# **Attacks on DNS**

**CS 161: Computer Security** 

**Prof. David Wagner** 

March 3, 2013

# Today

- Reminder: Project due tonight, 11:59pm
- Today, DNS: protocol for mapping hostnames to IP addresses, and attacks on DNS.


# **DNS Overview**

- DNS translates www.google.com to 74.125.25.99
- It's a performance-critical distributed database.
- DNS security is critical for the web. (Same-origin policy assumes DNS is secure.)
- Analogy: If you don't know the answer to a question, ask a friend for help (who may in turn refer you to a friend of theirs, and so on).

# **DNS Overview**

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- DNS security is critical for the web. (Same-origin policy assumes DNS is secure.)
- Analogy: If you don't know the answer to a question, ask a friend for help (who may in turn refer you to a friend of theirs, and so on).
- Security risks: friend might be malicious, communication channel to friend might be insecure, friend might be well-intentioned but misinformed

## DNS Lookups via a Resolver



## Security risk #1: malicious DNS server

- Of course, if any of the DNS servers queried are malicious, they can lie to us and fool us about the answer to our DNS query
- (In fact, they used to be able to fool us about the answer to other queries, too. We'll come back to that.)

## Security risk #2: on-path eavesdropper

- If attacker can eavesdrop on our traffic... we're hosed.
- Why? We'll see why.

## Security risk #3: off-path attacker

- If attacker can't eavesdrop on our traffic, can he inject spoofed DNS responses?
- This case is especially interesting, so we'll look at it in detail.

# **DNS Threats**

- DNS: path-critical for just about everything we do – Maps hostnames ⇔ IP addresses
  - Design only scales if we can minimize lookup traffic o #1 way to do so: caching
    - o #2 way to do so: return not only answers to queries, but additional info that will likely be needed shortly
- What if attacker eavesdrops on our DNS queries? — Then similar to DHCP/TCP, can spoof responses
- Consider attackers who *can't* eavesdrop but still aim to manipulate us via *how the protocol functions*
- Directly interacting w/ DNS: dig program on Unix – Allows querying of DNS system – Dumps each field in DNS responses



- ; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a
- ;; global options: +cmd
- ;; Got answer:
- ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901
- ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3


;; QUESTION SECTION: ;eecs.mit.edu. IN Α ;; ANSWER SECTION: 21600 eecs.mit.edu. IN Α 18.62.1.6 :: AUTHORITY SECTION: mit.edu. 11088 BITSY.mit.edu. IN NS mit.edu. 11088 IN NS W20NS.mit.edu. mit.edu. 11088 IN STRAWB.mit.edu. NS ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: STRAWB.mit.edu. 126738 18.71.0.151 Α IN 18.72.0.3 BITSY.mit.edu. 166408 IN Α W20NS.mit.edu. 18.70.0.160 126738 IN Α

; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a

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;; ANSWER SECTIC eecs.mit.edu.	N: 21600	IN	A	18.62.1.6
;; AUTHORITY SEC			220	
mit.edu.	11088	IN	NS	BITSY.mit.edu.
mit.edu.	11088	IN	NS	W20NS.mit.edu.
mit.edu.	The question we a	asked tl	he server	RAWB.mit.edu.
;; ADDITIONAL SE	CTION:			
STRAWB.mit.edu.	126738	IN	A	18.71.0.151
BITSY.mit.edu.	166408	IN	A	18.72.0.3
W20NS.mit.edu.	126738	IN	A	18.70.0.160

<pre>; ; &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; eecs.mit.edu a ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; -&gt;&gt;HEADER&lt;&lt;- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3</pre>							
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;eecs.mit.edu.			IN	A			
;; ANSWER SECTION: eecs.mit.edu.	2160	the	DNS cl	ient (dig	<b>n identifier</b> that enables g, in this case) to match up ginal request		
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:	'	_					
mit.edu.	1108		IN	NS	BITSY.mit.edu.		
mit.edu.	1108		IN	NS	W20NS.mit.edu.		
mit.edu.	1108	8	IN	NS	STRAWB.mit.edu.		
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: STRAWB.mit.edu.	1267	38	IN	A	18.71.0.151		
BITSY.mit.edu.	1664			A	18.72.0.3		
W20NS.mit.edu.	1267		IN	A	18.70.0.160		
	TZ0/	50	TTN	А	10.70.0.100		



; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901 ;; flags: gr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;eecs.mit.edu. IN Α ;; ANSWER SECTION: eecs.mit.edu. 21600 TN Α 18.62.1.6 ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: mit.edu. du. In general, a single *Resource Record* (RR) like du. mit.edu. this includes, left-to-right, a DNS name, a *time*mit.edu. edu. *to-live*, a family (IN for our purposes - ignore), a type (A here), and an associated value ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION STRAWB.mit.edu. 126738 18.71.0.151 IN Α BITSY.mit.edu. 166408 IN Α 18.72.0.3 126738 W20NS.mit.edu. 18.70.0.160 IN Α


; ; <<>> Dig 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eegs mit edu a								
"Authority" tells us the name servers responsible for the answer. Each RR gives the hostname of a different name server ("NS") for names in mit.edu. We should cache each record for 11,088 seconds.								
If the " <b>Answer</b> " had been empty, then the resolver next step would be to send the original query to on these name servers.								
21600 IN A 18.62.1.6								
21000			20.02.1.0					
11088	IN	NS	BITSY.mit.edu.					
11088	IN	NS	W20NS.mit.edu.					
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	"Authority the answer name serve cache each If the "Ans next step w these name 21600 11088 11088 11088 11088 11088 11088	"Authority" tells the answer. Each name server ("NS cache each record If the "Answer" H next step would b these name serve 21600 IN 11088 IN 11088 IN 11088 IN 11088 IN 11088 IN 11088 IN	<ul> <li>"Authority" tells us the name the answer. Each RR gives to name server ("NS") for name cache each record for 11,088</li> <li>If the "Answer" had been ennext step would be to send that these name servers.</li> <li>21600 IN A</li> <li>11088 IN NS</li> <li>126738 IN A</li> <li>166408 IN A</li> </ul>					


3

; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a

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;; QUESTION SECTI									
;eecs.mit.edu.	"Additional" provides extra information to save us from making separate lookups for it, or helps with bootstrapping.								
;; ANSWER SECTION eecs.mit.edu.	Here, it tells us the IP addresses for the hostnames of the name servers. We add these to our cache.								
;; AUTHORITY SECT	ION:								
mit.edu.	11088 IN	NS	BITSY.mit.edu.						
mit.edu.	11088 IN	NS	W20NS.mit.edu.						
mit.edu.	11088 IN	NS	STRAWB.mit.edu.						
;; ADDITIONAL SEC	TION:								
STRAWB.mit.edu.	126738 IN	A	18.71.0.151						
BITSY.mit.edu.	166408 IN	A	(18.72.0.3)						
W20NS.mit.edu.	126738 IN	A	18.70.0.160						






# **DNS Protocol, cont.**

#### Message header:

- Identification: 16 bit # for query, reply to query uses same #
- Along with repeating the Question and providing Answer(s), replies can include "Authority" (name server responsible for answer) and "Additional" (info client is likely to look up soon anyway)
- Each Resource Record has a Time To Live (in seconds) for caching (not shown)



; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE	E-P2	2 <<>>	> eed	cs.mit.edu	a		
;; global options: +cmd							
;; Got answer:							
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUEF		VVna		the mit.ed	u server	01 ADDITIONAL:	3
;; QUESTION SECTION:		its o	nera	ator steal,	sav all		
;eecs.mit.edu.			•	eb surfing			
;; ANSWER SECTION:		berk	kelev	.edu's ma	in web		
eecs.mit.edu.	21	serv				6	
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:							
mit.edu.	11(	288	IN	NS	BITSY.n	nit.edu.	
mit.edu.	11(	288	IN	NS	W20NS.n	nit.edu.	
mit.edu.	11(	288	IN	NS	STRAWB	.mit.edu.	
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:							
STRAWB.mit.edu.		6738	IN	A	18.71.0		
BITSY.mit.edu.		6408	IN	A	18.72.0		
W20NS.mit.edu.	126	6738	IN	A	18.70.0	0.160	

<pre>; ; &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; eecs.mit.edu a ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; -&gt;&gt;HEADER&lt;&lt;- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3</pre>								
<pre>;; QUESTION SECTION: ;eecs.mit.edu. ;; ANSWER SECTION:</pre> Let's look at a flaw in the original DNS design (since fixed)								
eecs.mit.edu.	216	500	IN	A	18.62.1	1.6		
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: mit.edu. mit.edu.		)88 )88	IN IN	NS NS		nit.edu. nit.edu.		
mit.edu.	110	88	IN	NS	STRAWB.	mit.edu.		
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: STRAWB.mit.edu. BITSY.mit.edu. W20NS.mit.edu.	166	5738 5408 5738	IN IN IN	A A A	18.71.0 18.72.0 18.70.0	).3		

; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3 ;; QUESTION SECTION: What could happen if the mit.edu server ;eecs.mit.edu. returns the following to us instead? ;; ANSWER SECTION: eecs.mit.edu. 21600 TN А 18.62.1.6 ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: mit.edu. 11088 NS BITSY.mit.edu. TN mit.edu. 11088 IN NS W20NS.mit.edu. mit.edu. 30 TN NS www.berkeley.edu. ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: 18.6.6.6 www.berkeley.edu. 30 IN Α 18.72.0.3 BITSY.mit.edu. 166408 IN Α W20NS.mit.edu. 126738 18.70.0.160 TN Α


; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a

- ;; global options: +cmd
- ;; Got answer:
- ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901
- ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3

;; QUESTION SECTION: ;eecs.mit.edu. We'd dutifully store in our cache a mapping of www.berkeley.edu to an IP address under ;; ANSWER SECTION: MIT's control. (It could have been any IP eecs.mit.edu. address they wanted, not just one of theirs.) ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: mit.edu. 11088 NS BITSY.mit.edu. IN mit.edu. 11088 IN W20NS.mit.edu. NS mit.edu. 30 IN NS www.berkeley.edu. ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: 18.6.6.6 www.berkeley.edu 30 IN Α BITSY.mit.edu. 18.72.0.3166408 IN Α W20NS.mit.edu. 126738 18.70.0.160 TN Α

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- ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3



; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a

- ;; global options: +cmd
- ;; Got answer:
- ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901
- ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3

IN

Α

;; QUESTION SECTION: ;eecs.mit.edu.

;; ANSWER SECTION How do we fix such *cache poisoning*? eecs.mit.edu. :: AUTHORITY SECTION: mit.edu. 11088 NS BITSY.mit.edu. TN mit.edu. 11088 IN NS W20NS.mit.edu. mit.edu. 30 TN NS www.berkeley.edu. ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: 18.6.6.6 www.berkeley.edu. 30 IN Α BITSY.mit.edu. 166408 IN 18.72.0.3 Α W20NS.mit.edu. 126738 18.70.0.160 TN Α

; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu	ı a
---	-----

;; global opti ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<< ;; flags: qr r	- opcod	they're for the domain we're looking up							
;; QUESTION SE	CTION:								
;eecs.mit.edu. ;; ANSWER SECI	return them to us directly in an <b>Answer</b> anyway.								
eecs.mit.edu.		21600	IN	A	18.62.1.6				
;; AUTHORITY S	SECTION:								
mit.edu.	1	11088	IN	NS	BITSY.mit.edu.				
mit.edu.		11088	IN	NS	W20NS.mit.edu.				
mit.edu. 💆		30	IN	NS	www.berkeley.edu.				
;; ADDITIONAL.	;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:								

www.berkeley.edu.	30	IN	Α	18.6.6.6
BITSY.mit.edu.	166408	IN	A	18.72.0.3
W20NS.mit.edu.	126738	IN	A	18.70.0.160

## Security risk #1: malicious DNS server

- Of course, if any of the DNS servers queried are malicious, they can lie to us and fool us about the answer to our DNS query...
- and they used to be able to fool us about the answer to other queries, too, using *cache poisoning*. Now fixed (phew).

## Security risk #2: on-path eavesdropper

- If attacker can eavesdrop on our traffic... we're hosed.
- Why?

## Security risk #2: on-path eavesdropper

- If attacker can eavesdrop on our traffic... we're hosed.
- Why? They can see the query and the 16-bit transaction identifier, and race to send a spoofed response to our query.

## Security risk #3: off-path attacker


- If attacker can't eavesdrop on our traffic, can he inject spoofed DNS responses?
- Answer: It used to be possible, via *blind spoofing*. We've since deployed mitigations that makes this harder (but not totally impossible).

### **Blind spoofing**

- Say we look up mail.google.com; how can an off-path attacker feed us a bogus A answer before the legitimate server replies?
- How can such a remote attacker even know we are looking up mail.google.com?

Suppose, e.g., we visit a web page under their control:

...<img src="http://mail.google.com" ...> ...



### **Blind spoofing**

	16 bits	16 bits		
	SRC=53	DST=53		
<ul> <li>Say we look up</li> </ul>	checksum	length		
mail.google.com; how can	Identification	Flags		
an off-path attacker feed us a	# Questions	# Answer RRs		
bogus A answer before the	# Authority RRs	# Additional RRs		
<ul> <li>Interpret and the second of the</li></ul>				
page under their control:				
<pre><img src="http://mail.goo&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;ogle.com" td="" …<=""/><td>&gt;</td></pre>	>			


### Blind spoofing

Fix?

Once they know we're looking it up, they just have to guess the Identification field and reply before legit server.

How hard is that?

Originally, identification field incremented by 1 for each request. How does attacker guess it?



So this will be k+1

<img src="http://mail.google.com" ...>

		16 bits	16 bits	
DNS Blind Spoofing, cont.		SRC=53 DST=53		
Once we randomize the		checksum	length	
Identification, attacker has a		Identification	Flags	
1/65536 chance of guessing it		# Questions	# Answer RRs	
correctly.		# Authority RRs	# Additional RRs	
Are we pretty much safe?	Questions (variable # of resource records)			
Attacker can send <i>lots</i> of replies,		Ansv variable # of res		
not just one		Authority (variable # of resource records) Additional information (variable # of resource records)		
However: once reply from legit				
server arrives (with correct Identification), it's <b>cached</b> and no more opportunity to poison it. Victim is innoculated!		Jnless attacke 000s of replie rrives, we're l	s before legit	

phew!?

# **DNS Blind Spoofing (Kaminsky 2008)**

- Two key ideas:
  - Attacker can get around caching of legit replies by generating a series of different name lookups:
  - <img src="http://random1.google.com" ...>
    <img src="http://random2.google.com" ...>
    <img src="http://random3.google.com" ...>
  - <img src="http://randomN.google.com" ...>
  - Trick victim into looking up a domain you don't care about, use Additional field to spoof the domain you do

# **Kaminsky Blind Spoofing**

OUECUTON C	at ea	For each lookup of <i>randomk</i> .google.com, attacker <b>spoofs</b> a bunch of records like this each with a different Identifier						
;; QUESTION SE				_				
;randomk.goog]	Le.com.		IN	A				
<pre>;; ANSWER SECT randomk.google ;; AUTHORITY S google.com.</pre>	e.com	21600 11088	IN IN	ANS	doesn't matter mail.google.com			
;; ADDITIONAL	SECTION:							
mail.google.co	om	126738	IN	A	6.6.6.6			
Once they	win the r	ace, not	only ha	ave they	poisoned			

mail.google.com ...

# **Kaminsky Blind Spoofing**

	For each lookup of <i>randomk</i> .google.com, attacker <b>spoofs</b> a bunch of records like this, each with a different Identifier			
			_	
;randomk.google.com.		IN	A	
<pre>;; ANSWER SECTION: randomk.google.com ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:</pre>	21600	IN	A	doesn't matter
google.com.	11088	IN	NS	mail.google.com
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION mail.google.com		IN	A	6.6.6.6

Once they win the race, not only have they poisoned mail.google.com ... but also the cached NS record for google.com's name server - so any **future** X.google.com lookups go through the attacker's machine

Central problem: all that tells a client they should accept a response is that it matches the **Identification** field.

With only 16 bits, it lacks sufficient entropy: even if truly random, the *search space* an attacker must *brute force* is too small.


Where can we get more entropy? (*Without* requiring a protocol change.)

16 bits	16 bits			
SRC=53	DST=53			
checksum	length			
Identification	Flags			
# Questions	# Answer RRs			
# Authority RRs	# Additional RRs			
Questions (variable # of resource records)				
Answers (variable # of resource records)				
Authority (variable # of resource records)				
Additional information (variable # of resource records)				

#### Total *entropy*: 16 bits

For requestor to receive DNS reply, needs both correct Identification and correct ports.

On a request, DST port = 53. SRC port usually also 53 - but not fundamental, just convenient.



"Fix": client uses random source port ⇒ attacker doesn't know correct dest. port to use in reply

16 bits 16 bits SRC=53 DST=rnd length checksum Identification Flags **#** Questions **# Answer RRs # Authority RRs #Additional RRs** Questions (variable # of resource records) Answers (variable # of resource records) **Authority** (variable # of resource records) Additional information (variable # of resource records)

Total *entropy*: ? bits

"Fix": client uses random source port ⇒ attacker doesn't know correct dest. port to use in reply

32 bits of entropy makes it orders of magnitude harder for attacker to guess all the necessary fields and dupe victim into accepting spoof response.

This is what primarily "secures" DNS against blind spoofing today.

#### 16 bits 16 bits SRC=53 DST=rnd checksum length Identification Flags **#** Questions **# Answer RRs # Authority RRs # Additional RRs** Questions (variable # of resource records) Answers (variable # of resource records) **Authority** (variable # of resource records) Additional information (variable # of resource records)

Total entropy: 32 bits

#### **Lessons** learned

- Security risks: friend might be malicious
- Communication channel to friend might be insecure
- Friend might be well-intentioned but misinformed

# **Extra Material**

# **Summary of DNS Security Issues**

- DNS threats highlight:
  - Attackers can attack opportunistically rather than eavesdropping
    - o Cache poisoning only required victim to look up some name under attacker's control (*has been fixed*)
  - Attackers can often manipulate victims into vulnerable activity

o E.g., IMG SRC in web page to force DNS lookups

- Crucial for identifiers associated with communication to have sufficient entropy (= a lot of bits of unpredictability)
- "Attacks only get better": threats that appears technically remote can become practical due to unforeseen cleverness

# **Common Security Assumptions**

- (Note, these tend to be pessimistic ... but prudent)
- Attackers can interact with our systems without particular notice
  - Probing (poking at systems) may go unnoticed ...
  - -... even if highly repetitive, leading to crashes, and easy to detect
- It's easy for attackers to know general information about their targets
  - OS types, software versions, usernames, server ports, IP addresses, usual patterns of activity, administrative procedures

# **Common Assumptions**

- Attackers can obtain access to a copy of a given system to measure and/or determine how it works
- Attackers can make energetic use of automation
   They can often find clever ways to automate
- Attackers can pull off complicated coordination across a bunch of different elements/systems
- Attackers can bring large resources to bear if needed
  - Computation, network capacity
  - -But they are not super-powerful (e.g., control entire ISPs)

# **Common Assumptions**

- If it helps the attacker in some way, assume they can obtain privileges
  - But if the privilege gives everything away (attack becomes trivial), then we care about unprivileged attacks
- The ability to robustly detect that an attack has occurred does not replace desirability of preventing
- Infrastructure machines/systems are well protected (hard to directly take over)
  - So a vulnerability that requires infrastructure compromise is less worrisome than same vulnerability that doesn't

# **Common Assumptions**

- Network routing is hard to alter ... other than with physical access near clients (e.g., "coffeeshop")
  - Such access helps fool clients to send to wrong place
  - Can enable Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks
- We worry about attackers who are lucky
  - Since often automation/repetition can help "make luck"
- Just because a system does not have apparent value, it may still be a target
- Attackers are undaunted by fear of getting caught