresso


Bradesco
Tarifas de
Serviços Bancários


wikileaks.org


widelec.org

“Trusted path.”

- Users need to know they are talking with the legit system
- System needs to know its talking with the legit user
- These channels need to be unspoofable and private
  - ATM skimmers are a failure of the trusted path

Soda Hall wiring closet



Protection?


398
COMMUNICATION

“Use fail-safe defaults.”

- But it can often be hard to determine
- Default for access here is reasonable...
  - Deny all except for an allowed user list
- But when the power goes out...
  - Should the lock fail shut?
    Should the lock fail open?

Common Assumptions When Discussing Attacks

- (Note, these tend to be pessimistic … but prudent)
- Attackers can interact with our systems ***without particular notice***
  - Probing (poking at systems) may go unnoticed …
  - … even if highly repetitive, leading to crashes, and easy to detect
- It's easy for attackers to know general information about their targets
  - OS types, software versions, usernames, server ports, IP addresses, usual patterns of activity, administrative procedures

Common Assumptions, con't

- Attackers can obtain access to a copy of a given system to measure and/or determine how it works
  - Shannon's Maxim: "The Enemy Knows the System"
- Attackers can make energetic use of automation
  - They can often find clever ways to automate
- Attackers can pull off complicated coordination across a bunch of different elements/systems
- Attackers can bring large resources to bear if req'd
  - Computation, network capacity
  - But they are not super-powerful (e.g., control entire ISPs)

Common Assumptions, con't

- If it helps the attacker in some way, ***assume they can obtain privileges***
  - But if the privilege gives everything away (attack becomes trivial), then we care about unprivileged attacks
- The ability to robustly detect that an attack has occurred ***does not replace desirability of preventing***
- Infrastructure machines/systems are well protected (hard to directly take over)
  - So a vulnerability that requires infrastructure compromise is less worrisome than same vulnerability that doesn't

Common Assumptions, con't

- Network routing is hard to alter … other than with physical access near clients (e.g., "wifi/coffeeshop")
  - Such access helps fool clients to send to wrong place
  - Can enable Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks
- We worry about attackers who are lucky
  - Since often automation/repetition can help "make luck":
    If its 1 in a million, just try a million times!
- Just because a system does not have apparent value,
  it may still be a target
  - "Lets break into the Casino network... Through the fishtank"
- Attackers are mostly undaunted by fear of getting caught
  - There are exceptions