

**Q1** *DNS over TCP (SU20 Final Q6)*

**(20 points)**

Standard DNS uses UDP to send all queries and responses. Consider a modified DNS that instead uses TCP for all queries and responses.

Q1.1 (3 points) Which of the following does DNS over TCP guarantee against a man-in-the-middle attacker? Select all that apply.

☐ (A) Confidentiality

☐ (C) Authenticity

☐ (E) —

☐ (B) Integrity

☐ (D) None of the above

☐ (F) —

Q1.2 (3 points) Compared to standard DNS, does DNS over TCP defend against more attacks, fewer attacks, or the same amount of attacks against an on-path attacker?

☐ (G) More attacks

☐ (I) Fewer attacks

☐ (K) —

☐ (H) Same amount of attacks

☐ (J) —

☐ (L) —

Q1.3 (5 points) What fields does an off-path attacker **not know** and need to **guess** correctly to spoof a response in DNS over TCP? Assume source port randomization is enabled. Select all that apply.

☐ (A) TCP sequence numbers

☐ (C) Recursive resolver port

☐ (E) DNS NS records

☐ (B) Name server port

☐ (D) DNS A records

☐ (F) None of the above

Q1.4 (3 points) Is the Kaminsky attack possible on DNS over TCP? Assume source port randomization is disabled.

☐ (G) Yes, because the attacker only needs to guess the DNS Query ID

☐ (H) Yes, but we consider it infeasible for modern attackers

☐ (I) No, because the attacker cannot force the victim to generate a lot of DNS over TCP requests

☐ (J) No, because TCP has integrity guarantees

☐ (K) —

☐ (L) —

Q1.5 (3 points) Recall the DoS amplification attack using standard DNS packets. An off-path attacker spoofs many DNS queries with the victim's IP, and the victim is overwhelmed with DNS responses.


Does this attack still work on DNS over TCP?

- ☐ (A) Yes, the attack causes the victim to consume more bandwidth than the standard DNS attack
- ☐ (B) Yes, the attack causes the victim to consume less bandwidth than the standard DNS attack
- ☐ (C) No, because the DNS responses no longer provide enough amplification
- ☐ (D) No, because the attacker cannot force the server to send DNS responses to the victim
- ☐ (E) —
- ☐ (F) —

Q1.6 (3 points) What type of off-path DoS attack from lecture is DNS over TCP vulnerable to, but standard DNS not vulnerable to? Answer in five words or fewer.

**Q2 Caltopia DNS (SP21 Final Q8)****(13 points)**

EvanBot is trying to determine the IP address of `caltopia.com` with DNS. However, some attackers on the network want to provide EvanBot with the wrong answer.



Assumptions:

- Each attacker is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker between their two neighbors on the diagram above.
- No attackers can perform a Kaminsky attack.
- Standard DNS (not DNSSEC) is used unless otherwise stated.
- No private keys have been compromised unless otherwise stated.
- In each subpart, both EvanBot's cache and the local resolver's cache start empty.
- Each subpart is independent.

*Clarification during exam:* Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

In each subpart, EvanBot performs a DNS query for the address of `caltopia.com`.

Q2.1 (4 points) In this subpart only, assume the attackers only passively observe messages.

Which of the attackers would observe an A record with the IP address of `caltopia.com` as a result of EvanBot's query? Select all that apply.

- |   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (A) Attacker 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> (C) Attacker 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> (E) None of the above |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (B) Attacker 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> (D) Attacker 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> (F) —                 |

Q2.2 (3 points) Which of the attackers can poison the local resolver's cached record for `cs161.org` by injecting a record into the additional section of the DNS response? Select all that apply.

*Note: Attacker 1 has intentionally been left out as an answer choice.*

- |   |  |                                |
|---|--|--------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (G) Attacker 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> (I) Attacker 4        | <input type="checkbox"/> (K) — |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (H) Attacker 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> (J) None of the above | <input type="checkbox"/> (L) — |

Q2.3 (4 points) Assume that the resolver and the name servers all validate DNSSEC, but EvanBot does not validate DNSSEC. Which of the attackers can poison EvanBot's cached record for `caltopia.com` by modifying the DNS response? Select all that apply.

☐ (A) Attacker 1

☐ (C) Attacker 3

☐ (E) None of the above

☐ (B) Attacker 2

☐ (D) Attacker 4

☐ (F) —

Q2.4 (2 points) TRUE or FALSE: DNSSEC prevents Attacker 4 from learning the IP address of `caltopia.com`.

☐ (G) True

☐ (H) False

☐ (I) —

☐ (J) —

☐ (K) —

☐ (L) —