Cryptography: Concepts & Confidentiality
Cryptography is nightmare magic math that cares what kind of pen you use - @swiftsonsecurity
Working Towards Secure Systems

- Along with securing individual components, we need to keep them up to date …

- What’s hard about patching?
  - Can require restarting production systems
  - Can break crucial functionality
  - Systems may be "certified", and patching might interfere with certification
Oracle quietly releases Java 7u13 early

First off, a huge thank you to readers Ken and Paul for pointing out that Oracle has released Java 7u13. As the CPU (Critical Patch Update) bulletin points out, the release was originally scheduled for 19 Feb, but was moved up due to the active exploitation of one of the critical vulnerabilities in the wild. Their Risk Matrix lists 50 CVEs, 49 of which can be remotely exploitable without authentication. As Rob discussed in his diary 2 weeks ago, now is a great opportunity to determine if you really need Java installed (if not, remove it) and, if you do, take additional steps to protect the systems that do still require it. I haven’t seen juschec pull this one down on my personal laptop yet, but if you have Java installed you might want to do this one manually right away. On a side note, we’ve had reports of folks who installed Java 7u11 and had it silently (and unexpectedly) remove Java 6 from the system thus breaking some legacy applications, so that is something else you might want to be on the lookout for if you do apply this update.
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  - Can break crucial functionality
  - Management burden:
    - It never stops (the “patch treadmill”) …
IT administrators give thanks for light Patch Tuesday

07 November 2011

Microsoft is giving IT administrators a break for Thanksgiving, with only four security bulletins for this month’s Patch Tuesday.

Only one of the bulletins is rated critical by Microsoft, which addresses a flaw that could result in remote code execution attacks for the newer operating systems – Windows Vista, Windows 7, and Windows 2008 Server R2.

The critical bulletin has an exploitability rating of 3, suggesting
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  • Can require restarting production systems
  • Can break crucial functionality
  • Management burden:
    • It never stops (the “patch treadmill”) …
    • … and can be difficult to track just what’s needed where

• Other (complementary) approaches?
  • Vulnerability scanning: probe your systems/networks for known flaws
  • Penetration testing (“pen-testing”): pay someone to break into your systems …
    • … provided they take excellent notes about how they did it!
Extremely critical Ruby on Rails bug threatens more than 200,000 sites
Servers that run the framework are by default vulnerable to remote code attacks.

by Dan Goodin - Jan 8, 2013, 4:35pm PST

Hundreds of thousands of websites are potentially at risk following the discovery of an extremely critical vulnerability in the Ruby on Rails framework that gives remote attackers the ability to execute malicious code on the underlying servers.

The bug is present in Rails versions spanning the past six years and in default configurations gives hackers a simple and reliable way to pilfer database contents, run system commands, and cause websites to crash, according to Ben Murphy, one of the developers who has confirmed the vulnerability. As of last week, the framework was used by more than 240,000 websites, including Github, Hulu, and Basecamp, underscoring the seriousness of the threat.

"It is quite bad," Murphy told Ars. "An attack can send a request to any Ruby on Rails sever and then execute arbitrary commands. Even though it’s complex, it’s reliable, so it will work 100 percent of the time."

Murphy said the bug leaves open the possibility of attacks that cause one site running rails to seek out and infect others, creating a worm that infects large swaths of the Internet. Developers with the Metasploit framework for hackers and penetration testers are in the process of creating a module that can scan the Internet for vulnerable sites and exploit the bug, said HD Moore, the CSO of Rapid7 and chief architect of Metasploit.

Maintainers of the Rails framework are urging users to update their systems as soon as possible to
Some Approaches for Building Secure Software/Systems

- Run-time checks
  - Automatic bounds-checking (overhead)
  - What do you do if check fails?

- Address randomization
  - Make it hard for attacker to determine layout
  - But they might get lucky / sneaky

- Non-executable stack, heap
  - May break legacy code
  - See also Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

- Monitor code for run-time misbehavior
  - E.g., illegal calling sequences
  - But again: what do you do if detected?
Approaches for Secure Software, con’t

• Program in checks / “defensive programming”
  • E.g., check for null pointer even though sure pointer will be valid
  • Relies on programmer discipline

• Use safe libraries
  • E.g. `strlcpy`, not `strcpy`; `snprintf`, not `sprintf`
  • Relies on discipline or tools …

• Bug-finding tools
  • Excellent resource as long as not many false positives

• Code review
  • Can be very effective … but expensive
Approaches for Secure Software, con’t

• Use a safe language
  • E.g., Java, Python, C#, Go, Rust
  • Safe = memory safety, strong typing, hardened libraries
  • Installed base? Programmer base? Performance?

• Structure user input
  • Constrain how untrusted sources can interact with the system
  • Perhaps by implementing a reference monitor

• Contain potential damage
  • E.g., run system components in jails or VMs
  • Think about privilege separation
Real World Security: Securing your cellphone... Look on the back:

- Does it say "iPhone"?
  - Keep it up to date and be happy
- Does it say "Nexus" or "Pixel"?
  - Keep it up to date and be happy
- Does it say anything else?
  - Toss it in the trash and buy an iPhone or a Pixel
- Why? The Android Patch Model...
  - "Imagine if your Windows update needed to be approved by Intel, Dell, and Comcast... And none of them cared or had a reason to care"
Cryptography: Philosophy...

- This part of the class is really **don't try this at home**
- It is **incredibly easy** to screw this stuff up
- It isn't just a matter of making encryption algorithms...
  - Unless your name is David Wagner or Ralcua Popa, **your crypto is broken**!
- It isn't just a matter of coding good algorithms...
  - Although just writing 100% correct code normally is hard enough!
- There is all sorts of deep voodoo that, **when** you screw up your security breaks
  - **EG**, bad random number generators, side channel attacks, reusing one-use-only items, replay attacks, downgrade attacks, you name it...
Three main goals

- **Confidentiality**: preventing adversaries from reading our private data
  - Data = message or document

- **Integrity**: preventing attackers from altering our data
  - Data itself might or might not be private

- **Authentication**: proving who created a given message or document
  - Generally implies/requires integrity
Special guests

- Alice (sender of messages)
- Bob (receiver of messages)
- The attackers
  - Eve: “eavesdropper”
  - Mallory: “manipulator”
Confidentiality

“Symmetric key encryption”

$E(M_i, K)$ and $D(C_i, K)$ are inverses for the same $K$

$M_i$: $i$th message of plaintext

$C_i$: $i$th message of ciphertext

Confidentiality
The Ideal Contest

- Attacker’s goal: any knowledge of $M_i$ beyond an upper bound on its length
  - Slightly better than 50% probability at guessing a single bit: attacker wins!
  - Any notion of how $M_i$ relates to $M_j$: attacker wins!

- Defender’s goal: ensure attacker has no reason to think any $M' \in \{0,1\}^n$ is more likely than any other
  - (for $M_i$ of length $n$)
Eve’s Capabilities/Foreknowledge

- No knowledge of $K$
  - We assume $K$ is selected by a *truly random process*
  - For $b$-bit key, any $K \in \{0,1\}^b$ is equally likely

- Recognition of success: Eve can generally tell if she has correctly and fully recovered $M_i$
  - But: Eve cannot recognize anything about *partial solutions*, such as whether she has correctly identified a particular bit in $M_i$
  - There are some attacks where Eve can guess and verify
  - Does not apply to scenarios where Eve exhaustively examines every possible $M_i' \in \{0,1\}^n$
Eve’s Available Information

1. Ciphertext-only attack:
   - Eve gets to see every instance of \( C_i \)
   - Variant: Eve may also have partial information about \( M_i \)
     - “It’s probably English text”
     - Bob is Alice’s stockbroker, so it’s either “Buy!” or “Sell”

2. Known plaintext:
   - Eve knows part of \( M_i \) and/or entire other \( M_j \)s
   - How could this happen?
     - Encrypted HTTP request: starts with “GET”
     - Eve sees earlier message she knows Alice will send to Bob
     - Alice transmits in the clear and then resends encrypted
     - Alex the Nazi always transmits the weather report at the same time of day, with the word "Wetter" in a known position
Eve’s Available Information, con’t

3. Chosen plaintext

• Eve gets Alice to send $M_j$’s of Eve’s choosing
• How can this happen?
  • E.g. Eve sends Alice an email spoofed from Alice’s boss saying “Please securely forward this to Bob”
  • E.g. Eve has some JavaScript running in Alice’s web browser that is contacting Bob’s TLS web server

4. Chosen ciphertext:

• Eve tricks Bob into decrypting some $C_j$’s of her choice and he reveals something about the result
• How could this happen?
  • E.g. repeatedly send ciphertext to a web server that will send back different-sized messages depending on whether ciphertext decrypts into something well-formatted
  • Or: measure how long it takes Bob to decrypt & validate
Eve’s Available Information, con’t

5. Combinations of the above
   • Ideally, we’d like to defend against this last, the most powerful attacker
   • And: we can!, so we’ll mainly focus on this attacker when discussing different considerations
Independence Under Chosen Plaintext Attack game: IND-CPA

- Eve is interacting with an encryption "Oracle"
  - Oracle has an unknown random key $k$
- She can provide two separate chosen plaintexts of the same length
  - Oracle will randomly select one to encrypt with the unknown key
  - The game can repeat...
- Goal of Eve is to have a better than random chance of guessing which plaintext the oracle selected
  - Variations involve the Oracle always selecting either the first or the second
Designing Ciphers

• Clearly, the whole trick is in the design of $E(M,K)$ and $D(C,K)$

• One very simple approach:
  \[ E(M,K) = ROTK(M); \quad D(C,K) = ROT-K(C) \]
  i.e., take each letter in $M$ and “rotate” it $K$ positions (with wrap-around) through the alphabet

• E.g., $M_i = “DOG”, \quad K = 3$
  \[ C_i = E(M_i,K) = ROT3(“DOG”) = “GRJ” \]
  \[ D(C_i,K) = ROT-3(“GRJ”) = “DOG” \]

• “Caesar cipher”
  • "This message has been encrypted twice by ROT-13 for your protection"
Attacks on Caesar Ciphers?

- Brute force: try every possible value of $K$
  - Work involved?
  - At most 26 “steps”
Attacks on Caesar Ciphers?

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  - Work involved?
  - At most 26 “steps”
- **Deduction:**
  - Analyze letter frequencies (“ETAOIN SHRDLU”)
  - Known plaintext / guess possible words & confirm
    - E.g. “JCKN ECGUCT” =?

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• Deduction:
  • Analyze letter frequencies (“ETAOIN SHRDLU”)
  • Known plaintext / guess possible words & confirm
    • E.g. “JCKN ECGUCT” =? “HAIL CAESAR” ⇒ K=2
  • Chosen plaintext
    • E.g. Have your spy ensure that the general will send “ALL QUIET”, observe “YJJ OSGCR” ⇒ K=24
Kerckhoffs’ Principle

- Cryptosystems should remain secure even when attacker knows all internal details
  - Don’t rely on security-by-obscurity
- Key should be only thing that must stay secret
- It should be easy to change keys
  - Actually distributing these keys is hard, but we will talk about that particular problem later.
  - But key distribution is one of the real...
Better Versions of Rot-K ?

- Consider $E(M,K) = \text{Rot-} \{ K_1, K_2, \ldots, K_n \}(M)$
- i.e., rotate first character by $K_1$, second character by $K_2$, up through nth character. Then start over with $K_1$, ...
- $K = \{ K_1, K_2, \ldots, K_n \}$

- How well do previous attacks work now?
  - Brute force: key space is factor of $26^{(n-1)}$ larger
    - E.g., $n = 7 \Rightarrow 300$ million times as much work
  - Letter frequencies: need more ciphertext to reason about
  - Known/chosen plaintext: works just fine

- Can go further with “chaining”, e.g., 2nd rotation depends on $K_2$ and first character of ciphertext
  - We just described 2,000 years of cryptography
And Cryptanalysis: ULTRA

- During WWII, the Germans used enigma:
  - System was a "rotor machine": A series of rotors, with each rotor permuting the alphabet and every keypress incrementing the settings
    - Key was the selection of rotors, initial settings, and a permutation plugboard
  - The British built a system (the "Bombe") to brute-force Enigma
    - Required a known-plaintext (a "crib") to verify decryption: e.g. the weather report
    - Sometimes the brits would deliberately "seed" a naval minefield for a chosen-plaintext attack
One-Time Pad

- Idea #1: use a different key for each message $M$
  - Different = completely independent
  - So: known plaintext, chosen plaintext, etc., don’t help attacker
- Idea #2: make the key as long as $M$
- $E(M,K) = M \oplus K$ ($\oplus$ = XOR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\oplus$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- $X \oplus 0 = X$
- $X \oplus X = 0$
- $X \oplus Y = Y \oplus X$
- $X \oplus (Y \oplus Z) = (X \oplus Y) \oplus Z$
One-Time Pad

• Idea #1: use a different key for each message M
  • Different = completely independent
  • So: known plaintext, chosen plaintext, etc., don’t help attacker

• Idea #2: make the key as long as M

• $E(M,K) = M \oplus K$ ($\oplus = \text{XOR}$)
  • $D(C,K) = C \oplus K$
  • $= M \oplus K \oplus K = M \oplus 0 = M$

  \[
  \begin{array}{c|cc}
    \oplus & 0 & 1 \\
    \hline
    0 & 0 & 1 \\
    1 & 1 & 0 \\
  \end{array}
  \]

  $X \oplus 0 = X$
  $X \oplus X = 0$
  $X \oplus Y = Y \oplus X$
  $X \oplus (Y \oplus Z) = (X \oplus Y) \oplus Z$
One-Time Pad: Provably Secure!

- Let’s assume Eve has partial information about $M$
- We want to show: from $C$, she does not gain any further information
- Formalization: supposed Alice sends either $M'$ or $M''$
  - Eve doesn’t know which; tries to guess based on $C$
- Proof:
  - For random, independent $K$, all possible bit-patterns for $C$ are equally likely
  - This holds regardless of whether Alice chose $M'$ or $M''$, or even if Eve provides $M'$ and $M''$ to Alice and Alice selects which one (IND-CPA)
  - Thus, observing a given $C$ does not help Eve narrow down the possibilities in any way:
One-Time Pad: Provably Impractical!

- Problem #1: key generation
  - Need truly random, independent keys

- Problem #2: key distribution
  - Need to share keys as long as all possible communication
  - If we have a secure way to establish such keys, just use that for communication in the first place!
  - Only advantage is you can communicate the key in advance: you may have the secure channel now but won't have it later
Two-Time Pad?

- What if we reuse a key $K$ jeeest once?
- Alice sends $C = E(M, K)$ and $C' = E(M', K)$
- Eve observes $M \oplus K$ and $M' \oplus K$
- Can she learn anything about $M$ and/or $M'$?
- Eve computes $C \oplus C' = (M \oplus K) \oplus (M' \oplus K)$
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  - Can she learn anything about $M$ and/or $M'$?
- Eve computes $C \oplus C' = (M \oplus K) \oplus (M' \oplus K)$
  \[= (M \oplus M') \oplus (K \oplus K)\]
  \[= (M \oplus M') \oplus 0\]
  \[= M \oplus M'\]
- Now she knows which bits in $M$ match bits in $M'$
- And if Eve already knew $M$, now she knows $M'$!
  - Even if not, Eve can guess $M$ and ensure that $M'$ is consistent
VENONA:
Pad Reuse in the Real World

- The Soviets used one-time pads for communication from their spies in the US
  - After all, it is provably secure!
- During WWII, the Soviets started reusing key material
  - Uncertain whether it was just the cost of generating pads or what...
- VENONA was a US cryptanalysis project designed to break these messages
  - Included confirming/identifying the spies targeting the US Manhattan project
  - Project continued until 1980!
- *Not declassified until 1995!*
  - So secret even President Truman wasn't informed about it.
  - But the Soviets found out about it in 1949, but their one-time pad reuse was fixed after 1948 anyway
Modern Encryption: Block cipher

- A function \( E : \{0, 1\}^b \times \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^b \). Once we fix the key \( K \) (of size \( k \) bits), we get:
  - \( E_K : \{0,1\}^b \rightarrow \{0,1\}^b \) denoted by \( E_K(M) = E(M,K) \).
  - (and also \( D(C,K) \), \( E(M,K) \)'s inverse)

- Three properties:
  - Correctness:
    - \( E_K(M) \) is a permutation (bijective function) on \( b \)-bit strings
      - Bijective \( \Rightarrow \) invertible
  - Efficiency: computable in \( \mu \)sec’s
  - Security:
    - For unknown \( K \), “behaves” like a random permutation
  - Provides a building block for more extensive encryption
DES (Data Encryption Standard)

- Designed in late 1970s
- Block size 64 bits, key size 56 bits
- NSA influenced two facets of its design
  - Altered some subtle internal workings in a mysterious way
  - Reduced key size 64 bits $\Rightarrow$ 56 bits
    - Made brute-forcing feasible for attacker with massive (for the time) computational resources
- Remains essentially unbroken 40 years later!
  - The NSA’s tweaking hardened it against an attack “invented” a decade later
- However, modern computer speeds make it completely unsafe due to small key size
Today’s Go-To Block Cipher: AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- 20 years old, standardized 15 years ago...
- Block size 128 bits
- Key can be 128, 192, or 256 bits
  - 128 remains quite safe; sometimes termed “AES-128”, paranoids use 256b
- As usual, includes encryptor and (closely-related) decryptor
  - How it works is beyond scope of this class
- Not proven secure
  - But no known flaws
    - The NSA uses it for Top Secret communication with 256b keys: stuff they want to be secure for 40 years including possibly unknown breakthroughs!
  - so we assume it is a secure block cipher
How Hard Is It To Brute-Force 128-bit Key?

- $2^{128}$ possibilities – well, how many is that?
- Handy approximation: $2^{10} \approx 10^3$
- $2^{128} = 2^{10 \times 12.8} \approx (10^3)^{12.8} \leq (10^3)^{13} \approx 10^{39}$
How Hard Is It To Brute-Force 128-bit Key?

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• $2^{128} = 2^{10 \times 12.8} \approx (10^3)^{12.8} \leq (10^3)^{13} \approx 10^{39}$
• Say we build massive hardware that can try $10^9$ (1 billion) keys in 1 nanosecond (a billionth of a second)
  • So $10^{18}$ keys/sec
  • Thus, we’ll need $\approx 10^{21}$ sec
• How long is that?
  • One year $\approx 3 \times 10^7$ sec
  • So need $\approx 3 \times 10^{13}$ years $\approx 30$ trillion years
What about a 256b key in a year?

- Time to start thinking in **astronomical** numbers:
  - If each brute force device is 1mm³...
  - We will need $10^{52}$ of these things...
  - $10^{43}$ cubic meters...
  - Or the volume of $7 \times 10^{15}$ suns!
  - Brute force is **not a factor** against modern block ciphers...

*IF the key is actually random!*
Issues When Using the Building Block

- Block ciphers can only encrypt messages of a certain size
  - If $M$ is smaller, easy, just pad it (details omitted)
  - If $M$ is larger, can repeatedly apply block cipher
    - Particular method = a “block cipher mode”
    - Tricky to get this right!
- If same data is encrypted twice, attacker knows it is the same
  - Solution: incorporate a varying, known quantity (IV = “initialization vector”)
Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode

- Simplest block cipher mode
- Split message into b-bit blocks $P_1, P_2, \ldots$
- Each block is enciphered independently, separate from the other blocks
  
  $C_i = E(P_i, K)$

- Since key $K$ is fixed, each block is subject to the same permutation
  
  (As though we had a “code book” to map each possible input value to its designated output)
ECB Encryption

Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption
ECB Decryption

Problem: Relationships between $P_i$’s reflected in $C_i$’s
IND-CPA and ECB?

- Of course not!
- $M, M'$ is 2x the block length...
  - $M = \text{all 0s}$
  - $M' = \text{0s for 1 block, 1s for the 2nd block}$
- This has catastrophic implications in the real world...
Original image, RGB values split into a bunch of b-bit blocks
Encrypted with ECB and interpreting ciphertext directly as RGB
Later (identical) message again encrypted with ECB
Building a Better Cipher Block Mode

• Ensure blocks incorporate more than just the plaintext to mask relationships between blocks. Done carefully, either of these works:
  • Idea #1: include elements of prior computation
  • Idea #2: include positional information

• Plus: need some initial randomness
  • Prevent encryption scheme from determinism revealing relationships between messages
  • Introduce initialization vector (IV):
    • IV is a public nonce, a use-once unique value: Easiest way to get one is generate it randomly

• Example: Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
CBC Encryption

E(Plaintext, K):

• If $b$ is the block size of the block cipher, split the plaintext in blocks of size $b$: $P_1$, $P_2$, $P_3$, ...
• Choose a random IV (do not reuse for other messages)
• Now compute:

  
  \[
  \text{Final ciphertext is } (\text{IV}, C_1, C_2, C_3). \text{ This is what Eve sees.}
  \]
CBC Decryption

\( D(\text{Ciphertext}, K) \):
- Take IV out of the ciphertext
- If \( b \) is the block size of the block cipher, split the ciphertext in blocks of size \( b \): \( C_1, C_2, C_3, \ldots \)
- Now compute this:
  - Output the plaintext as the concatenation of \( P_1, P_2, P_3, \ldots \)
Original image, RGB values split into a bunch of b-bit blocks
Encrypted with CBC
CBC Mode...

- Widely used
- Issue: sequential encryption, can't parallelize encryption
  - Must finish encrypting block $b$ before starting $b+1$
  - But you can parallelize decryption
- Parallelizable alternative: CTR (Counter) mode
- Security: If no reuse of nonce, both are provably secure (IND-CPA) assuming the underlying block cipher is secure
CTR Mode Encryption

(Nonce = Same as IV)

Important that nonce/IV does not repeat across different encryptions.
Choose at random!
Counter Mode Decryption

Note, CTR decryption uses block cipher’s encryption, **not** decryption
Thoughts on CTR mode...

- CTR mode is actually a stream cipher (more on those later):
  - You no longer need to worry about padding which is nice
- CTR mode is fully parallelizeable for encryption as well as decryption
NEVER EVER EVER use CTR Mode!

- What happens if you reuse the IV in CBC...
  - It's bad but not catastrophic: you fail IND-CPA but the damage may be tolerable:
    - $M = \{A,A,B\}$
    - $M' = \{A,B,B\}$
    Adversary can see that the first part of $M$ and $M'$ are the same, but not the later part

- What happens if you reuse the IV in CTR mode?
  - It is exactly like reusing a one-time pad!

- An example of a system which fails badly...
  - CTR mode is theoretically as secure as CBC when used properly...
  - But when it is misused it fails catastrophically:
    Personal bias: I believe we need systems that are still robust when implemented incorrectly
What To Use Then?

• What if you want a cipher mode where you don't need to pad (like CTR mode)?
  • But you want the robust to screwup properties of CBC mode?
• Idea: lets do it CTR-like (xor plaintext with block cipher output), but...
  • Instead of the next block input being an incremented counter...
    have the next block be the previous ciphertext
• Still lacks integrity however, we'll fix that next time...
CFB Encryption

Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode encryption
CFB Decryption

Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode decryption
CFB doesn't need to pad...

• Since the encryption is XORed with the plaintext...
  • You can end on a "short" block without a problem
  • So more convenient than CBC mode
• But similar security properties as CBC mode
  • Sequential encryption, parallel decryption
  • Same error propagation effects
  • Effectively the same for IND-CPA
• But a bit worse if you reuse the IV