

Instructors: Pieter Abbeel & Igor Mordatch

University of California, Berkeley

[These slides were originally created by Dan Klein, Pieter Abbeel for CS188 Intro to AI at UC Berkeley]

## Recall: Minimax



# MiniMiniMax and Emerging Coordination

- Minimax can be extended to more than 2 players
  - e.g. 2 ghosts and 1 pacman
- Result: even though the 2 ghosts independently run their own MiniMiniMax search, they will naturally coordinate because:
  - They optimize the same objective
  - They know they optimize the same objective (i.e. they know the other ghost is also a minimizer)



# Video of Demo Smart Ghosts (Coordination)



#### Video of Demo Smart Ghosts (Coordination) – Zoomed In



# Summary this week so far

- Games are decision problems with 2 or more agents
  - Huge variety of issues and phenomena depending on details of interactions and payoffs
- For zero-sum games, optimal decisions defined by minimax
  - Implementable as a depth-first traversal of the game tree
  - Time complexity O(b<sup>m</sup>), space complexity O(bm)
- Alpha-beta pruning
  - Preserves optimal choice at the root
  - alpha/beta values keep track of best obtainable values from any max/min nodes on path from root to current node
  - Time complexity drops to O(b<sup>m/2</sup>) with ideal node ordering
- Exact solution is impossible even for "small" games like chess
  - Evaluation function
  - Iterative deepening (i.e. go as deep as time allows)
- Emergence of coordination:
  - For 3 or more agents (all MIN or MAX agents), coordination will naturally emerge from each independently optimizing their actions through search, as long as they know for each other agent whether they are MIN or MAX

#### **Uncertain Outcomes**



#### Worst-Case vs. Average Case



#### Idea: Uncertain outcomes controlled by chance, not an adversary!

# **Expectimax Search**

- Why wouldn't we know what the result of an action will be?
  - Explicit randomness: rolling dice
  - Unpredictable opponents: the ghosts respond randomly
  - Actions can fail: when moving a robot, wheels might slip
- Values should now reflect average-case (expectimax) outcomes, not worst-case (minimax) outcomes
- Expectimax search: compute the average score under optimal play
  - Max nodes as in minimax search
  - Chance nodes are like min nodes but the outcome is uncertain
  - Calculate their expected utilities
  - I.e. take weighted average (expectation) of children
- Later, we'll learn how to formalize the underlying uncertainresult problems as Markov Decision Processes



# Video of Demo Minimax vs Expectimax (Min)



# Video of Demo Minimax vs Expectimax (Exp)



# Expectimax Pseudocode

#### def value(state):

if the state is a terminal state: return the state's utility if the next agent is MAX: return max-value(state) if the next agent is EXP: return exp-value(state)



# def exp-value(state): initialize v = 0 for each successor of state: p = probability(successor) v += p \* value(successor) return v

#### **Expectimax Pseudocode**





v = (1/2) (8) + (1/3) (24) + (1/6) (-12) = 10

#### Expectimax Example



# Expectimax Pruning?



#### **Depth-Limited Expectimax**



# Probabilities



# **Reminder:** Probabilities

- A random variable represents an event whose outcome is unknown
- A probability distribution is an assignment of weights to outcomes
- Example: Traffic on freeway
  - Random variable: T = whether there's traffic
  - Outcomes: T in {none, light, heavy}
  - Distribution: P(T=none) = 0.25, P(T=light) = 0.50, P(T=heavy) = 0.25
- Some laws of probability (more later):
  - Probabilities are always non-negative
  - Probabilities over all possible outcomes sum to one
- As we get more evidence, probabilities may change:
  - P(T=heavy) = 0.25, P(T=heavy | Hour=8am) = 0.60
  - We'll talk about methods for reasoning and updating probabilities later







0.25



# **Reminder: Expectations**

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- The expected value of a function of a random variable is the average, weighted by the probability distribution over outcomes
- Example: How long to get to the airport?



# What Probabilities to Use?

- In expectimax search, we have a probabilistic note of how the opponent (or environment) will behave any state
  - Model could be a simple uniform distribution (roll a die)
  - Model could be sophisticated and require a great deal of computation
  - We have a chance node for any outcome out of our contor opponent or environment
  - The model might say that adversarial actions are likely!
- For now, assume each chance node magically comes along with probabilities that specify the distribution over its outcomes

Having a probabilistic belief about another agent's action does not mean that the agent is flipping any coins!

 $\mathbf{\Sigma}$ 

00

 $\mathbf{\Sigma}$ 

# **Quiz: Informed Probabilities**

- Let's say you know that your opponent is actually running a depth 2 minimax, using the result 80% of the time, and moving randomly otherwise
- Question: What tree search should you use?



- Answer: Expectimax!
  - To figure out EACH chance node's probabilities, you have to run a simulation of your opponent
  - This kind of thing gets very slow very quickly
  - Even worse if you have to simulate your opponent simulating you...
  - ... except for minimax, which has the nice property that it all collapses into one game tree

## **Modeling Assumptions**



# The Dangers of Optimism and Pessimism

Dangerous Optimism Assuming chance when the world is adversarial



Dangerous Pessimism Assuming the worst case when it's not likely



## Assumptions vs. Reality



Results from playing 5 games

Pacman used depth 4 search with an eval function that avoids trouble Ghost used depth 2 search with an eval function that seeks Pacman

[Demos: world assumptions (L7D3,4,5,6)]

# Assumptions vs. Reality



	Adversarial Ghost	Random Ghost
Minimax	Won 5/5	Won 5/5
Pacman	Avg. Score: 483	Avg. Score: 493
Expectimax	Won 1/5	Won 5/5
Pacman	Avg. Score: -303	Avg. Score: 503

Results from playing 5 games

Pacman used depth 4 search with an eval function that avoids trouble Ghost used depth 2 search with an eval function that seeks Pacman

[Demos: world assumptions (L7D3,4,5,6)]

#### Video of Demo World Assumptions Random Ghost – Expectimax Pacman



#### Video of Demo World Assumptions Adversarial Ghost – Minimax Pacman



#### Video of Demo World Assumptions Adversarial Ghost – Expectimax Pacman



#### Video of Demo World Assumptions Random Ghost – Minimax Pacman



# Other Game Types



# Mixed Layer Types

- E.g. Backgammon
- Expectiminimax
  - Environment is an extra "random agent" player that moves after each min/max agent
  - Each node computes the appropriate combination of its children



# Example: Backgammon

- Dice rolls increase b: 21 possible rolls with 2 dice
  - Backgammon ≈ 20 legal moves
  - Depth 2 = 20 x (21 x 20)<sup>3</sup> = 1.2 x 10<sup>9</sup>
- As depth increases, probability of reaching a given search node shrinks
  - So usefulness of search is diminished
  - So limiting depth is less damaging
  - But pruning is trickier...
- Historic AI: TDGammon uses depth-2 search + very good evaluation function + reinforcement learning: world-champion level play
- 1<sup>st</sup> AI world champion in any game!



# **Multi-Agent Utilities**

• What if the game is not zero-sum, or has multiple players?

**1,6,**6

7,1,2

**6,1,2** 

7,2,1

<mark>5,1</mark>,7

1,5,2

<mark>5,2</mark>,5

7,7,1

- Generalization of minimax:
  - Terminals have utility tuples
  - Node values are also utility tuples
  - Each player maximizes its own component
  - Can give rise to cooperation and competition dynamically...



# Utilities



# Maximum Expected Utility

- Why should we average utilities? Why not minimax?
- Principle of maximum expected utility:
  - A rational agent should chose the action that maximizes its expected utility, given its knowledge

#### Questions:

- Where do utilities come from?
- How do we know such utilities even exist?
- How do we know that averaging even makes sense?
- What if our behavior (preferences) can't be described by utilities?



## Rationality



# **Rational Preferences**

#### The Axioms of Rationality



Theorem: Rational preferences imply behavior describable as maximization of expected utility

# **MEU Principle**

- Theorem [Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944]
  - Given any preferences satisfying these constraints, there exists a real-valued function U such that:

 $U(A) \ge U(B) \Leftrightarrow A \succeq B$ 

 $U([p_1, S_1; \ldots; p_n, S_n]) = \sum_i p_i U(S_i)$ 

- I.e. values assigned by U preserve preferences of both prizes and lotteries!
- Maximum expected utility (MEU) principle:
  - Choose the action that maximizes expected utility
  - Note: an agent can be entirely rational (consistent with MEU) without ever representing or manipulating utilities and probabilities
  - E.g., a lookup table for perfect tic-tac-toe, a reflex vacuum cleaner



#### Human Utilities



# Human Utilities

- Utilities map states to real numbers. Which numbers?
- Standard approach to assessment (elicitation) of human utilities:
  - Compare a prize A to a standard lottery L<sub>p</sub> between
    - "best possible prize" u<sub>+</sub> with probability p
    - "worst possible catastrophe" u\_ with probability 1-p
  - Adjust lottery probability p until indifference: A ~ L<sub>p</sub>
  - Resulting p is a utility in [0,1]

*Pay \$30* 





# Money

- Money <u>does not</u> behave as a utility function, but we can talk about the utility of having money (or being in debt)
- Given a lottery L = [p, \$X; (1-p), \$Y]
  - The expected monetary value EMV(L) is p\*X + (1-p)\*Y
  - $U(L) = p^*U(\$X) + (1-p)^*U(\$Y)$
  - Typically, U(L) < U(EMV(L))</p>
  - In this sense, people are risk-averse
  - When deep in debt, people are risk-prone





# Example: Insurance

- Consider the lottery [0.5, \$1000; 0.5, \$0]
  - What is its expected monetary value? (\$500)
  - What is its certainty equivalent?
    - Monetary value acceptable in lieu of lottery
    - \$400 for most people
  - Difference of \$100 is the insurance premium
    - There's an insurance industry because people will pay to reduce their risk
    - If everyone were risk-neutral, no insurance needed!
  - It's win-win: you'd rather have the \$400 and the insurance company would rather have the lottery (their utility curve is flat and they have many lotteries)



# Example: Human Rationality?

- Famous example of Allais (1953)
  - A: [0.8, \$4k; 0.2, \$0] <
  - B: [1.0, \$3k; 0.0, \$0]
  - C: [0.2, \$4k; 0.8, \$0]
  - D: [0.25, \$3k; 0.75, \$0]
- Most people prefer B > A, C > D
- But if U(\$0) = 0, then
  - B > A ⇒ U(\$3k) > 0.8 U(\$4k)
  - C > D ⇒ 0.8 U(\$4k) > U(\$3k)



### Next Time: MDPs!