#### **The Underground Economy**

#### CS 161: Computer Security Prof. Vern Paxson

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http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/

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#### Announcements

- Matthias back on May 5
  - Send him email for office hour appointments
- Reminder: Final exam in F295 Haas
  - (not Haas Pavilion!)
  - IEEE will provide breakfast munchies
- Course Summary/Review lecture on Thurs
  - TLS, certs, crypto requested by several
  - Possible other topics: DNSSEC, XSS/CSRF
  - ... ?



**Obuzoustoychivy hosting** is more expensive than usual, but you will have the full guarantee that your site no one ever closes, it will always be available to your customers!

MINI PLAN				
Volume disc	400 MB			
Domains	1			
Traffic *	Unlimited			
FTP-access	there is			
MySQL database	there is			
Control panel	there is			
COST	4 000 rub. / 1 month.			

STARTER PLAN					
Volume disc	500 mb				
Domains	3				
Traffic *	Unlimited				
FTP-access	there is				
MySQL database	there is				
Control panel th					
COST	5 000 rub. / 1 month.				
BUSINESS PLAN					
Volume disc	1000 mb				
Domains	7				
Traffic *	Unlimited				
FTP-access	there is				
MySQL database	there is				
Control panel	there is				
COST	7 000 rub. / 1 month.				
PREM	IUM PLAN				

## Fighting Bots / Botnets, con't

- Approach #2: seize the domain name used for C&C
  - This is what's currently often used, often to good effect ...
- ... Botmaster counter-measure?
  - Each day (say), bots generate a large list of possible domain names using a Domain Generation Algorithm
    - Large = 50K, in some cases
  - Bots then try a random subset looking for a C&C server
    - Server **signs** its replies, so bot can't be duped
    - Attacker just needs to hang on to a small portion of names to retain control over botnet
- This is becoming state-of-the-art ... (not yet widely used)
- Counter-counter measure?
  - Behavioral signature: look for hosts that make a lot of failed DNS lookups (research)

## The Problem of Botnets

- Constitute the Great Modern Threat of Internet security: Generic Platform For Badness
- Why botnets rather than worms?
  - Greater control
  - Less emergent
  - Quieter
  - Optimal flexibility
- Why the shift towards valuing these instead of seismic worm infection events?

#### \$\$ Profit \$\$

• How can attackers monetize botnets?

#### **Monetizing Botnets**

- General malware monetization approaches:
  - Keylogging: steal financial/email/social network accounts
  - Ransomware
  - Transaction generators
    - Malware watches user's surfing ...
    - ... waits for them to log into banking site (say) ...
    - ... and then injects additional banking transactions like "send \$50,000 to Nigeria" ...
    - ... and alters web server replies to mask the change in the user's balance

## Monetizing Botnets, con't

- Monetization that leverages scale
  - DDoS (extortion)
  - Spam
  - Click fraud
  - Scam infrastructure
    - Hosting web pages (e.g., phishing)
    - Redirection to evade blacklisting/takedown (DNS)
- Which of these cause serious pain for infected user?
  - None. Users have little incentive to prevent ( $\Rightarrow$  externality)

Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/03/mariposa\_botnet\_bust\_analysis/

#### How FBI, police busted massive botnet 12m zombie machines run by 3 admins

#### By John Leyden

Posted in Malware, 3rd March 2010 15:56 GMT

Analysis More details have emerged about a cybercrime investigation that led to the takedown of a botnet containing 12m zombie PCs and the arrest of three alleged kingpins who built and ran it.

As previously reported, the Mariposa botnet was principally geared towards <u>stealing</u> online login credentials for banks, email services and the like from compromised Windows PCs. The malware infected an estimated 12.7 million computers in more than 190 countries.

The Mariposa Working Group infiltrated the command-and-control structure of Mariposa to monitor the communication channels that relayed information from compromised systems back to the hackers who run the botnet. Analysis of the command system laid the groundwork for the December 2009 shutdown of the botnet, as well as shedding light on how the malware operated and provided a snapshot of the current state of the underground economy.

The botmasters made money by selling parts of the botnet to other cybercrooks,

Netkairo finally regained control of Mariposa and launched a denial of service attack against Defence Intelligence using all the bots in his control. This attack seriously impacted an ISP, leaving numerous clients without an Internet connection for several hours, including several Canadian universities and government institutions. Once again, the Mariposa Working Group managed to prevent the DDP Team from accessing Mariposa. We changed the DNS records, so the bots could not connect to the C&C servers and receive instructions, and at that moment we saw exactly how many bots were reporting. We were shocked to find that more than 12 million IP addresses were connecting and sending information to the C&C servers, making Mariposa one of the largest botnets in history.

alleged lieutenants "Ostiator" and "Johnyloleante" have been charged with cybercrime offences. More arrests are expected to follow.

Under Spanish law suspects are not named at this stage of proceedings. Pedro Bustamante, senior research advisor at Panda Security, said: "Our preliminary analysis indicates that the botmasters did not have advanced hacking skills.

"This is very alarming because it proves how sophisticated and effective malware distribution software has become, empowering relatively unskilled cyber criminals to inflict major damage and financial loss." ®







#### Список доступных акков

#### Сервис по продаже аккаунтов аукцыона eBay.

Добрые юзеры аукцыона eBay предлагают вашему вниманию свои аккаунты. Постоянным клиентам и тем, кто берет более 5 акков, различные бонусы и скидки. Все аккаунты с доступом к мылу холдера.

Вы сами выбираете акк (несколько акков) из списка. Говорите мне. Оплачиваете и получаете. Все акки предварительно проверяются перед продажей, в случае, если что-то не работает - 100% замена.

Актив/не актив смотрите сами по юзер ид. По активности не сортирую, так как это для каждого субъективно.

Также в продаже бывают акки PayPal. Цены рыночные. Постоянно не продаю.

Оплата по WM. Перед покупкой следует обязательно ознакомиться с FAQ. По работе с товаром не консультирую. Работа через гарант сервис приветствуется.

#### Мон цены:

seller/баер акк до 10 фидов = 5\$ seller/баер акк 10-25 фидов = 10\$ seller/баер акк 25-50 фидов = 15\$ seller/баер акк более 50 фидов = 25\$

# allBots Inc. Social Networking Bots GOOD News!!! We have something more for you! Yes, we have just integrated CAPTCHA Bypasser in all of our bots. Winsock (Multi-threaded) Bots Become an Affiliate and Start Earning Now

Accounts Creator (You Just Need To Type In The CAPTCHAs To Create Accounts)						
Social Networks	Social Networks					
MySpace Accounts Creator with Picture Uploader, Profile & Layout Manager	PayPal Buy Nov \$180.95	\$140.00				
MySpace Accounts Creator with Picture Uploader, Profile & Layout Manager (Winsock)	PayPal Buy Nov \$360.95	\$320.00				
YouTube Accounts Creator	PayPal Buy Nou \$120.95	\$95.00				
Friendster Accounts Creator	PayPal Buy Nov \$120.05	\$95.00				
Hi5 Accounts Creator	PayPal Buy Nov \$120.05	\$95.00				
TagWorld Assounts Croster	PayPal					

Friend Adders, Message Senders, Comment Posters & Others

(All Bots Work In A Conventional Manner, They Gather Friend IDs/Names And Send Friend Requests, Messages, Comments Automatically) \*\*Chaining Feature\*\* Is Available On All Bots for All Networks Except Facebook

#### Advertisement

i have boa wells and barclays bank logins....
have hacked hosts, mail lists, php mailer send to all inbox
i need 1 mastercard i give 1 linux hacked root
i have verified paypal accounts with good balance...and i can cashout paypals

#### Marketplace Ads for Services



#### Marketplace Ads for Goods



#### Marketplace Ads for Goods, con't



## The Underground Economy

- Why is its emergence significant?
- Markets enable efficiencies
  - Specialization: individuals rewarded for doing a single thing particularly well
- Lowers barrier-to-entry
  - Only need a single skill
  - Some underground market activities are legal
- Competition spurs innovation
  - Accelerates arms race
  - Defenders must assume a more pessimistic threat model
- Facilitates non-\$ Internet attacks (political, nation-state)
  - Provides actors with cheap attack components
  - Provides stealthy actors with plausible cover

## The Underground Economy, con't

- What problems do underground markets face?
- Markets only provide major efficiencies if they facilitate deals between strangers
  - Susceptible to *infiltration*
- Depending on marketplace architecture, can present a target / single point of failure
- By definition, deals are between crooks
   Major issue of betrayal by "rippers"

#### **Pay-Per-Install (PPI)**



Договорится по всем ценам и получить индивидуальные условия вы можете в службе поддержки. Пишите!



			all	3 18 PAS.				
Main	Sign up	Login	Rates	Contacts	Terms of ser	vice	FAQ	
Prices								
			G	oldinstall Rates	for 1K Installs fo	or each Co	ountry.	
				Country			Price	
				OTH			13\$	
				US			150\$ 110\$	

country	Price
ОТН	13\$
US	150\$
GB	110\$
CA	110\$
DE	30\$
BE	20\$
IT	65\$
CH	20\$
CZ	20\$
DK	20\$
ES	30\$
AU	55\$
FR	30\$
NL	20\$
NO	20\$
PT	30\$
LB	6\$







					$\bigwedge$	
	NAME	%	MONETIZATION	Kit	SEEN	
1	Palevo	7.50	DoS,Info stealer	1	1	
2	Hiloti	4.69	Downloader/PPI		1	The majority
3	Zbot	3.62	Info stealer	1	1	of the world's
4	FakeRean	3.47	Rogue AV(s)		1	
5	Onlinegames	2.94	Info stealer		?	top malware
6	Rustock	2.66	Spam		1	appeared in
7	Ldpinch	2.64	Info stealer	1	?	PPI downloads
8	Renos	2.58	Rogue AV(s)		?	
9	Zlob	2.54	Rogue software		1	
10	Autoit	2.53	Downloader/PPI			
11	Conficker	2.48	Worm			
12	Opachki	1.95	Click Fraud		1	
13	Buzus	1.91	Info stealer			
14	Koobface	1.17	Downloader			
15	Alureon	1.16	Downloader	1	1	
16	Bredolab	1.15	Downloader/PPI	1	1	
17	Piptea	1.13	Downloader/PPI		1	
18	Ertfor	0.91	Rogue AV(s)		1	
19	Virut	0.91	Downloader/PPI		~	
20	Storm 2.0	0.80	Spam		$\bigvee$	

Table 2: FireEye's top 20 malware families observed in their MAX Cloud network on the April–June 2010 time



PPI distribution of malware during August 2010

## Spam & Spam Profit

## **Modern Spam Operations**

- To make the issues concrete, let's take a tour of a modern "spambot"
  - = Botnet primarily used for sending spam
- Goal is to get a sense of:
  - Botnet construction
  - Email spam-sending process
  - Arms-race issues
- Note: not comprehensive

– E.g., there's also blog spam, social network spam, etc.

#### Welcome to **Storm**!



Would you like to be one of our newest bots? Just read your postcard!

(Or even easier: just wait 5 seconds!)

#### The Storm Botnet



#### The Storm Botnet



#### Spam "Campaign" Mechanics



#### **Campaign Mechanics: Harvest**



#### **Campaign Mechanics: Spamming**



Date: %^D-%^R30-600^%^%

Received: from auz.xwzww ([132.233.197.74]) by dsl-189-188-79-63.prod-infinitum.com.mx with ▷ Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Wed, 6 Feb 2008 16:33:44 -0800 Message-ID: <002e01c86921\$18919350\$4ac5e984@auz.xwzww> From: <katiera@experimentalist.org> To: <voelker@cs.ucsd.edu> Subject: JOB \$1800/WEEK - CANADIANS WANTED! Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2008 16:33:44 -0800

Figure 2: Snippet of a spam template, showing the transformation of an email header from template (top) to resulting content (bottom). The  $\triangleright$ -symbol indicates line continuations. Bold text corresponds to the formatting macros and their evaluation.

Synthetic diversity aims to thwart content-based anti-spam filtering

MACRO	SEEN LIVE	FUNCTIONALITY		
(0)	$\checkmark$	Spam target email address.		
(A)	$\checkmark$	FQDN of sending bot, as reported to the bot as part of the preceding C&C exchange.		
(B)		Creates content-boundary strings for multi-part messages.		
(Cnum)	$\checkmark$	Labels a field's resulting content, so it can be used elsewhere through (V); see below.		
(D)	$\checkmark$	Date and time, formatted per RFC 2822.		
(E)		ROT-3-encodes the target email address.		
(Fstring)	$\checkmark$	Random value from the dictionary named <i>string</i> . <sup>2</sup>		
(Gstring)	$\checkmark$	Line-wrap <i>string</i> into 72 characters per line.		
(Hstring)		Defines hidden text snippets with substitutions, for use in HTML- and plain-text parts.		
(I)	$\checkmark$	Random number between 1 and 255, used to generate fake IP addresses.		
(Jstring)		Produces quoted-printable "=20" linewrapping.		
(K)		IP address of SMTP client.		
(M)	$\checkmark$	6-character string compatible with Exim's message identifiers (keyed on time).		
(N)		16-bit prefix of SMTP client's IP address.		
(Ostring:num)	$\checkmark$	Randomized message identifier element compatible with Microsoft SMTPSVC.		
(Pnum <sub>1</sub> [-num <sub>2</sub> ]:string)	$\checkmark$	Random string of $num_1$ (up to $num_2$ , if provided) characters taken from string.		
(Qstring)		Quoted-printable "=" linewrapping.		
$(Rnum_1-num_2)$	$\checkmark$	Random number between $num_1$ and $num_2$ . Note, special-cased when used with (D).		
(Ustring)		Randomized percent-encoding of string.		
(Vnum)	$\checkmark$	Inserts the value of the field identified by (Cnum).		
(W)		Time and date as plain numbers, e.g. "20080225190434".		
(X)		Previously selected member of the "names" dictionary.		
(Ynum)	$\checkmark$	8-character alphanumeric string, compatible with Sendmail message identifiers.		
(Z)	$\checkmark$	Another Sendmail-compatible generator for message identifiers.		

Table 2: Storm's spam-generation templating language.

#### **Campaign Mechanics: Spamming**



#### **Campaign Mechanics: Reporting**



#### Welcome to Storm! What can we sell you?



## Anatomy of a modern Pharma spam campaign



Diagram by Stuart Brown modernlifeisrubbish.co.uk

## Life As A Spammer ...

- From a research study where we infiltrated Storm and measured its use for spamming:
  - Modern spam campaigns can send 10s of billions of spams using mailing lists of 100s of millions of addresses
  - 3/4 to 5/6 of all spam delivery attempts fail before the message is even sent to the receiver's server ...
    - ... due to heavy & effective use of black-listing
  - It takes around 20,000 "postcard" spams to get one person to visit the postcard site
    - 1 in 10 of the visitors will click to download the postcard
  - It takes around 12,000,000 Viagra spams to get one person to visit the site and make a purchase (~\$100)
  - Even given those low rates, huge volume  $\Rightarrow$  profitable