

# Web Security

## *CS 161: Computer Security*

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**July 25, 2019**

The web architecture is a mess when it comes to security



# Announcements

- Project 2 due next week Monday (7/29)
  - Project party tomorrow (3-5 pm @ Soda 606)
- Homework 2 due next week Thursday (8/1)
- Midterm 2 in 1.5 weeks (8/5)
  - Make sure to attend lectures and discussions

# Web 101



# What is the Web?

A platform for deploying applications and sharing information, *portably* and *securely*

client



client browser



web server




Bank of America 

# HTTP

## (Hypertext Transfer Protocol)

A common data communication protocol on the web

CLIENT BROWSER



WEB SERVER

### HTTP REQUEST:

```
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.safebank.com
```




### HTTP RESPONSE:

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK  
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
```



# URLs

Global identifiers of network-retrievable resources



- Protocol
  - http, https, ftp, ...
- Port
  - http: 80, https: 443, ...
- Sent to web server
  - path, query
- Local to client browser
  - fragment

# HTTP

CLIENT BROWSER



WEB SERVER

HTTP REQUEST:

```
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.safebank.com
```



HTTP RESPONSE:

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK  
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
```



# HTTP Request


GET: no  
side effect  
POST:  
possible  
side effect

Method Path HTTP version Headers

```
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1  
Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap,  
image/jpeg, */*  
Accept-Language: en  
Connection: Keep-Alive  
User-Agent: Chrome/21.0.1180.75 (Macintosh;  
Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4)  
Host: www.safebank.com  
Referer: http://www.google.com?q=dingbats
```

Blank line

Data – none for GET

The diagram shows an example of an HTTP GET request. The request is displayed in a grey box. Above the box, labels 'Method', 'Path', 'HTTP version', and 'Headers' have arrows pointing to the corresponding parts of the request line: 'GET', '/index.html', 'HTTP/1.1', and the header fields. Below the box, an arrow labeled 'Blank line' points to the empty space between the last header and the data field. Another arrow labeled 'Data – none for GET' points to the data field, which is empty.



# HTTP

CLIENT BROWSER



WEB SERVER

HTTP REQUEST:

```
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.safebank.com
```




HTTP RESPONSE:

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK  
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
```




# HTTP Response



Can be a webpage

# Web page



# HTML

A language to create structured documents

One can embed images, objects, or create interactive forms

```
index.html
```

```
<html>
  <body>
    <div>
      foo
      <a href="http://google.com">Go to Google!</a>
    </div>
    <form>
      <input type="text" />
      <input type="radio" />
      <input type="checkbox" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
```

# CSS (Cascading Style Sheets)

Style sheet language used for describing the presentation of a document

## **index.css**

```
p.serif {  
font-family: "Times New Roman", Times, serif;  
}  
p.sansserif {  
font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;  
}
```

# Javascript

Programming language used to manipulate web pages. It is a high-level, untyped and interpreted language with support for objects.


Supported by all web browsers

```
<script>
function myFunction() {
document.getElementById("demo").innerHTML = "Text changed.";
}
</script>
```

**Very powerful!**

# HTTP

CLIENT BROWSER



WEB SERVER

HTTP REQUEST:

```
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.safebank.com
```



HTTP RESPONSE:



```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK  
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
```



**webpage**



# Page rendering






# DOM (Document Object Model)

a cross-platform model for representing and interacting with objects in HTML

## HTML

```
<html>
  <body>
    <div>
      foo
    </div>
    <form>
      <input type="text" />
      <input type="radio" />
      <input type="checkbox" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
```




## DOM Tree

```
|-> Document
  |-> Element (<html>)
    |-> Element (<body>)
      |-> Element (<div>)
        |-> text node
      |-> Form
        |-> Text-box
        |-> Radio Button
        |-> Check Box
```

# Web & HTTP 101

CLIENT BROWSER



WEB SERVER

HTTP REQUEST:

```
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.safebank.com
```



HTTP RESPONSE:

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK  
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
```



# The power of Javascript

Get familiarized with it so that you can think of all the attacks one can do with it

# What can you do with Javascript?

Almost anything you want to the DOM!

A JS script embedded on a page can modify in almost arbitrary ways the DOM of the page. The same happens if an attacker manages to get you load a script into your page.

w3schools.com has nice interactive tutorials:  
<https://www.w3schools.com/js>

# Example of what Javascript can do...

Can change HTML content:

```
<p id="demo">JavaScript can change HTML content.</p>
```

```
<button type="button"  
onclick="document.getElementById('demo').innerHTML =  
'Hello JavaScript!'">  
    Click Me!</button>
```

DEMO from [w3schools.com](http://w3schools.com)

# Other examples

- Can change images
- Can change style of elements
- Can hide elements
- Can unhide elements
- Can change cursor

# Other example: can access cookies

Will learn later that cookies are useful for authentication.

JS can read cookie:

```
var x = document.cookie;
```

Change cookie with JS:

```
document.cookie = "username=John Smith; expires=Thu,  
18 Dec 2013 12:00:00 UTC; path="/;
```

Demo

# Frames



# Frames

- Enable embedding a page within a page


```
<iframe src="URL"></iframe>
```

The screenshot shows a Google AdSense page. At the top left is the Google AdSense logo. Below it, the text reads: "Earn money from relevant ads on your website. Google AdSense matches ads to your site's content, and you earn money whenever your visitors click on them." There are several ads displayed, including one for "Roses, Daisies, and more" from "www.seedsandsaplings.com". A red box highlights a sign-up form on the right side of the page. The form contains the text: "Sign up now »", "Existing AdSense users:", "Sign in to Google AdSense with your Google Account", "Email: [input field]", "Password: [input field]", and a "Sign in" button. A blue arrow points from the text "outer page" to the top right of the page, and another blue arrow points from the text "inner page" to the sign-up form.

outer page

inner page

# Frames



- Modularity
  - Brings together content from multiple sources
  - Client-side aggregation
- Delegation
  - Frame can draw only on its own rectangle




# Frames

- Outer page can specify only sizing and placement of the frame in the outer page
  - demo
- Frame isolation: Our page cannot change contents of inner page, inner page cannot change contents of outer page

# Web Security

# A historical perspective

- The web is an example of “bolt-on security”
- Originally, the web was invented to allow physicists to share their research papers
  - Only textual web pages + links to other pages;  
no security model to speak of



# The web became complex and adversarial quickly

- Then we added embedded images
  - Crucial decision: a page can embed images loaded from another web server
- Then, Javascript, dynamic HTML, AJAX, CSS, frames, audio, video, ...
- Today, a web site is a distributed application
- Attackers have various motivations

**Web security is a challenge!**

# Desirable security goals

- **Integrity:** malicious web sites should not be able to tamper with integrity of my computer or my information on other web sites
- **Confidentiality:** malicious web sites should not be able to learn confidential information from my computer or other web sites
- **Privacy:** malicious web sites should not be able to spy on me or my activities online
- **Availability:** attacker cannot make site unavailable

# Security on the web

- Risk #1: we don't want a malicious site to be able to trash my files/programs on my computer
  - Browsing to `awesomevids.com` (or `evil.com`) should not infect my computer with malware, read or write files on my computer, etc.
- Defense: Javascript is **sandboxed**;  
try to avoid security bugs in browser code;  
privilege separation; automatic updates; etc.



# Security on the web

- Risk #2: we want data stored on a web server to be protected from unauthorized access
- Defense: server-side security
  - Think **Project 2**

# Security on the web

- Risk #3: we don't want a malicious site to be able to spy on or tamper with my information or interactions with other websites
  - Browsing to evil.com should not let evil.com spy on my emails in Gmail or buy stuff with my Amazon account
- Defense: **the same-origin policy**
  - A security policy grafted on after-the-fact, and enforced by web browsers

# Security on the web

- Risk #4: we don't want malicious websites to subvert or act in opposition to user's intent
  - Clickjacking attack
- Defense: **frame busting** can help prevent some clickjacking attacks

# Break Time: Spencer McCall



- Missouri -> San Diego, CA
- Enjoys game theory, also crypto
- English, French, Italian

- Accidentally DoS government server while web scrapping



Image: Getty Images/iStockphoto

# **Same-origin Policy**

# Same-origin policy


One origin should not be able to access the resources of another origin

Javascript on one page cannot read or modify pages from different origins

# Same-origin policy

- Each site in the browser is isolated from all others

browser:




security barrier



wikipedia.org




bankofamerica.com



# Same-origin policy

- Multiple pages from the same site are not isolated


browser:



No security barrier



wikipedia.org




wikipedia.org



# Same-origin policy

- The origin of a site is derived from its URL

http://en.wikipedia.org




The image shows a screenshot of the Wikipedia main page in a web browser. The address bar at the top displays the URL `http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page`, which is circled in orange. An orange arrow points from the text `http://en.wikipedia.org` above to the circled part of the URL. The page content includes the Wikipedia logo, navigation links, a search bar, and several featured articles. The main article is titled "Today's featured article" and discusses "The Lucy poems" by William Wordsworth. Other articles in the "In the news" section include reports on a fire in Perm, Russia, and the re-election of Hifikepunye Pohamba as President of Namibia.

# Same-origin policy

- The origin of a site is derived from its URL
  - Images adopt origin of site that loads them

<http://en.wikipedia.org>




<http://upload.wikimedia.org>

# Same-origin policy

- The origin of a site is derived from its URL
  - Images adopt origin of site that loads them
  - Javascript runs with the origin of the site that loaded it

<http://en.wikipedia.org>




# Origins of Frames

- iframes **do not** adopt origin of site that loads them
  - iframe origin is the inner site (being displayed), and not the outer site (loading website)

# Origin

- Granularity of protection for same origin policy
- Origin = protocol + hostname + port



- Origin is determined by **string matching!** If these match, it is same origin, else it is not.
  - However, port matching depends on browser implementation

# Exercises

Originating document	Accessed document
<a href="http://wikipedia.org/a/">http://wikipedia.org/a/</a>	<a href="http://wikipedia.org/b/">http://wikipedia.org/b/</a>
<a href="http://wikipedia.org/">http://wikipedia.org/</a>	<a href="http://www.wikipedia.org/">http://www.wikipedia.org/</a>
<a href="http://wikipedia.org/">http://wikipedia.org/</a>	<a href="https://wikipedia.org/">https://wikipedia.org/</a>
<a href="http://wikipedia.org:80/">http://wikipedia.org:80/</a>	<a href="http://wikipedia.org:81/">http://wikipedia.org:81/</a>
<a href="http://wikipedia.org:80/">http://wikipedia.org:80/</a>	<a href="http://wikipedia.org/">http://wikipedia.org/</a>



except



# Chromodo

## Private Internet Browser

Fast and versatile Internet Browser based on Chromium, with highest levels of speed, security and privacy!

**Issue 704: Comodo: Comodo "Chromodo" Browser disables same origin policy, Effectively turning off web security.**  
13 people starred this issue and may be notified of changes.

**Status:** Fixed  
**Reporter:** [tav...@google.com](mailto:tav...@google.com)  
**Created:** Yesterday  
[project-...@google.com](mailto:project-...@google.com)

**Project Member** Reported by [tav...@google.com](mailto:tav...@google.com), Jan 21, 2016

When you install Comodo Internet Security, by default a new browser called Chromodo is installed and set as the default browser. Additionally, all shortcuts are replaced with Chromodo links and all settings, cookies, etc are imported from Chrome. They also hijack DNS settings, among other shady practices.


<https://www.comodo.com/home/browsers-toolbars/chromodo-private-internet-browser.php>

Chromodo is described as "highest levels of speed, security and privacy", but actually disables all web security. Let me repeat that, they \*\*\*disable the same origin policy\*\*\*.....?!?..


**Severity:** Comodo  
**Impact:** Chromodo  
**Priority:** critical

# Cross-origin communication

- Allowed through a narrow API: **postMessage**
- Receiving origin decides if to accept the message based on origin (whose correctness is enforced by browser)



`postMessage`  
("run this script",  
script)



**Check origin, and request!**



# Clickjacking

# Clickjacking attacks

- Exploitation where a user's mouse click is used in a way that was not intended by the user

# Talk to your partner

- How can a user's click be used in a way different than intended?

# Simple example

```
<a  
  onMouseDown=window.open(http://www.evil.com)  
  href=http://www.google.com/>  
  Go to Google  
</a>
```

What does it do?

- Opens a window to the attacker site

Why include **href** to Google?

- Browser status bar shows URL when hovering over as a means of protection

# What happens in this case?

The image shows a web browser window with the address bar containing `funnycats.com`. The browser's address bar and search bar are highlighted with a blue border. The browser's toolbar includes a search bar with the text "Search" and various navigation icons. The browser's tabs show "Gmail", "News", "PreVeil Email", "Safeway - Groceri...", "Instacart - Whole ...", "CS 294, Fall 2011", and "Bear Facts Faculty...".

The main content of the browser window is the "Funny cats website" page, which displays the Bank of America website. The Bank of America logo is visible at the top left of the page. The page content includes a "Secure Sign-in" form with two input fields containing the text "secret" and a "Sign In" button. Below the sign-in form are links for "Save Online ID", "Security & Help", "Forgot ID", "Forgot Passcode", and "Enroll". The page also features a navigation menu with links for "Banking", "Credit Cards", "Loans", and "Investments". A large red "\$10" is visible in the bottom right corner of the page.

A red arrow labeled "JavaScript" points from the left side of the browser window to the "Sign In" button on the Bank of America website, indicating a JavaScript injection.

# Frames: same-origin policy

- Frame inherits origin of its URL
- Same-origin policy: if frame and outer page have different origins, they cannot access each other
  - In particular, malicious JS on outer page cannot access resources of inner page

# How to bypass same-origin policy for frames?

Clickjacking

# Clickjacking using frames

- Evil site frames good site
- Evil site covers good site by putting dialogue boxes or other elements on top of parts of framed site to create a different effect
- Inner site now looks different to user



How can we defend against clickjacking?

# Defenses

- User confirmation



- Good site pops dialogue box with information on the action it is about to make and asks for user confirmation
- Degrades user experience

- UI randomization

- good site embeds dialogues at random locations so it is hard to overlay
- Difficult & unreliable (e.g. multi-click attacks)

# Defense 3: Framebusting

Web site includes code on a page that prevents other pages from framing it



Demo

# What is framebusting?

Framebusting code is often made up of

- a conditional statement and
- a counter action

Common method:

```
if (top != self) {  
    top.location = self.location;  
}
```

# A Survey

Framebusting is very common at the Alexa Top 500 sites

[global traffic rank of a website]

Top 10	60%
Top 100	37%
Top 500	14%

# Many framebusting methods

```
if (top != self)
```

```
if (top.location != self.location)
```

```
if (top.location != location)
```

```
if (parent.frames.length > 0)
```

```
if (window != top)
```

```
if (window.top !== window.self)
```

```
if (window.self != window.top)
```

```
if (parent && parent != window)
```

```
if (parent && parent.frames &&  
    parent.frames.length>0)
```

```
if((self.parent && !(self.parent===self)) &&  
    (self.parent.frames.length!=0))
```

# Many framebusting methods

```
top.location = self.location
```

```
top.location.href = document.location.href
```

```
top.location.href = self.location.href
```

```
top.location.replace(self.location)
```

```
top.location.href = window.location.href
```

```
top.location.replace(document.location)
```

```
top.location.href = window.location.href
```

```
top.location.href = "URL"
```

```
document.write("")
```

```
top.location = location
```

```
top.location.replace(document.location)
```

```
top.location.replace('URL')
```

```
top.location.href = document.location
```

Most current framebusting  
can be defeated



# Easy bugs

Goal: bank.com wants only bank.com's sites to frame it

Bank runs this code to protect itself:

```
if (top.location != location) {  
    if (document.referrer &&  
        document.referrer.indexOf("bank.com") == -1)  
    {  
        top.location.replace(document.location.href);  
    }  
}
```

**Problem:** <http://badguy.com?q=bank.com>

# Abusing the XSS filter

IE8 reflective XSS filters:

- Browser requested URL contains javascript:
  - `http://www.victim.com?var=<script> alert('xss'); </script>`
- Server responds
- Browser checks
  - If `<script> alert('xss'); </script>` appears in rendered page word for word, the IE8 filter will replace it with `<sc#pt> alert('xss'); </sc#pt>`

How can attacker abuse this?

# Abusing the XSS filter

- Attacker figures out the framebusting code of victim site (easy: visit victim site in attacker's browser and view the source code)
  - `<script> if(top.location != self.location) //framebust </script>`
- Framing page (attacker's outer page) does:
  - `<iframe src="http://www.victim.com?var=<b>script</b> if(top.location != self.location) //framebust </script>">`
- IE8 XSS filter modifies victim site's script to:
  - `<sc#pt> if(top.location != self.location)`

XSS filter disables legitimate framebusting code!!

Coming up:  
attacks on web servers!

