
Midterm Review Games

Q1. Games

Summer 2024

QS 188

For the following game tree, each player maximizes their respective utility. Let x, y respectively denote the top and bottom values in a node. Player 1 uses the utility function $U_1(x, y) = x$.



- (a) Both players know that Player 2 uses the utility function $U_2(x, y) = x y$.
 - (i) Fill in the rectangles in the figure above with pair of values returned by each max node.
 - (ii) You want to save computation time by using pruning in your game tree search. On the game tree above, put an 'X' on branches that do not need to be explored or simply write 'None'. Assume that branches are explored from left to right.
- (b) Now assume Player 2 changes their utility function based on their mood. The probabilities of Player 2's utilities and mood are described in the following table. Let M, U respectively denote the mood and utility function of Player 2.


| | | | M = happy | M = mad |
|--------------|------------|----------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| P(M = happy) | P(M = mad) | $P(U_2(x,y) = -x \mid M)$ | c | f |
| a | b | $P(U_2(x,y) = x - y \mid M)$ | d | g |
| | | $P(U_2(x,y) = x^2 + y^2 \mid M)$ | e | h |

(i) Calculate the maximum expected utility of the game for Player 1 in terms of the values in the game tree and the tables. It may be useful to record and label your intermediate calculations. You may write your answer in terms of a max function.

Q2. Bike Bidding Battle

Alyssa P. Hacker and Ben Bitdiddle are bidding in an auction at Stanley University for a bike. Alyssa will either bid x_1 , x_2 , or x_3 for the bike. She knows that Ben will bid y_1 , y_2 , y_3 , y_4 , or y_5 , but she does not know which. All bids are nonnegative.

(a) Alyssa wants to maximize her payoff given by the expectimax tree below. The leaf nodes show Alyssa's payoff. The nodes are labeled by letters, and the edges are labeled by the bid values x_i and y_i . The maximization node S represents Alyssa, and the branches below it represent each of her bids: x_1, x_2, x_3 . The chance nodes P, Q, R represent Ben, and the branches below them represent each of his bids: y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4, y_5 .




(i) Suppose that Alyssa believes that Ben would bid any bid with equal probability. What are the values of the chance (circle) and maximization (triangle) nodes?

Node P: _____ Node Q: _____ Node R: _____ Node S: _____


- (ii) Based on the information from the above tree, how much should Alyssa bid for the bike?
 - $\bigcirc x_1 \bigcirc x_2 \bigcirc x_3$
- (b) Alyssa does expectimax search by visiting child nodes from left to right. Ordinarily expectimax trees cannot be pruned without some additional information about the tree. Suppose, however, that Alyssa knows that the leaf nodes are ordered such that payoffs are non-increasing from left to right (the leaf nodes of the above diagram is an example of this ordering). Recall that if node X is a child of a maximizer node, a child of node X may be pruned if we know that the value of node X will never be > some threshold (in other words, it is \leq that threshold). Given this information, if it is possible to prune any branches from the tree, mark them below. Otherwise, mark "None of the above."

$$\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \square A & \square B & \square C & \square D & \square E & \square F & \square G & \square H \\ \hline I & \square J & \square K & \square L & \square M & \square N & \square O & \bigcirc & \text{None of the above} \end{array}$$

(c) Unrelated to parts (a) and (b), consider the minimax tree below. whose leaves represent payoffs for the maximizer. The crossed out edges show the edges that are pruned when doing naive alpha-beta pruning visiting children nodes from left to right. Assume that we prune on equalities (as in, we prune the rest of the children if the current child is $\leq \alpha$ (if the parent is a minimizer) or $\geq \beta$ (if the parent is a maximizer)).




Fill in the inequality expressions for the values of the labeled nodes A and B. Write ∞ and $-\infty$ if there is no upper or lower bound, respectively.



(d) Suppose node B took on the largest value it could possibly take on and still be consistent with the pruning scheme above. After running the pruning algorithm, we find that the values of the left and center subtrees have the same minimax value, both 1 greater than the minimax value of the right subtree. Based on this information, what is the numerical value of node C?

$$\bigcirc 1 \quad \bigcirc 2 \quad \bigcirc 3 \quad \bigcirc 4 \quad \bigcirc 5 \quad \bigcirc 6 \quad \bigcirc 7 \quad \bigcirc 8 \quad \bigcirc 9 \quad \bigcirc 10$$


(e) For which values of nodes D and E would choosing to take action z_2 be guaranteed to yield the same payoff as action z_1 ? Write ∞ and $-\infty$ if there is no upper or lower bound, respectively (this would correspond to the case where nodes D and E can be any value).



Q3. Games

Alyssa P. Hacker and Ben Bitdiddle are bidding in an auction at Stanley University for a bike. Alyssa will either bid x_1 , x_2 , or x_3 for the bike. She knows that Ben will bid y_1 , y_2 , y_3 , y_4 , or y_5 , but she does not know which. All bids are nonnegative.

(a) Alyssa wants to maximize her payoff given by the expectimax tree below. The leaf nodes show Alyssa's payoff. The nodes are labeled by letters, and the edges are labeled by the bid values x_i and y_i . The maximization node S represents Alyssa, and the branches below it represent each of her bids: x_1, x_2, x_3 . The chance nodes P, Q, R represent Ben, and the branches below them represent each of his bids: y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4, y_5 .




- (i) Suppose that Alyssa believes that Ben would bid any bid with equal probability. What are the values of the chance (circle) and maximization (triangle) nodes?
 - 1. Node P _____
 - 2. Node Q _____
 - 3. Node R _____
 - 4. Node S _____
- (ii) Based on the information from the above tree, how much should Alyssa bid for the bike?


 $\bigcirc x_1 \bigcirc x_2 \bigcirc x_3$

(b) Alyssa does expectimax search by visiting child nodes from left to right. Suppose she knows that the leaf nodes are ordered such that lower payoffs appear to the right of higher payoffs (the leaf nodes of the above diagram is an example of this ordering). Given this information, if it is possible to prune any branches from the tree, mark them below. Otherwise, mark "None of the above."

 (c) Now consider the minimax tree below, whose leaf nodes show the payoff that Alyssa would receive by selling the bike to her friends Yegres Russell and Trauts Levine. The top maximizing triangle corresponds to Alyssa, the minimizing triangles correspond to Ben (Alyssa prepares for the worst case in this question), and the maximizing triangles in the bottom row correspond to a maximization over Yegres and Trauts's bids. The crossed out edges show the edges that Alyssa prunes when doing naive alpha-beta pruning, pruning on equality (e.g. \geq or \leq) and visiting children nodes from left to right.



Fill in the inequality expressions for the values of the labeled nodes A and B.Write ∞ and $-\infty$ if there is no upper or lower bound, respectively.



(d) Suppose node B took on the largest value it could possibly take on and still be consistent with the pruning scheme above. After running the pruning algorithm, Alyssa notices the values of the left and center subtrees have the same minimax value, both 1 greater than the minimax value of the right subtree. Based on this information, what is the numerical value of node C?

 $\bigcirc 1 \quad \bigcirc 2 \quad \bigcirc 3 \quad \bigcirc 4 \quad \bigcirc 5 \quad \bigcirc 6 \quad \bigcirc 7 \quad \bigcirc 8 \quad \bigcirc 9 \quad \bigcirc 10$

(e) For which values of nodes D and E would choosing to bid x_2 be guaranteed to yield the same payoff as choosing to bid x_1 ? Write ∞ and $-\infty$ if there is no upper or lower bound, respectively (this would correspond to the case where nodes D and E can be any value).

