Elections, Computer Security, and Electronic Voting

CS161 4/19/2010 David Wagner



For Delegate to Congress. FRANCIS GEHON. For Representatives. John Frierbow S.S. Lotheok For County Commissioners. Abree Walcott John Morfort Joh Aigins byrus Jander For Assessor. L.B. Mulholland John Hawkers For Constable. John Boyal Doright Regard A. D. Stephen

REPUBLICAN TICKET.

For Mayor, M. F. FAIRCHILD. For City Solicitor, J. P. DOLLIVER. For City Assessor, L. G. SPRING. For City Treasurer, BETH VINCENT. For Councilman-4th Ward, A. H. JOHNSON.

REPUBLICAN TICKET.

STATE TICKET.

For Governor, WILLAM LARRABEE, Of Fayette County, For Lieutenant Governor, JOHN A. T. HULL, Of Polk County, For Judge of the Supreme Court, GIFFORD S. ROBINSON, Of Buena Vista County, For Superintendent of Public Instruction, HENRY SABIN, Of Clinton County,

County Ticket

For Senator Thirty-sixth District, J. P. PATRICK. For Representative Seventieth District, W. W. GOODWIN, For Auditor, JULIUS H. BUHLMAN, For Treasurer,

> For Sheriff, WILLIAM WELLMAN. For County Superintendent, JAMES W. WYATT. For Supervisor, PATRICK COSTIGAN. For Cornner, L. L. RENSHAW. For Surveyor, SANFORD L. PECK.

Township Ticket.

For Trustee,

For Constable,

For Road Supervisor District No.....





Security Goals for an Election

- Integrity: No election fraud
- Transparency: Everyone especially the loser - must be able to verify that the election was conducted appropriately



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- Privacy: No one learns how the voter has voted
- Secret ballot: Voter cannot prove how she voted



Breakthrough! — the Australian secret ballot.

Ballot printed by govt. Ballot boxes monitored by observers. Ballots counted, by hand, in public. Competing interests keep each other honest.









Confusion at Palm Beach County polls Some Al Gore supporters may have mistakenly voted for Pat Buchanan because of the ballot's design. Punching the second hole casts a vote for the Reform party. Although the Democrats are listed second in the column on the left, they are the third hole on the ballot. (REPUBLICAN) 3:00 GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENT (REFORM) **DICK CHENEY** . MCE PRESIDENT PAT BUCHANAN . PRESIDENT (DEMOCRATIC) FZOLA FOSTER, yest pressions AL GORE - PRESIDENT 5eð (SOCIALIST) JOE LIEBERMAN . VICE PRESIDENT DAVID MCREYNOLDS . PRESIDENT (LIBERTARIAN) FLECTORS MARY CAL HOLLIS - war mesindar FOR PRESIDENT HARRY BROWNE PRESIDENT 7046 AND (CONSTITUTION) **ART OLIVIER** . VICE PRESIDENT VICE PRESIDENT HOWARD PHILLIPS - PRESIDENT (GREEN) id vote for the candidates will J. CURTIS FRAZIER - VICE PRESIDEN actually be a vote for their electors.) RALPH NADER - PRESUMENT Stall: (WORKERS WORLD) WINDNA LADUKE, VICE PRESUMENT Note for Group! MONICA MOOREHEAD - PRESIDENT **e**n 10 (SOCIALIST WORKERS) **GLORIA La RIVA** - vice president JAMES HARRIS PRISIDINT 11:20 MARGARET TROWE . VICE PRESIDENT WRITE-IN CANDIDATE To vote for a write in candidate, follow the (NATURAL LAW) directions on the long stub of your ballot card. JOHN HAGELIN - PRESIDENT 13**-**9

NAT GOLDHABER - VICE PRESIDENT

Another anomaly during the 2000 election

From: Lana Hires Subject: 2000 November Election

I need some answers! Our department is being audited by the County.

I have been waiting for someone to give me an explanation as to why Precinct 216 gave Al Gore a minus 16022 when it was uploaded. Will someone please explain this so that I have the information to give the auditor instead of standing here "looking dumb".









Summary Ballot Instructions Press the candidate name or contest title to return to a contest. Vote button will light up when

Best	Automobile Manufacturer Vote For ONE	
	FORD	Laurenseen
(Vo	Best Vocal Artist le for Not More Than TWO)	
	PA	
	No selection made.	
B	est Ice-Cream Flavor Vote For ONE	
	No selection made.	
	Proposition 1	
	No selection made.	
	Proposition 2	
	No selection made.	
6	Pask 011	
2	Back UI / U	

you may cast your ballot.

Question: How do election security goals apply to touchscreen (DRE) electronic voting machines?

1. Machine must allow each authorized voter to vote exactly once; must prevent tampering with votes after they are cast.

2. Machine should be verifiably trustworthy.

3. Machine must randomize the order in which votes were cast.

4. Machine must not give voter a "receipt".

 Security Goals for an Election: Integrity, Transparency, Privacy, Secret ballot Nov 4, 2002: State of Georgia votes on Diebold DREs.

March 18, 2003: Diebold source code leaks.

July 23, 2003: Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Avi Rubin, Dan Wallach, "Analysis of an Electronic Voting System".

The voter authorization protocol



QueryStatus

ACTIVE (0x01)

(record vote)



SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)

Status = CANCELED

Succeeded

The voter authorization protocol





Please Insert 'our Card QueryStatus

ACTIVE (0x01)

(record vote)

SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)

Succeeded

malicious smartcard

QueryStatus

ACTIVE (0x01)

(record another vote)

SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)

Succeeded

Authenticating election officials





What's the secret PIN?

2301

Ok, you have admin access.



Source code excerpts



DESCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data, totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT);

Source code excerpts

// LCG - Linear Congruential Generator // used to generate ballot serial numbers
// A psuedo-random-sequence generator
// (per Applied Cryptography, Bruce Schneier)

int lcgGenerator(int lastSN) {
 return ((lastSN*1366) + 150889)%714025;
}

"Unfortunately, linear congruential generators cannot be used for cryptography." — Applied Cryptography, p.369

More than 4,500 North Carolina votes lost because of mistake in voting machine capacity

JACKSONVILLE, N.C. (AP) — More than 4,500 votes have been lost in one North Carolina county because officials believed a computer that stored ballots electronically could hold more data than it did. Scattered other problems may change results in races around the state.

Officials said UniLect Corp., the maker of the county's electronic voting system, told them that each storage unit could handle 10,500 votes, but the limit was actually 3,005 votes.

Machine error gives Bush 3,893 extra votes in Ohio

By John McCarthy, Associated Press

COLUMBUS, Ohio — An error with an electronic voting system gave President Bush 3,893 extra votes in suburban Columbus, elections officials said.

Franklin County's unofficial results had Bush receiving 4,258 votes to Democrat John Kerry's 260 votes in a precinct in Gahanna. Records show only 638 voters cast ballots in that precinct. Bush's total should have been recorded as 365.

Broward Vote-Counting Blunder Changes Amendment Result

POSTED: 1:34 pm EST November 4, 2004

BROWARD COUNTY, Fla. -- The Broward County Elections Department has egg on its face today after a computer glitch misreported a key amendment race, according to WPLG-TV in Miami.

Amendment 4, which would allow Miami-Dade and Broward counties to hold a future election to decide if slot machines should be allowed at racetracks, was thought to be tied. But now that a computer glitch for machines counting absentee ballots has been exposed, it turns out the amendment passed.

"The software is not geared to count more than 32,000 votes in a precinct. So what happens when it gets to 32,000 is the software starts counting backward," said Broward County Mayor Ilene Lieberman.



Broward County Mayor Ilene Lieberman says voting counting error is an "embarrassing mistake."

That means that Amendment 4 passed in Broward County by more than 240,000 votes rather than the 166,000-vote margin reported Wednesday night. That increase changes the overall statewide results in what had been a neck-and-neck race, one for which recounts had been going on today. But with news of Broward's error, it's clear amendment 4 passed.



California Top-to-Bottom Review

In 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen commissions a review of California's voting systems.

43 experts (led by David Wagner & Matt Bishop) examine voting systems used nationally.



THE SECRETARY Bowen opens the public hearing in Sacramento.

Technical findings of the CA TTBR

All voting systems examined have serious security problems:

- None followed sound engineering principles expected of security-critical systems.
- All were vulnerable to viral attacks: one outsider could subvert all voting machines countywide

Example flaw (Premier system)

Bug: The code that reads data off the memory card has buffer overrun vulnerabilities.

Attack:

- 1. Attacker writes malicious code onto 1 card
- 2. When central PC reads votes off card on election night, it gets infected
- 3. Infected PC writes malicious code onto all cards used in the next election, infecting entire county

Quotes from the reports

"We found pervasive security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia software. Virtually every important software security mechanism is vulnerable to circumvention."

"Our study of the Diebold source code found that the system does not meet the requirements for a security-critical system. It is built upon an inherently fragile design and suffers from implementation flaws that can expose the entire voting system to attacks."

"The Hart software and devices appear to be susceptible to a variety of attacks which would allow an attacker to gain control of some or all of the systems in a county. [..] Many of these attacks can be mounted in a manner that makes them extremely hard to detect and correct. We expect that many of them could be carried out in the field by a single individual, without extensive effort, and without long-term access to the equipment."

Outcome of the CA TTBR

Bowen decertifies most DRE voting systems and imposes strict new procedural protections.

Result: Most Californians now vote on paper ballots.



Trojan Horses and the Insider Threat



Ronald Dale Harris

Employee, Gaming Control Board, 1983-1995

Arrested, Jan 15,1995 Convicted, Sept 23, 1997, for rigging slot machines

Attempted Trojan Horse in Linux Kernel

```
...
      schedule();
      goto repeat;
if ((options == (___WCLONE|___WALL)) &&current->uid = 0
      retval = -EINVAL:
retval = -ECHILD;
                                       ???
end_wait4:
current->state = TASK RUNNING;
. . .
```

Trojan Horses and Voting Machines

Malicious logic hidden by an insider might, e.g., record votes incorrectly to favor one candidate. How would we defend a voting system against this kind of insider threat?

Potential solutions:

- Verify that the software is free of Trojans and will work correctly on all future elections.
 (beyond the state of the art) Voting on Satan's computer.
- Assume sw might contain Trojans. Verify that sw worked correctly in this particular election. (voter-verified paper records + random audits)





FOR	COMMISSIONERS NATIONAL PASTIMES (Vote for Two)	
JIM THORPE		
BILL RUSSELL		
JOE DIMAGGIO		
PEGGY FLEMING		
Write-in		
Write-in		
CC	OMMISSIONER OF RICAN LITERATURE (Vote for One)	
ERNEST HEMINGWAY		
WILLIAM FAULKNER		
JOHN STEINBECK		
SINCLAIR LEWIS		
Write-in		
- Back Instruction	s Page Summary	Next 🔹



A paper copy of your ballot, which may be used for recount or auditing purposes, will be printed before your vote is cast.

Touch the Print Ballot button to print and verify your ballot.

OR

Fouch the Back button or one of the races on this screen to go be cand make changes.

PRESIDENT (Vote for One) ABRAHAM LINCOLN POET LAUREATE	MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION (Vote for One) CHUCK YEAGER	QUESTION Do you favor a National Lottery Administered by the Federal Covernment?
(Vote for One) CARL SANDBURG	MINISTER OF COMIC RELIEF (Vote for One)	No Vote Cast
FOR NATIONAL	CAROL BURNETT	Shall the City of Anytown,
PASTIMES (Vote for Two)	MINISTER OF ART (Vote for One)	USA issue and sell its General Obligation Bonds
No Vote Cast	ALEXANDER CALDER	YES
No Vote Cast COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN LITERATURE (Vote for One) No Vote Cast	AMBASSADORS OF THE AMERICAN MUSICAL COMEDY (Vote for One pair) GEORGE GERSHWIN and IRA GERSHWIN	

Back

Print Ballot

Touch the Print Next Page button to print and verify the next page. OR Touch the Reject Ballot button to go back and make changes.

NOTE: you may reject your printed ballot a maximum of two times, after which you will no longer be allowed to make changes and printing your ballot will cast your vote. Contact a pollworker if you are experiencing difficulty with this process.



Famous N PRECINCT	ever Demonstration	BA
PRESIDEN [X] AB	RANNAM L'INCOLN (NP)	
POET LAU	REATE AL SANDBURS (NP)	
	ONERS FOR NATIONAL Vote Cast Vote Cast	Fil
	OMER OF AMERICAN L. Vote Cast	TTELL
"INISTER	OF TRANSPORTATION UCX YEAGER ONPO	-
MINISTER	OF CONTE SELIEF	
MINISTER NJ R	OF ART DANNER CALDER ON	0
AMERICAN DE	OFS OF THE AMERICA	NI T.

N.C. STATE SENATE DISTRICT 25 You may vote for ONE	DEM	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20 You may vote for ONE	AMENDMENT II Constitutional amendment to provide that the General Assembly may place the clear receased at clear enables child before an
	DEM	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	civil fines collected by a State agency in a State fund to be used exclusively for
N.C. STATE HOUSE DISTRICT 69 You may vote for ONE		DISTRICT 20 You may vote for ONE	maintaining free public schools. FOR AGAINST
PRYOR GIBSON HILDA L MORTON	DEM	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20	AMENDMENT III
REGISTER OF DEEDS You may vote for ONE	13	TANYA WALLACE	Constitutional amendment to provide for the first term of office for magistrates of the General Court of Justice to be two years and
JOANNE S. HUNTLEY	DEM	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	for subsequent terms to be four years.
NON PARTISAN OFFICES		DISTRICT 20 You may vote for ONE	O FOR
Non partisan offices are not included in Straight Party voting and must be voted separately to be counted.		W. DAVID McSHEEHAN JOSEPH J. WILLIAMS	
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF SUPREME COURT You may vote for ONE SARAH PARKER JOHN M. TYSON	1	NON PARTISAN OFFICES Additional instructions to Voter If you wish to write in a name for any of the following offices, write the name in the blank space provided and completely fill in the oval to the left of the name in order for your vote to count.	
SUPREME COURT You may vote for ONE RONNIE ANSLEY RACHELLEA HUNTER HOWARD E. MANNING, JR. BETSY McCRODDEN		BROWN CREEK SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT SUPERVISOR You may vote for ONE JOHN C. SPRINGER	
FRED MORRISON, JR. PAUL MARTIN NEWBY		STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS	
MARVIN SCHILLER		AMENDMENT I	1
JAMES A. WYNN, JR. JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS You may vote for ONE LINDA McGEE BILL PARKER		Constitutional amendment to promote local economic and community development projects by (i) permitting the General Assembly to enact general laws giving counties, cities, and towns the power to finance public improvements associated with qualified private economic and community improvements within development districts, as long	
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS You may vote for ONE		as the financing is secured by the additional tax revenues resulting from the enhanced property value within the development district and is not secured by a pledge of the local government's faith	
ALICE C. STUBBS		and credit or general taxing authority, which financing is not subject to a referendum; and (ii)	
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS You may vote for ONE		permitting the owners of property in the development district to agree to a minimum tax value for their property, which is binding on future owners as long as the development district is in	
BARBARA JACKSON ALAN THORNBURG		Existence.	
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		⊖ AGAINST	J
You may vote for ONE			

BACK Card 3 SEQ#1

1







Statistical audit

- After election, randomly choose 1% of machines and manually recount the paper records on those machines. If paper count ≠ electronic count, there was fraud.
- If » 100 machines cheat, detection is likely.
 Consequently: If paper count = electronic count, then no more than ~100 machines cheated.

Prover (Elec. Official)

The tallies are $t_1, ..., t_n$

Show me the paper for machine i.

Verifier (skeptical voter)

(voter-verified paper audit trail)

Trends in e-voting technology



Adoption of paper records + random audits



Timeline



Conclusions

- E-voting security is hard, but...
- E-voting can be made secure and trustworthy, if it can be audited.

- Technical principles:
 - Two-person control, separation of duties
 - Statistical audit
 - Security against malicious insiders

Lessons

- Understand security requirements before you design & deploy an information system.
- Independent review is valuable.
- Sometimes technical threats can be handled through non-technical defenses.
- Seek independent, end-to-end checks that the system is working properly.
- Securing systems against malicious insiders is extremely challenging.
- Business structure determines the technology that is built & deployed. If buyers cannot measure how secure a product is, be prepared for market failures.

