The web architecture is a mess when it comes to security.
Announcements

• Homework 3 due Friday,
• Project 1 and 2 grades released
What is the Web?

A platform for deploying applications and sharing information, *portably and securely*
HTTP
(Hypertext Transfer Protocol)
A common data communication protocol on the web

HTTP REQUEST:
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.safebank.com

HTTP RESPONSE:
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
URLs

Global identifiers of network-retrievable resources

Example:

http://safebank.com:81/account?id=10#statement
HTTP

HTTP REQUEST:
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.safebank.com

HTTP RESPONSE:
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
### HTTP Request

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Path</th>
<th>HTTP version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GET</td>
<td>index.html</td>
<td>HTTP/1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Headers**

- `Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, */*`
- `Accept-Language: en`
- `Connection: Keep-Alive`
- `User-Agent: Chrome/21.0.1180.75 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4)`
- `Host: www.safebank.com`
- `Referer: http://www.google.com?q=dingbats`

**Data** – none for GET

- GET: no side effect
- POST: possible side effect
HTTP REQUEST:
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.safebank.com

HTTP RESPONSE:
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
<HTML> ... </HTML>
HTTP Response

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Date: Sun, 12 Aug 2012 02:20:42 GMT
Server: Microsoft-Internet-Information-Server/5.0
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: text/html
Last-Modified: Thu, 9 Aug 2012 17:39:05 GMT
Set-Cookie: ... 
Content-Length: 2543

<HTML> This is web content formatted using html </HTML>

Can be a webpage
Web page

- HTML
- CSS
- Javascript
HTML

A language to create structured documents
One can embed images, objects, or create interactive forms

index.html
<html>
  <body>
    <div>
      foo
      <a href="http://google.com">Go to Google!</a>
    </div>
    <form>
      <input type="text" />
      <input type="radio" />
      <input type="checkbox" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
CSS (Cascading Style Sheets)

Style sheet language used for describing the presentation of a document

```css
index.css

p.serif {
  font-family: "Times New Roman", Times, serif;
}

p.sansserif {
  font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
}
```
Javascript

Programming language used to manipulate web pages. It is a high-level, untyped and interpreted language with support for objects.

Supported by all web browsers

```javascript
<script>
function myFunction() {
    document.getElementById("demo").innerHTML = "Text changed.";
}
</script>

Very powerful!
HTTP

HTTP REQUEST:
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.safebank.com

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<HTML> ... </HTML>

webpage
Page rendering

HTML → HTML Parser

CSS → CSS Parser

Javascript → JS Engine

DOM

modifications to the DOM

Painter

bitmap
DOM (Document Object Model)

a cross-platform model for representing and interacting with objects in HTML

**HTML**

```html
<html>
  <body>
    <div>
      foo
    </div>
    <form>
      <input type="text" />
      <input type="radio" />
      <input type="checkbox" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
```

**DOM Tree**

```
|-> Document
  |-> Element (<html>)
    |-> Element (<body>)
      |-> Element (<div>)
        |-> text node
        |-> Form
          |-> Text-box
          |-> Radio Button
          |-> Check Box
```
HTTP REQUEST:
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.safebank.com

HTTP RESPONSE:
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
The power of Javascript

Get familiarized with it so that you can think of all the attacks one can do with it
What can you do with Javascript?

Almost anything you want to the DOM!

A JS script embedded on a page can modify in almost arbitrary ways the DOM of the page. The same happens if an attacker manages to get you load a script into your page.

w3schools.com has nice interactive tutorials: https://www.w3schools.com/w3css/tryit.asp
Example of what Javascript can do...

Can change HTML content:

```html
<p id="demo">JavaScript can change HTML content.</p>

<button type="button" onclick="document.getElementById('demo').innerHTML = 'Hello JavaScript!'">
  Click Me!
</button>

DEMO from w3schools.com
Other examples

Can change images
Can change style of elements
Can hide elements
Can unhide elements
Can change cursor
Other example: can access cookies

Will learn later that cookies are useful for authentication.

JS can read cookie:

```javascript
var x = document.cookie;
```

Change cookie with JS:

```javascript
document.cookie = "username=John Smith; expires=Thu, 18 Dec 2013 12:00:00 UTC; path=/";
```
Frames
Frames

• Enable embedding a page within a page

<iframe src="URL"></iframe>
Frames

• Modularity
  – Brings together content from multiple sources
  – Client-side aggregation

• Delegation
  – Frame can draw only on its own rectangle
Frames

- Outer page can specify only sizing and placement of the frame in the outer page
  - demo
- Frame isolation: Our page cannot change contents of inner page, inner page cannot change contents of outer page
Web security

ONE DOES NOT SIMPLY HACK MY COMPUTER
A historical perspective

- The web is an example of “bolt-on security”
- Originally, the web was invented to allow physicists to share their research papers
  - Only textual web pages + links to other pages; no security model to speak of
The web became complex and adversarial quickly

• Then we added embedded images
  – Crucial decision: a page can embed images loaded from another web server
• Then, Javascript, dynamic HTML, AJAX, CSS, frames, audio, video, …
• Today, a web site is a distributed application
• Attackers have various motivations

Web security is a challenge!
Desirable security goals

- **Integrity**: malicious web sites should not be able to tamper with integrity of my computer or my information on other web sites
- **Confidentiality**: malicious web sites should not be able to learn confidential information from my computer or other web sites
- **Privacy**: malicious web sites should not be able to spy on me or my activities online
- **Availability**: attacker cannot make site unavailable
Security on the web

- Risk #1: we don’t want a malicious site to be able to trash my files/programs on my computer
  - Browsing to awesomevids.com (or evil.com) should not infect my computer with malware, read or write files on my computer, etc.
Security on the web

• Risk #1: we don’t want a malicious site to be able to trash my files/programs on my computer
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• Defense: Javascript is sandboxed; try to avoid security bugs in browser code; privilege separation; automatic updates; etc.
Security on the web

• Risk #2: we don’t want a malicious site to be able to spy on or tamper with my information or interactions with other websites
  – Browsing to evil.com should not let evil.com spy on my emails in Gmail or buy stuff with my Amazon account
Security on the web

• Risk #2: we don’t want a malicious site to be able to spy on or tamper with my information or interactions with other websites
  – Browsing to evil.com should not let evil.com spy on my emails in Gmail or buy stuff with my Amazon account

• Defense: the same-origin policy
  – A security policy grafted on after-the-fact, and enforced by web browsers
Security on the web

• Risk #3: we want data stored on a web server to be protected from unauthorized access
Security on the web

• Risk #3: we want data stored on a web server to be protected from unauthorized access
• Defense: server-side security
Same-origin policy
Same-origin policy

• Each site in the browser is isolated from all others
Same-origin policy

- Multiple pages from the same site are not isolated
Origin

- Granularity of protection for same origin policy
- Origin = (protocol, hostname, port)

\[\text{http://coolsite.com:81/tools/info.html}\]

- It is **string matching**! If these match, it is same origin, else it is not. Even though in some cases, it is logically the same origin, if there is no match, it is not
Same-origin policy

One origin should not be able to access the resources of another origin.

Javascript on one page cannot read or modify pages from different origins.
Same-origin policy

• The origin of a page is derived from the URL it was loaded from:

  - http://upload.wikimedia.org
Same-origin policy

- The origin of a page is derived from the URL it was loaded from.
- Special case: Javascript runs with the origin of the page that loaded it.

http://en.wikipedia.org

http://www.google-analytics.com
Origins of other components

- `<img src=""">` the image is “copied” from the remote server into the new page so it has the origin of the embedding page (like JS) and not of the remote origin

- iframe: origin of the URL from which the iframe is served, and not the loading website.
### Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originating document</th>
<th>Accessed document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**except**
Random fact about … Scott Shenker

Bio according to me: A legend in computer networking

Bio on EECS website: “Scott Shenker spent his academic youth studying theoretical physics but soon gave up chaos theory for computer science. Continuing to display a remarkably short attention span, his research over the years has wandered […]. Unable to focus on any single topic, his current research projects include software-defined networking, […]. Unable to hold a steady job, he currently splits his time between the UC Berkeley Computer Science Division and the ICSI.”

Bio from him: “I have never taken a CS course in my life, and I don’t program.”

If you want to how he succeeded … attend next lecture