

Question 2 Perfect Forward Secrecy**(15 min)**

Alice (A) and Bob (B) want to communicate using some shared symmetric key encryption scheme. Consider the following key exchange protocols which can be used by A and B to agree upon a shared key, K_{ab} .

El Gamal-Based Key Exchange			Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange		
Message 1	$A \rightarrow B:$	$\{K_{ab}\}_{K_B^{pub}}$	Message 1	$A \rightarrow B:$	$g^a \mod p$
			Message 2	$A \leftarrow B:$	$g^b \mod p$
	Key exchanged			Key exchanged	
				$K_{ab} = g^{ab} \mod p$	
Message 2	$A \leftarrow B:$	$\{secret1\}_{K_{ab}}$	Message 3	$A \leftarrow B:$	$\{secret1\}_{K_{ab}}$
Message 3	$A \rightarrow B:$	$\{secret2\}_{K_{ab}}$	Message 4	$A \rightarrow B:$	$\{secret2\}_{K_{ab}}$

Some additional details:

- K_B^{pub} is Bob's long-lived public key.
- K_{ab} , the Diffie-Hellman exponents a and b , and the messages themselves are destroyed once all messages are sent. That is, these values are not stored on Alice's and Bob's devices after they are done communicating.

Eavesdropper Eve records all communications between Alice and Bob, but is unable to decrypt them. At some point in the future, Eve is lucky and manages to compromise Bob's computer.

(a) Is the confidentiality of Alice and Bob's prior El Gamal-based communication in jeopardy?

(b) What about Alice and Bob's Diffie-Hellman-based communication?

Question 3 *Hashing password with salts*

(10 min)

When storing a password pw , a website generates a random string $salt$, and saves:

$(salt, Hash(pw \parallel salt))$

in the database, where $Hash$ is a cryptographic hash function.

(a) If a user tries to log in with password pw' (which may or may not be the same as pw). How does the site check if the user has the correct password?

(b) Why use a hash function $Hash$ rather than just store pw directly?

(c) What is the purpose of the salt?